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INTRODUCTION
This Article challenges the claim that law plays a significant role in
legitimating1 the standing social and political order within the
oppressed groups or classes in society.2 The claim rests on an
assumption, occasionally explicit, that a dominant class could not rule,
or at least could not rule as efficiently, without the consent of the
dominated. In other words, a distribution of power that leaves the
dominant group with less than complete control of society compels
the resort to legality.' By the logic of this view, one should not
1. As used here, "legitimation" refers to "the attempt by those engaged in some realm of
social activity to offer a normative justification for their actions." Richard L. Abel, Why Does the
ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 686 (1981) (concluding that rules do not
serve legitimating function if they are impossible to carry out). According to Professor Richard
Abel, the party may offer the justification to those whom the policy will affect or to outside
observers. Id.
2. There is a voluminous body of scholarship positing that law confers legitimacy on the
state or political system. See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 25-49 (1974)
(arguing that dominant groups in society use law to cement their authority); ANTONIO GRAMSci,
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (1971) (theorizing that
successful domination rests on legitimacy and consent of governed); Charles W. Gray, Whatever
Happened to Politics? A Critique of Structuralist Marxist Accounts of State and Law, in MARXISM AND
lAW 196, 196-207 (Piers Beirne & Richard Quinney eds., 1982) (concentrating on Marx's theory
of law and its effect on society); 6 20TH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES, MAX WEBER ON LAW
IN ECONOMYAND SocIETY 334-37, 338-42 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954) (studying impact of law and
economics on society); ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOcIETY 43-242 (1969) (finding
that law is glue that holds society together); cf. Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the
Sociology of Law, 1983 WiS. L. REV. 379, 400-18 (questioning theoretical and empirical validity of
Weberian model of legitimation through law).
3. See, e.g., GENOVESE, supra note 2, at 25 (suggesting that rulers of Western world maintain
dominion over their subjects by representing their governance as embodying interests and
objectives of dominated). In another variation, Unger suggests that the legal order in liberal
societies is a sort of compromise, a "class stand-off," brought about by the incapacity of any one
class to impose its hegemony over all the others. UNGER, supra note 2, at 69.
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expect to find a legalistic style of governance in societies characterized
by extreme imbalances of power, wherein one group or class
thoroughly dominates all others, and the support of the dominated
is therefore inessential to the regime.
Yet heavy reliance on law is characteristic of many colonial societies
that are typified by precisely such extreme imbalances of power.4
The use of law by colonizers to execute and rationalize oppressive
policies, notably the acquisition of native lands for European
settlement, is poorly explained as an effort to gain the consent of
thoroughly dominated indigenous populations.5 Rather, it is argued
4. "Colonialism" refers to European expansion into Asia, Africa, and the Americas that
took place from the fifteenth through the twentieth centuries. Cf MARY E. TOWNSEND,
EUROPEAN COLONIAL EXPANSION SINCE 1871, at 8-9 (1941) (defining modem colonialism as
European expansion from mid-nineteenth century). Conquests of other peoples have by no
means been limited to this era or to European powers. Both the size and the sweep of modem
European colonialism, however, are unprecedented, doubtless because of the "unique alliance
of the state and private enterprise which characterized the late modem period and distinguished
it from its predecessors." Id. at 3-4. Although colonialism is a tremendously variable
phenomenon, classical colonialism, if there is such a thing, involved domination of a non-
European country by a European one, with political control often exercised from the European
metropole. Beverly Gartrell, "Colonialism" and the Fourth World: Notes on Variations in Colonial
Situations, 6 CULTURE 3, 3-4 (1986); Hans Kohn, Reflections on Colonialism, in THE IDEA OF
COLONIALISM 4, 11 (Robert Strausz-Hup6 & Harry W. Hazard eds., 1958).
The term "colonial society," on the other hand, denotes a society in which relatively sharp
social distinctions persist between a settler population established via a colonial project and an
indigenous population. Moshe Semyonov & Andrea Tyree, Community Segregation and the Costs
of Ethnic Subordination, 59 SOC. FORCES 649, 649-50 (1981). These distinctions give rise to
differential access to economic, political, military, cultural, and other tangible and intangible
power resources, whether or not the society remains under the political control of a European
metropole. The interaction between settler and indigenous populations tends to constitute a
prominent social dynamic only when the indigenous population maintains a numerical "critical
mass"; thus, to constitute a "colonial society," the indigenous population should represent some
minimum of the society's total population. Other scholars, in describing "multi-ethnic societies,"
have fixed upon the necessarily arbitrary figure of ten percent, and that figure will be adopted
here. See Semyonov & Tyree, supra, at 656-59 (studying segregation and its effect on Israeli
society); Oren Yiftachel, The Concept of 'Ethnic Democracy' and its Applicability to the Case of Israe4
15 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 125, 128, 130 (1992) (rebutting Professor Smooha's classification of
Israel as ethnic democracy).
5. Virtually all settler-colonial ventures of the last five hundred years grappled with the
moral and legal challenges of acquiring land for European settlement in areas inhabited by
indigenous peoples. Popular memory aside, the history of European settlement is seldom simply
"the story of the unbridled, unabashed, and undisguised power of the conqueror over the
conquered," MichaelJ. Kaplan, Issues in Land Claims, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS'
ESTATE AND CLAIMS 71-72 (Imre Sutton ed., 1985); see also Albie Sachs, Liberating the Land -
Liberating the Law, in ESSAYS ON THIRD WORLD PERSPECIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE 355 (M. L.
Marasinghe & William E. Conklin eds., 1984) ("This history of conquest and pillage and of
violence to serve the ends of exploitation, was the principal element characterizing the phase
of the implantation of the Portuguese colonial system in Mozambique."). Studies of Spanish,
see, e.g., L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD 17-27,
81-124, 143-73 (1989) (evaluating legal, theological, and philosophical justifications of
colonizers); LOUIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FORJUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA
17-36 (1949) (articulating that Spain attempted to make Christian principles prevail in its
conquest of America); Rene Kuppe, The Indigenous Peoples of Venezuela and the National Law, 2
LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 113, 116-28 (1987) (focusing on current structure of national legislation
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concerning Venezuela's indigenous population), English, see, e.g., Russell L. Barsh, Behind Land
Claims: RationalizingDispossession inAnglo-American Law, 1 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 15,20-26, 28-41
(1986) (explaining that British recognized native laws but not native rights); LESTER, ABORIGINAL
LAND RIGHTS: SOME NOTES ON THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH CLAIMS IN NORTH AMERICA
(1988); Gordon R. Woodman, Aboriginal Peoples and the Law of Anglophone West Africa (Excluding
Liberia), 2 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 313, 318-30 (1987) (describing British efforts in West Africa
to create law that British purported to be identical to folk laws), French, see, e.g., AMAL R.
VINOGRADOv, THE AlT NDHIR OF MOROCCO: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF A
BERBER TRIBE 5-13, 79, 93-105 (University of Michigan Anthropological Papers No. 55, 1974)
(studying French classification of Moroccan society as tribal anarchy and barbarism); John
Ruedy, Land Policy in ColonialAlgeria, in 10 NEAR EAST STUDIES 87-97 (J.J. Finkelstein et al. eds.,
1967) (tracing imposition of French law to public lands controlled by indigenous land tenure
rules based on history, economy, and ecology), Dutch, see, e.g., JOHN S. FURNIVALL, COLONIAL
POLICY AND PRACICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BURMA AND NETHERLANDS INDIA 8-10, 131-37,
267-69 (1956) (maintaining that European powers established control in Burma and India by
imposing Western system of law in place of native personal authority systems), colonialism in
many regions of the world, as well as studies of derivative settler-colonial societies such as the
United States, see, e.g., FRANCISJENNNGS, THE INVASION OFAmERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND
THE CANT OF CONQUEST 43-48 (1975) (reviewing European attempts to justify seizure of
American Indian land); Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispossessing
the Indians, in SEVENTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 15, 16-25 (James
M. Smith ed., 1959) (describing moral and legal problems caused by European expansion);
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 98-99 (1990)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN] (justifying dispossession of American Indians on
grounds that native Americans lacked mental capacity to manage own lands); Maivan Lam, The
Imposition of Anglo-Amerian Land Tenure Law on Hawaiians, 23 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 103, 104-15
(1985) (studying court application of land tenure and adverse possession laws to dispossess
native tenants); James W. Springer, American Indians and the Law of Real Property in Colonial New
England, 30 AM.J. LEG. HIST. 25,25-55 (1986) (analyzing American Indian property rights under
New England law), Canada, see, e.g., MENNO BOLDT & J. ANTHONY LONG, THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 18-245 (1985) (posing answer for how
Canada should redress historic injustices to native peoples); Douglas M. Sanders, AboriginalRights
in Canada: An Ovendew, 2 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 177, 178-79 (1987) (explaining British land
gain in Canada through land cessation treaties and myth that Canada was "juridically a vacant
land"), Australia, see, e.g., MARC GUMBERT, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR REASON (1984) (combining
legal and anthropological analysis of aboriginal land rights); NANCY M. WILLIAMS, THE YOLNGU
AND THEIR LAND 139-55 (1986) (accounting for European belief that Aborigines had no
proprietary interest in land); Garth Nettheim, Australian Aborigines and the Law, 2 LAW &
ANTHROPOLOGY 371, 372-400 (1987) (focusing on legal treatment of Australian aboriginal
populations), New Zealand, see, e.g., David Williams, Aboriginal Rights in Aotearoa (New Zealand),
2 LAw & ANTHROPOLOGY 423, 424-40 (1987) (discussing New Zealand legal treatment of Maori),
and South Africa, see, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, The Uses of History: Language, Ideology, and Law in the
United States and South Africa, 22 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 661, 663-72 (1988) (hypothesizing that
government rationalized dispossession of South African natives by claiming it was for natives'
own protection); M.C.J. Olmesdahl, Aboriginal Peoples and South African Law, 2 LAW &
ANTHROPOLOGY 277, 280-306 (1987) (reporting on unequal treatment of native population
under South African law), suggest that the investment of considerable resources in the
construction of moral and legal frameworks legitimating the dispossession of indigenous peoples
of their lands has been, if not the norm in Europe's colonial expansion, certainly more common
than is frequently recognized. The land rights of indigenous peoples have continued to present
challenges to modern colonial and post-colonia states. In some places, recent disputes over
land arose due to new waves of expansion into remote territories into which indigenous peoples
had been pushed, and to increased demands for raw materials and energy. This was the case
in Canada, see Sanders, supra, at 185-87 (finding renewed interest in Aboriginal rights in 1970s),
the United States, see William T. Hagan, Justting Dispossession of the Indian: the Land Utilization
Argument, in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTS: ECOLOGICAL ISSUES IN NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY
65, 77-80 (Christopher Vecsey & Robert W. Venables eds., 1980), and Australia, see Barsh, supm,
at 34-41 (redefining Aboriginal rights after Australian economic growth in 1960s), in the 1960s
and 1970s.
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here, the use of law under such circumstances reflects the needs of
dominant colonial groups to maintain internal cohesion and morale,
and, to a lesser extent, to gain international approval for their
policies.
This argument is substantiated through a detailed examination of
the Zionist movements, and later, Israel's acquisition of Arab lands in
Palestine,6 beginning in the period before Israel's establishment as a
state, and extending to Israel's current program of settlement in the
6. The Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, which historically are part of Egypt and
Syria, respectively, are excluded from this study. See infra note 11 and accompanying text
(noting that Palestine formally became distinct political entity only following its conquest by
British armed forces in World War I and that, prior to British administration, the area had been
part of Ottoman Turkish Empire).
Palestine had been administered under a variety of different schemes, but was always divided
into several geographical sub-units. See NEVILLE E. MANDEL, THE ARABS AND ZIONISM BEFORE
WORLD WAR I xix (1976) (studying Palestine at end of Ottoman period and noting that
Ottomans never treated Palestine as single administrative unit). Nonetheless, both the Ottoman
Government and the Arab inhabitants of the Levant referred to a geographic area as Filastin
("Palestine") that roughly corresponds to the modern state of Israel and the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Id. at xx. In 1920, after several years of British military administration, the League
of Nations' charter assigned Palestine to Great Britain as a Mandate. The mandate eventually
became legally binding on September 29, 1923. QUINCYWRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS 607 n.9 (1930) (making reference to Article 22 of Covenant of League of Nations,
28 June 1919). The mandate system was a compromise arrangement between the imperial
ambitions of France and Britain, id. at 48, and the demands for independence of the residents
of the former colonies of the defeated Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Id. at 62. The
system divided those colonies into Class A, B, and C mandates, in descending order of their
perceived readiness for self-government, and placed them under either British or French
authority for an indefinite "tutelage," after which they would gain national independence. See
NORMAN BENTWICH, THE MANDATES SYSTEM 11-14 (1930). Palestine, alongwith the other former
Ottoman provinces (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Transjordan), were categorized as Class A
mandates. Id.
Britain's task in Palestine was, in retrospect, fatally complicated by the incorporation into the
Palestine Mandate of the Balfour Declaration, an informal and unilateral statement offered in
1917 by then British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour to Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann that the
British Government approved the use of Palestine as ajewish homeland as long as the rights of
non-Jewish citizens living in Palestine were not compromised. WRIGHT, supra, at 600. Article
4 of the Palestine Mandate also provided for the recognition of a quasi-governmental "Jewish
Agency" that would help develop social, economic, and other policy matters that would affect
Jewish citizens and the new Jewish State. See id. at 600-01 (describing functions of Jewish
Agency). The Palestinian Arabs, the region's predominant group, also had aspirations of
political independence within some form of Arab state and were steadfastly, and not
infrequently, violently opposed to Zionism from the outset. See MANDEL, supra, at xviii (noting
that as early as 1891, Arab elite in Jerusalem pressed the Ottoman Government to haltJewish
immigration and land purchases in Palestine); see also MUHAMMAD Y. MUSLIH, THE ORIGINS OF
PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM 69-78 (1988) (studying social forces such as Ottoman ideology,
Western threats, Arab nationalism, and Zionist encroachment and how they shaped Palestinian
nationalism); YEHOSHUA PORATH, THE PALESTrINIAN ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT: FROM RIOTS
TO REBELLION 68-70, 71, 77, 108, 127 (1977) (discussing history of Palestinian Arab National
Movement in decade following 1929 riots); Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Peasant Resistance to Zionism
before World War I, in BLAMING THE VICTIMS 207 (Edward W. Said & Christopher Hitchens eds.,
1988) (examining reaction of Palestinian peasant class to Zionism).
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territories it occupied in the 1967 war with the Arab states.7  This
Article demonstrates that although Israel, like some other colonial
powers,8 has enjoyed virtually unchecked power vis-A-vis the Arab
7. See IBRAHIM ABu-LUGHOD, THE ARAB-ISRAEU CONFRONTATION OFJUNE 1967: AN ARAB
PERSPECTIVE 99 (1970) (compilingworks of previously published Americans of Arab descent that
conflict with commonly accepted conclusions drawn by Western authors); JOHN QUIGLEY,
PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 229 (1990) (examining tension surrounding
Israel from its inception to present). Several months of escalating tensions between Israel, on
one side, and Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, on the other, capped by Egypt's decision to close the
Straits of Tiran (leading from the Gulf of Aqaba into the Red Sea) to Israeli shipping, preceded
the war. QUIGLEY, supra, at 161. In the early hours of'June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it
characterized as a "pre-emptive strike" against Egypt. Id. at 162. Jordan entered the fray later
in the morning of June 5 by shelling and launching air strikes against Israel. Id. Syria shelled
targets in Israel, but otherwise was only peripherally involved in the fighting until June 9, when
Israel attacked Syrian forces in the Golan Heights. Id. at 163. When the fighting ended onJune
10, Israel had occupied EastJerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and
the Golan Heights. Id.; see also Richard B. Parker, The June 1967 War Some Mysteries Explored 46
MIDDLE E. J. 177, 177-97 (Spring 1992) (studying origins of war as well as responses of Soviet
Union and Egypt). While Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt following the 1979 peace
treaty between Israel and Egypt, the other areas have remained under Israeli occupation. See
Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1988, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERITORIES 25, 41.42 (Emma
Playfair ed., 1992) (analyzing Israel's use of law in light of its long-term military occupation of
its territories); HENRY CATrAN,JERUSALEM 115 (1981) (viewing Arab-Israeli conflict from its effect
onJerusaem). Israel exerted its authority over EastJerusalem, the municipal borders of which
were considerably extended into the West Bank, shortly after the cessation of the fighting, and
then formally annexed the city on July 30, 1980. Israel extended its authority over the Golan
Heights and effectively annexed it in December 1981. Roberts, supra, at 41.
8. The state of Israel was founded in 1948 through the efforts of a European-based
colonial project, the Zionist movement. See Teodor Shanin, The Price of Suspension: The Policy
of Stages and the Historical Defeat of Moderate Zionism, in ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS (Uri Davis
et al. eds., 1975). The term "Zionism," derived from Mount Zion inJerusalem, emerged in the
late nineteenth century to designate a heterogeneous group of movements, mostly withinJewish
communities in Central and Eastern Europe, that shared the aim of giving Jews a spiritual,
territorial, or state center, preferably in Palestine, as a response to the problem of European
anti-Semitism. See Maxine Rodinson, Zionism: Theoretical Sketch of an Ideology, in ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTINIANS, supra, at 57, 59. See generally DAVID VITAL, THE ORIGINS OF ZIONISM (1975)
[hereinafter VITAL, ORIGINS] (exploring changes inJewish peoples following Zionist revolution);
DAVID VITAL, ZIONISM: THE CRUCIAL PHASE (1987) [hereinafter VITAL, CRUCIAL PHASE]
(defining political forces that shaped Zionism); DAVID VITAL, ZIONISM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS
(1982) [hereinafter VITAL, FORMATIVE YEARS] (considering phenomenon of Zionism during its
formal organizational stage). Zionism first achieved organizational coherence in the initial
convention of the World Zionist Congress in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland. The delegates to the
Congress, under the sway of ideologist Theodor Herzl's manifesto DerJudenstaat ("The Jewish
State"), adopted the aim of establishing aJewish state in Palestine. VITAL, ZIONISM: FORMATIVE
YEARS, supra, at 1-8. Prior to that, Herzl had considered the viability of colonizing either
Argentina or Uganda, but selected Palestine on the basis of its anticipated appeal to Jews. See
Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, in THE ZIONIST IDEA 204, 222 (Arthur Hertzberg ed., 1959)
(explaining that Herzl selected Palestine over Argentina because Palestine was historic homeland
for Jews and would serve as rallying cry); Morris R. Cohen, Zionism: Tribalism or Liberalism?, in
ZIONISM: THE DREAM AND THE REALITY 48, 49 (Gary V. Smith ed., 1974). The 1897 meeting in
Basel signaled the ascendance of "political Zionism," a largely secular nationalist movement, over
religious and humanist variants of Zionism, which were led, for example, by Ahad Ha'am.
Ha'am advocated establishment of a spiritual center for Jews in Palestine, but eschewed state
power. VITAL, ZIONISM: FORMATIVE YEARS, supra, at 27-28. For purposes of this Article, the
terms "Zionism" and "Zionist movement" will refer to political Zionism, unless otherwise
specified. Israel's non-Jewish minority-almost entirely Palestinian Arab by ethnicity, Kevin
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populations under its authority, it has nonetheless resorted to legality
as a strategy for the appropriation of Arab land and for the general
social control of the area's Arab population. Neither the purpose nor
the effect of this strategy, however, was to legitimate Israel's actions
among its Palestinian subjects. Instead, law was employed to rational-
ize and defend acquisition of Arab lands for two principal audiences:
the Israeli public itself, and, secondarily, the international community.
If the oft-claimed connection between law and political legitimacy
seems weakest with respect to colonial societies, it may be no stronger
in non- or post-colonial societies. This Article concludes by pointing
to the absence of empirical verification for law's legitimating role
within marginal groups and classes in even non- or post-colonial
societies.' Thus, this Article suggests that law in its legitimating
Avruch, The Society and Its Environment, in ISRAEL A COUNTRY STUDY, 83, 120 (Helen Metz ed.,
1990)--composed 18.1% of the country's total population of 5,037,000 in 1991. ISRAEL
YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC, 1991/1992, at 104. Thus Israel, whether viewed discretely or together
with the West Bank (with a Palestinian population of 990,000, including residents of East
Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip (with a Palestinian population of 650,000), clearly meets the
demographic profile of a colonial society. McDowall, A Profile of the Population of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, 2J. REFUGEE STUD. 20, 21 (1989).
Persistent sharp distinctions between Palestinian Arabs and IsraeliJews give rise to differential
access to most power and other resources in society. Thus, Israel clearly meets the definition
of a "colonial society" offered above. For other scholars who have applied models of colonialism
to Israel, see MAXINE RODINSON, ISRAEL A COLONiAL-SETTLER STATE? 35-78 (1973) (distinguish-
ing Israel from other colonial empires); GERSHON SHAFIR, LAND, LABOR, AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE IsRAELI-PALESTrNLN CONFLICT 1882-1914, at 8-12 (1989) (arguing that Palestine shares
characteristics of other European settlement colonies); ELiA T. ZUREIK, THE PALESISNIANs IN
ISRAEL A STUDY IN INTERNAL COLONIALISM 76-79, 143-44 (1979) (researching cultural and
psychological characteristics of Arabs and Jews).
Zionist writers have adamantly rejected the colonial appellation for Israel. Avneri, for
example, argues that unlike colonials, whose aim was to exploit the land and send its profits
home, the Zionists came to settle the land and make it their home. ARIEH L. AVNERI, THE
CLAIM OF DISPOSSESSION: JEWISH LAND-SETrLEMENT AND THE ARABS 1878-1948, at 279-80 (1984).
This description of colonialism encompasses only onevariant, or perhaps phase, of colonialism,
which Israel appears not to resemble. Nonetheless, as will become clear, Zionist colonization
of Palestine shared many features of colonial ventures in other parts of the world. Moreover,
Avneri relies on a view of colonialism reconstructed through hindsight, and underestimates the
extent to which a shield ofjustificatory ideology preceded even the most rapacious colonial
ventures. At the times these ventures unfolded, their perpetrators did not view themselves as
robbers and racists, but as bearers of civilization and progress to unschooled heathens and
primitives. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Introduction to EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW 8 (W.J.
Mommsen &J.A. de Moor eds., 1992) (characterizing conquest as cultural mission).
9. Indeed, the small but growing body of ethnographic studies of popular attitudes toward
law in the United States report findings consistent with those presented here. See generally SALLY
E. MERRY, GETTINGJUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS
AMERICANS (1990) (contrasting perceptions of plaintiffs and court personnel toward court
system); Sally E. Merry, Everyday Understandings of the Law in Working-Class America 13 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 253 (1986) (studying legal ideology of American society through observation of
city residents using courts for personal and business reasons); Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All
Over'" Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 343
(1990) (examining intrusiveness of law into lives of welfare poor); Austin Sarat & William L.F.
Felstiner, Lauyers and Legal ConsciouSness: Law Talk in the Divorce Layer's Ofice, 98 YALE LJ. 1663
(1989) (focusing on role of lawyers in legitimating legal institutions); Barbara Yngevesson,
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function may be effective chiefly, if not exclusively, among those
proximate to the centers of social and political power.
0
Part I commences with a discussion of the centrality of land
acquisition to the Zionist enterprise, and the various ideological
constructs that Zionists used to rationalize their goal. Part II lays a
backdrop necessary for the understanding of subsequent sections by
describing the status of land tenure in Palestine and the program of
Zionist land acquisition in the pre-state period. Part III examines the
continuation of this program following the Zionist movement's
accession to state power, and the exploitation of the opportunity for
land acquisition presented by the mass flight of Palestinians from
their homes during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Part IV reviews the
laws used by Israel to acquire Palestinian lands and the role of Israeli
courts in this land acquisition program. Part V recounts the
continuation of Israel's acquisition of Palestinian lands in the
territories occupied in the 1967 war. Part VI explores the effect of
Israel's resort to law to acquire Arab lands on Palestinians, on the
international community, and on the Israeli public, as well as the
limitations on legal justifications for land acquisition. This Article
concludes that Israel has employed a complex legal regime to
"finesse" the apparent conflict between its need to acquire land and
its democratic impulses, and questions whether law is ever effective,
in any society, in gaining legitimacy for a government among those it
injures and oppresses.
I. LAND AND THE ZIONIST ENTERPRISE
The alienation of Arab land in Palestine began in the late period
of Ottoman rule" when Jewish individuals and private institutions
Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Cultur 98 YALE LJ. 1689 (1989) (analyzing
anthropology and literature to determine their role in shaping law).
10. In so doing, the author hopes to validate the assertioil by anthropologist Sally Engle
Merry that, while studies of colonialism focus on the mechanics of domination at the fringe of
the world stage, "the way in which European societies expanded and endeavored to dominate
culturally distinct groups indicates much about the nature of European society itself," and that
attention to "the role law played in the establishment of colonial control in the past and at the
periphery... provides insights into processes of domination in the present and in the core."
SeeSally E. Merry, Law and Colanialism, 25 LAW & Soc'y REV. 889, 890 (1991) (emphasizing that
domination occurred at "periphery of the world stage" because European nations did not have
enough power to effectively dominate their neighbors but did have such power over
unsophisticated societies that were not considered major actors on world stage).
11. See MOSHE MA'OZ, STUDIES ON PALESTINE DURING THE OTrOMAN PERIOD XV, 375 (1975)
(explaining that Ottomans ruled Palestine from 1516 until British military forces occupied it
during World War I). At its apogee, the Ottoman Empire, which was a Turkish Muslim dynasty,
encompassed Hungary, virtually all of Southeastern Europe, Anatolia, and most of the Arab
world. 1 STANFORD SHAw, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY 1 (1976).
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started to purchase land from Arab owners. 2 The purchases
accelerated considerably during the thirty-one years of British rule
(1917-48),"3 increasingly as part of a coordinated effort directed by
the central organizations of the Zionist movement with the conscious
intent of establishing a territorial nucleus for the creation of a Jewish
state. 14 By far the greatest number of land transfers from Arab to
Jewish ownership occurred after the Zionist movement gained control
of the apparatuses of state with the creation of Israel in 1948.1'
Since that time, Israeli control has replaced Arab control of large
areas of land, usually through the medium of a relatively complex
legal regime pieced together in the initial years of Israeli indepen-
dence. 6 This process continues today in somewhat modified form,
especially in those areas under Israeli authority in which significant
Arab private ownership in land still exists, such as the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip.'
7
12. See MA'OZ, supra note 11, at xv, 375 (commenting that Arabs opposed Jewish purchase
of land); SHAW, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that sizable Jewish population existed in Palestine
by turn of century).
13. See infta note 14 (noting that Zionist purchases of land predated period of British
Mandate rule).
14. ZIONISM: THE DREAM AND THE REALITY, supra note 8, at 16. The intent to establish a
Jewish state, and Zionist purchases toward that end, certainly predated the years of British
mandatory rule. See supra note 4. Yet the focus on the purchase of contiguous plots forJewish
settlement, requiring cooperation and planning among Zionist institutions and individuals, came
only in response to the civil strife in Palestine in 1929, when dispersed Jewish communities fell
victim to attacks by Palestinian Arabs protesting Zionist colonization. KENNETH W. STEIN, THE
LAND QUESTION IN PALESTINE, 1917-1939, at 65 (1984).
15. Avruch, supra note 8, at 93. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General
Assembly passed Resolution 181 (II), which provided for the division of Palestine into two states,
oneJewish and one Arab, and for the establishment of an international administration for the
city ofJerusalem. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 322-43, U.N. Doc. A/364
(1947). The Zionist movement accepted the plan for the partition of Palestine, but the Arab
residents of Palestine vehemently resisted. As civil unrest in the country grew, Great Britain
announced its inability to implement Resolution 181 and its intent to withdraw permanently
from Palestine on May 15, 1948. JACOB C. HuREwITz, THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE 311 (1950).
The day before the British announcement, Zionist leaders had declared the independence of
the State of Israel. Id. at 314. Within hours, five Arab countries (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,Jordan,
and Egypt) declared war on the new state. Id. at 315. In the ensuing fighting, lands slated to
become the Arab state were absorbed either by Israeli forces advancing from the coastal region
to the east (and later annexed by Israel), or were occupied by Egypt (the Gaza Strip) or
annexed byJordan (the West Bank). Id. at 318. The city ofJerusalem was divided, the western
half of the city falling under Israeli jurisdiction, and the eastern half under Jordanian
jurisdiction. Id. at 319. Jordan subsequently annexed the West Bank, including EastJerusalem,
while the Egyptian military government placed the Gaza Strip under martial law. Id. at 318-19.
16. ESTER I. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967-1982, at
152-56 (1985).
17. Avruch, supra note 8, at 93. Officially barred until 1979, purchases in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip by private Israeli individuals or land development companies have become a
significant aspect of the overall process of the alienation of Palestinian lands. COHEN, supra note
16, at 155. As in Israel itself, however, the Israeli Government (military, in the case of the
Occupied Territories) has instigated the largest proportion of transfers through methods that
will be discussed more fully below. Continuing settlement activity in and around the Old City
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A. Motivations for Zionist Land Acquisition
Zionism's movement to colonize Palestine, like all other colonial
ventures,"8 has its own unique characteristics. For example, unlike
early English settlers in the United States, whose religious utopianism
and flight from sectarian persecution are otherwise reminiscent of
Zionism, Jewish settlers conceptualized their arrival in Palestine as a
"return" to a land that belonged to them by historical or divine
right.1 9 That Zionism was impelled in significant measure by high
ideals, by the notion of liberatingJews from injustice and persecution,
rather than by imperial and economic aims,2" was also unusual,
of Jerusalem, while involving comparatively little territory, nonetheless excites great political
controversy. Michael Dumper, Israeli Settlement in the Old City ofJerusalem, 21 J. PALESTINE STUD.
32, 37-38, 40-52 (1992); Anita Vitullo, Erasing Arab Jerusalem, 175 MIDDLE E. REP. 24, 24-27
(1992); ISRAEL YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC, 1991/1992, at 230-31.
18. No two colonial ventures have been identical. On the contrary, each has varied
according to the historical period in which the venture unfolded, the colonial power's
philosophy and strategy of rule, the venture's fit within a grander colonial scheme, the venture's
particular needs for land and labor, the relative size, characteristics, and patterns of resistance
of colonized populations, the natural terrain and resources of the colony, and a multitude of
other factors. See Gartrel1, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining colonialism to be variable phenome-
non); Merry, supra note 10, at 891 (noting that role of law in colonial process varied greatly over
time, but was usually central to colonizing process); see alsoJorg Fisch, Law as a Means to an End:
Some Remarks on the Function of European and Non-European Law in the Process ofEuropean Expansion,
in EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW, supra note 8, at 20-26 (describing three distinct types of
colonies, "colonies of settlement," "commercial and tributary colonies," and "feudal colonies").
19. See QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 66 (discussing Zionist justification for espoused claim of
right to Palestine). In the words of David Ben-Gurion, a central figure in the pre-state Zionist
movement and Israel's first Prime Minister. "We are in Palestine as of right. We are at home
here. Ever since the Jewish people has existed, Palestine has been, remains, and will remain
their national home-and to one's home one can always return as of right without having to ask
anybody else's leave." David Ben-Gurion, The Only Solution of the Jewish Problem, in 1 PALESTINE
YEARBOOK 11, 19 (1945). Zionism's mytho-historical tracing of the roots of the Jewish nation
to antiquity, on the other hand, is typical of nationalism, which despite its objective modernity,
nearly always depicts itself as ancient. See, e.g., B. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 9 (rev. ed.
1991) (identifying nationalism as cultural artifact that commands and arouses deep emotional
attachment); NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES AND THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL CULTURES xi (Richard
G. Fox ed., 1990) (describing how political activity of ethnic groups contributed to growth of
nationalism); THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1-4 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983)
(noting that, although tradition surrounding British monarchy appears ancient, traditions that
appear old are often quite recent in origin and are sometimes invented). This tendency to
project claims of nationhood backward in time reverberates in some academic work on the
region. Arieh Avneri, for example, referring, apparently unselfconsciously, to the expulsion of
the Jews from Palestine in the first century A.D., states: "After the nation oflsraellost its indepen-
dence, there were many expeditions of conquest, each of which introduced a layer of new
settlers into the country's population." AVNERI, supra note 8, at 11 (emphasis added). Similarly,
the Biblical injunction that man "occupy the earth, increase, and multiply," although not a
mandate to settle a specific locale, was one of the primary rationalizations employed by the
Puritans for the appropriation of Native American lands. See Chester E. Eisinger, The Puritans'
Justificationfor TakingtheLand, 84 ESSEx INST. HIST. COLL. 131-43 (1948) (describing ideological,
theological, and moral justifications Puritans offered for dispossessing Indians from American
lands).
20. QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 5. Still, Zionist leaders actively courted imperialist powers and
appealed directly to their strategic and economic interests as a means to achieve Zionist ideals.
Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism and the leader of the world Zionist
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although not unique. The Puritan colonists of New England, for
example, came to America with lofty ideals of creating a "visible
Kingdom of God."21
Yet, for all its arguably distinctive features, the Zionist movement
resembled most other settler-colonial ventures in facing the initial
challenge of obtaining land for settlement. While small numbers of
religious Jews, mostly from Europe, had been making their way to
Palestine for centuries,22 the organized Jewish Community in
Palestine, the Old Yishuv,2" in the nineteenth century was small,
concentrated in a relatively few urban centers (primarily Jerusalem,
Hebron, Safad, and Tiberias), and possessed negligible holdings of
land. 4 The community subsisted mainly on commerce and on alms,
or "halukka," from Jews abroad.' Few members of the Old Yishuv
were adherents of the nascent ideology of Zionism," which was still
organization, for example, argued to European leaders that a Zionist presence in Palestine
would "constitute part of the wall of defense against Asia; we would serve as an outpost of
civilization against barbarism." Herzl, supra note 8, at 52; see also QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 7
("The idea of Zionism, which is a colonial idea, should be easily and quickly understood in
England."); ALAN tR TAYLOR, PRELUDE TO ISRAEL: AN ANALYSIS OF ZIONIST DIPLOMACY, 1897-
1947 v-viii (1961) (tracing political and cultural origins of Zionist movement, concentrating on
diplomatic activities of its leadership); Walid Khalidi, The Jewish-Ottoman Land Company: Herl's
Blueprint for the Colonization of Palestine, 22J. PALESTINE STUD. 30, 44 (1993) (noting that Herzl
drafted charter for prospective "Jewish-Ottoman Land Company" that closely traced models of
British and Dutch East India companies); RODINSON, supra note 8, at 28-33 (suggesting that
although Zionist colonial project was sponsored by political movement that spanned European
national boundaries, Britain, through its incorporation of Balfour Agreement into terms of
Mandate and creation ofJewish Agency, performed function of colonial sponsor state for Zionist
movement).
21. YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA, PURITAN JUSTICE AND THE INDIAN: WHITE MAN'S LAW IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1763, at 8 (1986) (quoting EDMOND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY 3-4
(1966)).
22. MANDEL, supra note 6, at xxiii.
23. See CHARLEs S. KAMEN, LITTLE COMMON GROUND: ARAB AGRICULTURE AND JEWISH
SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE, 1920-1948, at 8 (1991) (explaining that"Yishuv," literally "settlement"
in Hebrew, is term used by Jewish settlers to refer to organizedJewish community in Palestine);
see alsoJEFF HALPER, BETwEEN REDEMPTION AND REVIVAL: THEJEWISH YISHUV OFJERUSALEM IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6-9 (1990) (noting that "Old Yishuv," which is traditional pre-Zionist
Jewish community, is distinguished from "New Yishuv," which is composed of Zionist settlers).
24. KAMEN, supra note 23, at 8.
25. See Mo'she Ma'oz, Changes in the Position of the Jewish Communities of Palestine and Syria in
Mid-Nineteenth Century, in STUDIES ON PALESTINE DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD, supra note 11,
at 142-63 (stating that in 1850, Jewish population of Palestine was 13,000 and that, in 1880,
about time that Zionist colonization began, number had risen to 14,731); see also JUSTIN
MCCARTHY, THE POPULATION OF PALESTINE 10 (1990) (acknowledging difficulty in determining
exact extent ofJewish landholdings in Palestine in same period, but nevertheless concluding that
they were minute). In 1900, after nearly a decade of Zionist colonization,Jewish land ownership
in Palestine was 220,700 dunums, equivalent to 0.8% of later Mandate Palestine's 25 million
dunums. 1 A SURVEY OF PALESTINE 244, 372 (1991). A dunum, the local unit of measure for
real property, equals 0.227, or roughly one-quarter, of an acre. ABRAHAM GRANOVSKY, LAND
POLICY IN PALESTINE ix (1940) (explaining evolution of land values in history of speculations and
problems with national land policy in Israel).
26. ZIONISM: THE DREAM AND THE REALIY, supra note 8, at 13.
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a minority viewpoint even within the European Jewish communities
in which it originated.27 Thus, the Palestinian Jewish community
provided neither a tangible nor ideological base for expansion and
development. The creation of such a base was the primary task of the
Zionist movement during the periods of Ottoman and British rule.
Zionist leaders were fully aware that acquisition of a land base in
Palestine would be essential to the realization of the Zionist pro-
ject." They viewed control of land as an essential component of
independence and stability in the prospective society.29 In 1940,
Abraham Granovsky (Granott), head of the Jewish National Fund
(JNF),° wrote:
27. ZIONISM: THE DREAM AND THE REALITY, supra note 8, at 16. Many Eastern European
Jews saw anti-Semitism as an example of racist persecution endemic to class-based societies, and
responded by joining either the Communist movement or the Bund. See Uri Davis, Foreword to
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that Bund was Jewish socialist
organization that insisted on positive value of national and cultural pluralism and "embraced
the idea of a Jewish people, differentiated by culture, history and tradition within a Socialist
commonwealth of nations"). Both communism and the Bund had greater numbers ofJewish
adherents than Zionism until World War II, during which the Bund was physically decimated
and the Holocaust lent credence to the Zionist claim that survival could only be assured through
the medium of aJewish state. Id. There continue to be leftistJews critical of Zionism, both in
and outside of Israel. See, e.g., ARIE BOBER, THE OTHER ISRAEL: THE RADICAL CASE AGAINST
ZIONISM 2-4 (1972) (compiling statements issued by Israeli Socialist Organization and articles
written by its members detailingJewish-Arab relations, social conditions, and influence of Israel-
Arab war); URI DAVIS, ISRAEL AN APARTHEID STATE 13 (1987) (criticizing racial segregation
between Jews and non-Jews in Palestine); NATHAN WEINSTOCK, ZIONISM: FALSE MESSIAH 22
(1979) (providing socioeconomic explanation for Zionist movement). For an analysis of the
strong socialist tendencies within Zionism, see YOSEF CORNY, ZIONISM AND THE ARABS 1882-1948:
A STUDY OF IDEOLOGY 81 (1987) (asserting that socialist tendencies became salient during pre-
state period and continued, after Israel's establishment in 1948, to dominate Israeli politics
through Labor Party); Ben Halpern &Jehuda Reinharz, The Cultural and Social Background of the
Second Aliyah, 27 MIDDLE E. STUD. 487, 495 (1991) (noting strong socialist tendencies within
Zionism, particularly associated with Second Aliyah of 1904-1914 and relating that "aliyah" means
"rising up" in Hebrew and connotes waves of Zionist immigration into Palestine). For analysis
ofJewish religious opposition to Zionism, see Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, Israel's Ultra-Orthodox: A
Jewish Ghetto Within the Zionist State, 179 MIDDLE E. REP. 22, 23 (1992) (relating that ultra-
orthodox Jews from Germany and Eastern Europe, who opposed Zionist definition of Jews as
nation and cleaved to ancient tradition of Jews as religious community waiting for messiah,
formed anti-Zionist movement Agudat Israel).
28. See QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 4-5 (noting central role of land to realization of Zionist
project); see also DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 49 (1990)
(discussing Zionist leaders' belief thatJewish ownership and control of land was needed both
as resource for settlement of Jews and in order to transform social and economic structure of
Jewish people into successfulJewish state); Raya Adler, The Tenants ofWadi Hawarith and the Land
Question, 20 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 197, 214-17 (1988) (reviewing role of tenants of Wadi
Hawarith, and descendants of first Bedouin tribe, in affecting Palestinian Arab national
movement in history ofJewish land purchase).
29. QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 4-5.
30. The JNF was originally created as a corporation under English law, and its primary
function was to purchase lands in the prescribed region (Palestine, Syria, any parts of Turkey
in Asia, and the Sinai peninsula), for purposes of settling Jews in these lands. Uri Davis &
Walter Lehr, And the Fund Still Lives, 7J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1978, at 3, 4-7.
Following the establishment of Israel, the "World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency
(Status) Law of 1952" and the "Keren Keyemeth Leisrael Law of 1953" formalized the
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The realization that the first step in the struggle for a Jewish
Homeland is the struggle for land is one of the basic principles of
Zionism. Land is the indispensable foundation of any human
activity. Without it, there can be no agriculture, no industry, no
urban settlement. The first task of a landless people is to provide
this foundation for its existence."'
Indeed, the "conquest of the land" was one of the pillars of the
Zionist effort.
3 2
The Zionist leadership was also aware that the indigenous Arab
population would steadfastly oppose acquisition of land in Palestine
as a base for the establishment of a Jewish state. 3 Dr. Yitzhak
Epstein, in an address to the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905,
queried, "Therefore, as we come to possess the land, does not the
question immediately arise: What will become of the Arab fellahin
[peasants] whose lands we buy?"34  Concerns about the impact of
Zionist colonization on the indigenous Arab population, and the
latter's anticipated hostile reaction, caused humanist Zionists, such as
author Ahad Ha'am, to question the propriety of seeking statehood,
as opposed to a home for Jews in Palestine that would serve as a
spiritual center.35
Such views, however, remained in the minority. As Israeli sociolo-
gist Gershon Shafir points out, the offer of land may have been a
necessary inducement to attract settlers in numbers sufficient to
relationships between the state and the various institutions of the Zionist movement. Id. at 7.
In 1960, the Knesset passed the "Israel-Lands Law," which spells out the respective powers and
responsibilities of theJNF and the state in implementing land distribution in Israel. Id. at 108.
As a result, theJNF became one of the principal holders of public lands in Israel, administering
over 90% of the area of the country. Id. at 69-74. As one commentator has remarked:
The existence of separate,Jewish institutions such as theJNF, that control vast resources
and do not include Arabs in the decisionmaking process, enables the government to
use the legal system to transfer resources from the public domain to the Jewish sector.
It does this without discriminating in the law between Jews and Arabs, but by assigning
responsibility for the disposition of these resources (especially lands and funds from
abroad) to institutions which are historical creations of the Zionist movement with
personnel imbued with the desire to consolidate and strengthen the Jewish community
in Eretz Ysrael.
IAN LUsTIcK, ARABS IN AJEWISH STATE: ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL MINORITY 109 (1980).
31. GRANOVSKY, supra note 25, at 3; see also ABRAHAM GRANOTr, THE LAND ISSUE IN
PALESTINE 12 (1936) (advocating thatJews return to vocation that is source of all production:
agriculture).
32. See Davis, supra note 27, at 8 (naming Hebrew conquest of land, labor, and means of
production as three pillars of Zionist effort).
33. NEIL CAPLAN, PALESTINE JEWRY AND THE ARAB QUESTION 3-5 (1978) (explaining that
large segment of Zionists viewed Arab question as serious demographic, political and physical
threat to Zionism).
34. Yitzak Epstein, A Hidden Question, 28 NEw OUTLOOK 27, 29 (1985).
35. SeeAhad Ha'am, After the BalfourDedlaration, in ZIONISM: THE DREAM AND THE REALrrY,
supra note 8, at 83; Hans Kohn, Ahad Ha'am: Nationalist with a Difference, in ZIONISM: THE
DREAM AND THE REALrIY, supra note 8, at 21.
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mount a credible claim to Jewish sovereignty in Palestine:
Palestine, however deeply it was embedded in the Jewish psyche,
was a less desirable European settlement society than many of the
alternatives available to Jewish immigrants. As long as other shores
were open only a small percentage of ashkenazi [Eastern Europe-
an] Jews chose Palestine .... To attract voluntary Jewish immi-
grants and attain the critical demographic mass necessary to
establish a claim to parts of Palestine, a popular social program
remained essential... [and] the continued provision of "free land"
by the JNF was indispensable in this respect. 6
These pragmatic considerations also dovetailed with ambitions, held
by influential groups within the Zionist movement, that went beyond
mere Jewish settlement in Palestine; these groups aimed at restructur-
ing the Jewish society, which historically had been barred from
ownership of land, by giving it an agricultural base.-7
36. SHAFIR, supra note 8, at 198. Shafir notes, however, that the majority of land purchased
by the Zionist colonization organizations continued to be owned by the organizations, which
held the land in trust "for the entire Jewish people." Because the colonization organizations
controlled much of the land, the inducement to settlers was free access to land rather than
individual enrichment through outright land grants. Id.
37. John Ruedy, Dynamics of Land Alienation, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE 119
(Ibrahim Abu-Lughod ed., 1971). According to Ruedy:
The conditioning of Jews in Europe ... had taught them that dignity and honor
flowed from land, land from which European Christian society for a millennium and
a half had systematically excluded theJew. Forced into the urban ghetto and confined
exclusively to city occupations, the Zionist Jew came to see himself and his culture as
distorted, warped, lacking in balance; nor, of course, had his considerable urban and
village accomplishments over the centuries ever permitted him to own any country.
Cultural accomplishments were politically ephemeral, but land ownership had an aura
of permanence.
Id. at 127.
Ber Borochov, a Marxist-influenced Zionist, coined the term "inverted pyramid" as a metaphor
for the structure ofJewish society, arguing that reestablishing a more typically shaped society was
a necessary antecedent to further revolutionary transformation. See BER BOROCHOV,
NATIONALISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE 17 (1937) (asserting that formula for success of Jewish
national movement required synthesis of nationalism and class struggle); see also Amos
Perlmutter, Dov Ber Borochov: A Marxist Zionist Ideologist, 5 MIDDLE E. STUD. 32, 40-43 (1969)
(explaining Borochov's formula for socialist-Zionist movement and its role in colonization of
Palestine).
The notion of the "redemption of Jewish labor" was the rallying cry of the Second Aliyah, a
term used to describe the second wave of immigrants to Israel and Palestine in 1904-14. CORNY,
supra note 27, at 12. The "redemption ofJewish labor' was the unifying theme expressed by the
Second Aliyah immigrants who believed Jewish manual labor to be the vital factor in national
revival. Id. These immigrants are credited with leading jews to national independence by
preparing the course for the newJewish society. Id. at 13. Referring to these immigrants, Yosef
Corny wrote:
The leading force among the newcomers was a group of several thousand young
people with revolutionary ideas. These secular, romantic young people came singly,
without families; some of them were socialists. They disagreed as to whether the class
struggle was the way to build the Jewish society, but agreed that Jewish labour was a
vital factor in the national revival process.
Id. at 12; see also SHAFIR, supra note 8, at 6 (cautioning against weighing ideological factors too
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B. Zionist Settlement and "Arab Feudalism"
Justifying theJewish settlement in Palestine to the indigenous Arabs
and to the world was an important, even necessary task in the pre-
state period because the Zionist movement was forced to operate
under the authority of two foreign state powers: the Ottoman
Empire, and later, Great Britain. 8 Again, while recognizing the
indisputably distinctive features of the Zionist colonization movement,
as discissed below, it is clear that its leaders fixed upon a number of
ideas and images, some implicit and others explicit, that have been
used to rationalize colonial ventures in many other parts of the world.
This challenge was especially great during the Mandate period 9
due to explicit British commitments, canonized in the Palestine
Mandate, to advance the interests of both Jewish and Arab residents
of Palestine.' Although subsequent events gave rise to further
rationales for Zionist settlement and land acquisition in Palestine, it
heavily when interpreting forms that Zionist colonization assumed in Palestine and arguing
convincingly that much of specificity of Israeli society is due precisely to Zionist movement's
response to conflict betweenJewish immigrant-settlers and Palestinian Arab inhabitants of land
and not to ideological commitments in abstract); Davis, supra note 27, at 7-8 (mentioning that
other ideological trends within Zionism at time were not averse to exploiting, rather than
displacing, Arab agricultural labor).
In practice, even Jewish settlers committed to the "redemption of Jewish labor" sometimes
resorted to using Arab labor. Rishon-le-Zion, established in 1882 as the first permanent Zionist
settlement in Palestine, was run by ajewish advisory staff and a small number of landowners who
employed mostly Arab laborers. STANLEY B. GREENBERG, RACE AND STATE IN CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVES 359 (1980). Since 1967, Israeli employers,
particularly in agriculture and construction, have relied heavily on cheap, politically and legally
vulnerable Palestinian day laborers from the Occupied Territories. See, e.g., Samir A. Saleh, The
Effects of Israeli Occupation on the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in INTIFADA: PALESTNE
AT THE CROSSROADS 4-6 (Uamal R. Nassar & Roger Heacock eds., 1990) (explaining use of day
laborers by Israeli employers and defining "Intf[add' as right of Palestinians in West Bank and
Gaza to determine their destiny, which entails termination of Israeli occupation of West Bank
and Gaza); Toby Shelley, Palestinian Migrant Workers in IsraeL From Repression to Rebellion, in ADEL
SAMARA, PALESTINE: PROFILE OF AN OCCUPATION 32, 56 (1989) (noting that in 1980s, interest
in welfare of migrant workers increased and unionization efforts developed).
38. MANDEL, supra note 6, at 3-11 (exploring limitations and restrictions Ottoman and
British rulers placed on Jewish settlement). The Zionist appeal to the Ottoman Sultan was
primarily based on promises thatJewish financial resources would be mobilized globally to lend
assistance to his financially strapped empire. Id. at 14-16. This appeal fell flat. SeeKhalidi, supra
note 20, at 30-47 (describing Theoder Herzl's failed pitch to Ottoman administrators in 1903).
Ottoman leaders viewed Zionism as likely to foment nationalistic sentiments already stirring in
the Levant, and feared that Zionist colonization might serve as a bridgehead in Palestine for its
principal European rival, Russia. MANDEL, supra note 6, at 16. Indeed at this time, a majority
of Zionists were native Russians. These concerns led the Ottoman Sultan to restrict Jewish
immigration and land purchases in Palestine in the late nineteenth century. Id.; see also Khalidi,
supra note 20, at 30-47 (noting thatJewish colonization of Palestine did occur during Ottoman
period in spite of Ottomans' preferences and reflected increasing impotence of Ottoman
administration to enforce its will in outlying provinces during waning years of Empire).
39. "Mandate period" refers to the 26 years of British rule in Palestine from 1922 to 1948.
MANDEL, supra note 6, at xx.
40. MANDEL, supra note 6, at xviii, xix; see supra note 6 (discussing incorporation of Balfour
Declaration into Palestine Mandate).
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was during the Mandate period that Zionist leaders mapped the main
strategy of justification for the movement. Zionist functionaries and
agents associated with the Jewish Agency4' churned out position
papers, reports, and proposals seeking to justify Jewish settlement in
Palestine and to convince Mandate officials of the compatibility of
their project with British interests and obligations.
42
Among the ideological tools employed most ubiquitously by
colonial movements in their efforts to justify acquisition of native
lands were notions of "progress" and hierarchical schemes of social
evolution. These schemes ranked sedentary, agriculturally based, and
Christian European societies at the pinnacle of civilization, and
designated all other societies as vestiges of an earlier, primitive stage
of human development. 4  Colonial ventures imagined that Europe-
an societies were dynamic, rational, scientific, and progressive, while
non-European societies were thought to be static, moribund, and
bound to endless self-replication by blind and irrational adherence to
custom."
Colonists constructed myths of native peoples engaged in hunting
and gathering over wide expanses of land. These myths held that the
native peoples' occupation of the land was wasteful and, in a sense,
therefore unjust.45 In this view, land rights were, according to John
41. See supra note 6 (explaining that function of quasi-governmental body, Jewish Agency,
was principally to advise and cooperate with administration of Palestine to facilitate interests of
Jewish population in Palestine).
42. KAMEN, supra note 23, at 5.
43. SeeWILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 5, at 3-8 (describing rationale employed
by Americans to justify colonization of land inhabited by American Indians). Williams writes:
In seeking the conquest of the earth, the Western colonizing nations of Europe and
the derivative settler-colonized states produced by their colonial expansion have been
sustained by a central idea: that the West's religion, civilization, and knowledge are
superior to the religions, civilizations, and knowledge of non-Western peoples. This
superiority, in turn, is the redemptive source of the West's presumed mandate to
impose its vision of truth on non-Western peoples.
Id. Concepts such as "discovery" and "settlement" seem to derive from the colonialists'
hierarchical ordering of societies. JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 32. As FrancisJennings observes:
The implications of this use of the word settlement are worth notice. First, it vaguely
implies that preexisting populations did not classify as humanity, for it is not used to
apply to Indians; only Europeans "settle." It also dismisses the Indians' ability to wrest
a generally satisfactory living from the "wilderness" and to travel over established trails
to known destinations.
Id.
44. See I RAYMOND ARON, MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 77-95 (1968). The
quintessential ideologist of the notion of progress was the Frenchman Auguste Comte, the father
of positive philosophy. Id.
45. See EMMERICH DE VATrEL. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAw
85-87 (1758) (providing first articulation of this concept as legal principle). De Vattel, the
prominent international lawyer of the Enlightenment, wrote:
[T]hose that pursue an erratic life, and live by hunting rather than cultivate their
lands, usurp more extensive territories than with a reasonable share of labor they
[Vol. 43:467482
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Locke, established by productive agricultural use of the land:
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has
provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property ....
As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, and can use of the
product of, so much is his property.46
In Palestine, European-born Zionists encountered an Arab society
that was, for the most part, undeniably sedentary and agricultural, 7
and that possessed medium to large urban centers and developed
court systems.4 Thus, the imagined stark contrasts between Europe-
ans and their colonial subjects that served so conveniently to justify
dispossession of native populations in the New World, Africa, and
would have occasion for, and have, therefore, no reason to complain if other nations,
more industrious, and too closely confined, come to take possession of a part of those
lands.
Id. This idea was echoed in the writings of colonial administrators and in the judgments of
colonial courts from Australia to America. See Report of ReverendJedediah Morse to the Secretary of
War, in ALPHEUS SNOW, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES 125 (1921) (articulating concept that
ownership of land flows legally to those who cultivate land and work soil). A government
emissary wrote from the western American frontier to the Secretary of War in 1821:
When the hunter state, from whatever cause, is relinquished and the agricultural state
adopted, the Indians are entitled to no more of their territories, so changed, than is
requisite to give them, from cultivating the earth, a support equal to that which they
derived from their whole territory in the hunter state. The advantages of the
agricultural over the hunter state are presumed to be ajust equivalent to the Indians
for the lands they are constrained to resign to the civilized state.
Id.
European colonizers often simply ignored, or consciously concealed, the reality that the native
populations themselves were greatly dependent on agriculture, and were, in the first centuries
of settlement at least, superior to Europeans in this endeavor. See, e.g., JENNINGS, supra note 5,
at 60; Washburn, supra note 5, at 15; Thomas R. Wessel, Agriculture, Indians, and American History,
in THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PAST AND PRESENT 1-9 (Roger L. Nichols ed., 3d ed. 1986) (discussing
how North America's European invaders viewed indigenous peoples as uncivilized and simple
people and overlooked their extensive agricultural skills); Davidson & Wells, The Land, the Law,
and the State: Colonial Australia 1788-1890, in 2 LAw IN CONTEXT 89-117 (1984). In Anglo-
American jurisprudence, at least, there is a discernible thread of distrust of individuals who are
not linked to a specific community and place. See generally William Chambliss, Vagrancy Law in
England and America, in THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAw 132, 135 (Donald Black & Maureen
Mileski eds., 1973) (positing that Anglo-American jurisprudence assumes that individuals who
are not linked to specific place are immoral due to legacy of feudal bonds to land and need to
control movement of labor during emergence of early capitalism).
46. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17, 20 (Liberal Arts Press, 3d ed.,
1952).
47. The principal exception is the Bedouin population that inhabited the southern Negev
desert in Palestine. See LonginaJakubowska, Resisting "Ethnicity':" The Israeli State and Bedouin
Identity, in THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND TERROR 85, 91 (Carolyn Nordstrom &
Jo Ann Martin eds., 1992). But see THE CHANGING BEDOUIN x (Emanuel Marx & Avshalom
Shemu'eli eds., 1984) (explaining that Bedouin depended to some extent on seasonal
agriculture); EMANUEL MARX, BEDOUIN OF THE NEGEV 3 (1967) (examining economic changes
among pastoral nomads in Negev region).
48. Jakubowska, supra note 47, at 91.
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Oceania could not be as easily drawn in the colonization of Pales-
tine. 9
Instead, Zionists depicted pre-Zionist Palestine as a desolate
backwater, trammeled by governmental corruption and inefficiency
and hindered by ancient, outmoded agricultural practices." The
cause of the social and economic torpor afflicting Palestine, according
to the Zionists, was the structure of local society. The Zionists
sometimes referred to the Arab local society as an example of "Arab
feudalism," which was epitomized by a class of absentee Arab
landowners known as the effendis.A The Zionists also lamented
communal forms of land tenure that Palestinians practiced into the
twentieth century52 as causes of stagnation and waste in the agricul-
tural sector.
5 3
49. See KAMEN, supra note 23, at 5 (arguing that Zionists nonetheless saw themselves as
purveyors of science and enlightened European values in backward region of world).
50. See David Waines, The Failure of the National Resistance in THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PALESTINE 214-15 (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod ed., 1971) (explaining that Arab population was poorly
trained and too slow to achieve desired progress in agriculture and land development).
51. Barsh, supra note 5, at 28 (arguing that other colonial powers had employed feudalist
imagery asjustification for colonization and undertook "sweeping reconstruction of land tenure"
in those areas). For a discussion of the British approach to India's land law, see HERBERT
MERILLAT, LAND AND THE CONSTITUTION IN INDIA 37 (1970).
52. See infra notes 89-168 and accompanying text (discussing history of communal land
tenure in Palestine region).
53. See Waines, supra note 50, at 215 (discussing transformation of Palestinian agricultural
base as necessary to goal ofJewish land settlement and progress). Indigenous communal land
tenure has been attacked as an obstacle to economic growth by colonial administrators
throughout the world. Collective ownership was believed to discourage individual entrepreneur-
ship and capital investment, to inhibit the adoption of modem techniques of production, and
to result in waste. In Algeria, for example, officials were "struck by the apparent disproportion
between the amount of land legally owned or occupied by the Muslims and the number of
individuals this land supported." Ruedy, supra note 5, at 87. In the United States, the Indian
General Allotment Act (commonly known as the Dawes Act), 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988), enacted
February 8, 1887, registered formerly communal tribal lands to individual Indians in 160 acre
"allotments." Its proponents believed that this measure would encourage Indians to adopt
"modem" methods of farming, leading to their general assimilation into majority society and
culture. Donald J. Berthrong, Legacies of the Dawes Act: Bureaucrats and Land Thieves at the
Cheyenne-Arapaho Agencies of Oklahoma, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PAST AND PRESENT, supra note
45, at 204-18.
A common result of colonialism's introduction of individual private property into
non-capitalist societies was the growth of land speculation. Peasant holders, often in debt and
always at the mercy of the elements, frequently sought relief through the sale of their lands, and
so were in essence "cashed out" of the agricultural sector, or became agricultural laborers. See,
e.g., ALLAN CHRISTELOW, MUSLIM LAw COURTS AND THE FRENCH COLONIAL STATE IN ALGERIA 28
(1985) (explaining modem European colonialism in Africa and Asia as both agent of change
and impediment to it); ERIC WOLF, PEASANT WARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 214 (1968)
(explaining modem European colonization in Africa and Asia as both agent of and impediment
to change). Theodore Roosevelt approvingly described the Dawes Act as a "mighty pulverizing
engine to break up the tribal mass." Joe Ryan, Compared to Other Nations, 3 AM. INDIAN J. 3, 4
(1977). Interestingly, this connection between collective ownership and communal solidarity
was not lost on the Zionist movement, which organized its colonization effort in the main
through bodies (such as theJNF) that obtained land and held it in trust for the "entire Jewish
people" and only leased it to individual Jews. See generally FRANZ OPPENHEIMER & JACOB
484
LAND, LAW, AND LEGmMACY IN ISRAEL
Alfred Bonne, Director of the Economic Research Institute of the
Jewish Agency, wrote with regard to "Arab feudalism":
These Arab states exhibit, as heretofore, the typical features of an
Oriental administration and an Oriental mentality, which are found
among the governing and governed alike. The relations between
the masses and the State are largely determined by the old feudal
pattern with the fate of State placed almost exclusively in the hands
of a class of large landowners. The landless population in the
village and town has practically no say in any of the representative
bodies and is thus without political influence, a state of affairs that
breeds indifference among the masses towards the State and its
functions.
54
Bonne also asserted that the "Oriental administration" lacked the
capacity to function as a modem state, and "[i]n particular, the
execution of policies designed to raise the standard of living, the level
of education, of health services, etc., all of which are dependent on
the co-operation of the population, is greatly hampered by this
lack.""5
The image of Arab feudalism was rich withjustificatory possibilities.
Preeminently, the image demonstrated that the allegedly miserable
social and material conditions of the country, held to have existed for
centuries, could not possibly be changed from within. 6 Only a
dynamic external agent, Zionist colonization, could overcome local
OETnINGER, LAND TENURE IN PALESTINE 12-13 (1917) (noting that only factor that can truly
protect national property is introduction and permanent establishment of paramount ownership
by community of land).
54. Alfred Bonne, The Potential Importance of the Jewish State for the Middle East, 4 PALESTINE
Y.B. & ISRAELI ANN. 221, 224 (1948-1949).
55. Id. at 225.
56. This conception was false on several counts. Palestine was neither isolated nor static.
In fact, Palestinian society and its economy had undergone striking changes between the
eighteenth and twentieth centuries. SeeJOEL S. MIGDAL, PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS 10
(1980). Far from being a backwater, Palestine was suffering the throes of its incorporation into
the capitalist world system and the demise of its former agrarian system. Furthermore, at the
time of the Mandate, it was experiencing other fundamental socioeconomic transformations.
See generally LAND TENURE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Tarif Khalidi ed.,
1984) (exploring studies of ancient medieval, early modem, and modem transformations in
land tenure, rural topography, and ecology in Middle East); MIGDAL, suipra, at 10 (exploring
changes in Palestinian stratification and population resulting from distinct policies of investment,
alliance, and scrutiny); YLANA N. MILLER, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN RURAL PALESTINE, 1920-
1948 (1985) (investigating conditions that determined and limited Palestinian Arab capacity to
protect their homeland); OTTOMAN PALESTINE, 1800-1914: STUDES IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
HISTORY (Gad G. Gilbar ed., 1990) (providing collection of studies tracing demographic
characteristics and changes in Palestine by examining immigration of Muslims, Arabs, andJews);
ALEXANDER SCHOLCH, PALESTINE IN TRANSFORMATION, 1856-1882: STUDIES IN SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1992) (offering systematic analysis of Palestinian society and
politics under four regimes to identify causes of social stratification).
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stagnation and be the catalyst for progressive change.5 7 The advent
of a modem and scientifically minded settler group would abolish
feudalism, liberate the local peasants from the oppression and
exploitation of the effendis,5" raise living standards, and transmit
new technological knowledge throughout the region. 9 The Zionist
envisioned that the new settier society would be a beacon of progress
for the entire Middle East.
Zionist leaders argued, therefore, that the local population would
benefit as much from Jewish colonization as would the new settlers
themselves.' In 1937, Berl Katznelson, a Jewish Agency leader,
wrote, "Never before has the white man undertaken colonization with
that sense ofjustice and social progress which fills the Jew who comes
to Palestine."6 Jewish settiers arrived in Palestine infused with the
ideal of "coming to conquer the desert and to redeem the land from
its desolate state,"62 to make "gardens in the desert and the
swamp."6 3
Although land reclamation would provide some margin for Jewish
57. See KAMEN, supra note 23. at 70-71 (discussing positive effectsJews believed colonization
would have on Arab population, including development of innovative agricultural techniques,
improved health conditions, and creation of growing urban market for Arab farmers).
58. The effendis were not, strictly speaking, figments of the Zionists' imagination. There
were indeed absentee Arab landowners (a number of them Lebanese or Syrian) who owned
large tracts of land in Palestine. Barsh, supra note 5, at 15. Moreover, there was an identifiable
trend toward the consolidation of landholdings in Palestine that had begun at least as early as
the mid-nineteenth century. Id. But see ZURIK, supra note 8, at 43 (demonstrating that in first
half of twentieth century, no more than 10% of populated portion of Palestine was controlled
by large landowners).
59. ZUREIK, supra note 8, at 194. Leftist Zionists attempted to state this argument in Marxist
terms, applying to Palestine the model of the "Asiatic mode of production." See, e.g., Schlomo
Avineri, Modernization and Arab Society: Some Reflections, in ISRAEL, THE ARABS, AND THE MIDDLE
EAST (I. Howe & C. Gresham eds., 1973) (noting impact of Western imperialism on Arab
society). For a critique of this attempt, see Bryan S. Turner, Avineri's View of Marx's Theory of
Colonialism: Israe4 in 40 SCIENCE AND SoCIEY 385-409 (1976-1977).
60. See KAMEN, supra note 23, at 70-71 (explaining Jews perspective on improvements
colonization brought to Arab population in Palestine and Arab view that colonization had
negative impact in region). Although this view was the public position taken by the Zionist
movement, many Zionists privately recognized that their ambitions were irreconcilable with the
interests of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, and saw the coming clash with them as
unfortunate but inevitable. CALAN, supra note 33, at 4. This expectation was not broadcast,
however, because it would have jeopardized the support of British administrators in Palestine
and the support of the public in Britain and elsewhere-support on which the Zionist movement
was highly dependent at the time. Id.
61. GREENBERG, supra note 37, at 357 (quoting Katznelson). Katznelson's statement
notwithstanding, there is nothing novel in a colonizers' claim that colonization would benefit
native subjects by bestowing on them the manifold wonders of civilized society. See Barsh, supra
note 5, at 26 ("Unceded Indian lands were opened to settlement, for example, on the pretence
that the natives would benefit from closer contact with civilized, Christian company.").
62. AVNERI, supra note 8, at 61.
63. Lionel Feitelberg, Jewish Settlement in Israe4 4 PALESTINE Y.B. & ISRAELI ANN. 365, 379
(1948-1949).
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settlement,"4 the indigenous population already worked most of the
arable land in Palestine.' The prescription lay in increasing
productivity through the intensification of Arab agriculture, guided by
the example of the Zionist settlers. Jewish colonization, it was argued,
could then take place without disturbing the local population.'
The Zionists devised numerous schemes for agricultural develop-
ment that would have concentrated Arab land holdings, thereby
freeing lands for Jewish settlement. For example, in 1933, Arthur
Ruppin, head of the World Zionist Organization's67 colonization
program, presented a broad plan for the development of the
country's coastal plain that would have reduced Arab landholdings by
one-third. Under this plan, the Jews would buy Arab landholdings
and the Arabs would use the proceeds from this sale to introduce
modem agricultural techniques onto the remaining lands.' This
plan would thus free 700,000 dunums of land forJewish settlement.69
64. SeeJoseph Weitz, CreatingNewSoil, 3 PALESrINEY.B. 119, 136 (1947-1948) (arguing that
notion of land scarcity is part of anti-Zionist propaganda proclaiming that there is hardly room
for existing population, let alone new immigrants).
65. See KAMEN, supra note 23, at 117 (discussing Palestinian use of land as demonstrated by
commitment to land development, modernization, and productivity).
66. See The Influence ofJewish Colonization on Arab Development in Palestine, 3 PALESTINE Y.B.
185, 190 (1947-1948) [hereinafter Jewish Agency Memorandum] (reprinting memorandum by
Jewish Agency presented in March, 1946, to Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry) ("The whole
problem of agricultural settlement in Palestine boils down to one of productivity of the soil.
The conception that colonization must be based on a displacement of population is disproved
both by experience and by theoretical analysis."). The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
was a delegation jointly dispatched by the American and British Governments to study the
problem of Palestine in 1946. See Horowitz, Palestine's Absorptive Capadty, 1 PALESTINEY.B. 60-76
(1944-1945) (arguing that crucial problem of Palestine is that of its economic capacity to absorb
large numbers of immigrants during war period of 1939-44). Colonials in America also
rationalized that relocation of Native Americans was in the Native Americans' interests; the
additional land that became available to whites was merely a happy incident to the relocation.
Hagan, supra note 5, at 73. European settlers in New Zealand made similar arguments, as did
a variety of other colonial societies. SHAFIR, supra note 8, at 210.
67. The World Zionist Organization is the global representative of the Zionist movement
and was founded at the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. See supra note 8
(discussing contribution of renowned Zionist organization leaders such as Theodor Herzl and
Ahad Ha'am and their impact on growth and philosophy of World Zionist Organization).
68. AVNERI, supra note 8, at 246 (proposing that Arabs would apply proceeds from sale of
lands to Jews to paying debts and living expenses, and investing remainder in irrigation systems,
citrus plantation and livestock).
69. AVNERI, supra note 8, at 246. Similar plans were drawn up for the Jordan and Beit
Shean Valleys. Joshua Hankin, a land purchasing agent, presented another plan to the Palestine
Land Development Company, see infra note 128, in 1934 for the settlement of the Bedouin
populations in the Negev desert. Id. Hankin stated:
I believe there are some 4,000,000 dunam [sic] which can be considered suitable for
cultivation. Concerning the number of Bedouin candidates for settlement (10,000
families), half the area should suffice for them once the water problem has been
solved. This would leave 2,000,000 dunam forJewish settlement, and at the same time
the Bedouins, too, will become established farmers thanks to the development projects
which will come into being through the influx ofJewish capital.
Id. Following the establishment of Israel, the Negev Bedouins were progressively settled: ninety-
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Not surprisingly, the desire to free land for Jewish settlement
strongly influenced the Zionists' analysis of the problems of Arab
agriculture in Palestine, and the solutions to those problems?0' The
Zionists thus advocated the type of intensification of agriculture that
would reduce the Arab land use-increasing the labor input per unit
of land by changing the crops grown from cereals to vegetables and
citrus-instead of increasing the frequency of cropping, which was
arguably more suited to the environmental and infrastructural
conditions of the country?'1
As Zionist settlements were established, the image of Arab feudal-
ism, and the contrasting image of the dynamic force of Zionism,
yielded still further justificatory arguments during the Mandate
period. Palestinian opposition to Jewish settlement was delegitimated
as the reactionary impulse of the retrograde class of Arab effendis,
whose economic dominance was threatened by the progressive
newcomers to the country.2  Zionists further sought to undermine
the Palestinians' claim to the land by arguing that many were recent
immigrants from surrounding Arab countries, attracted to Palestine
by the economic opportunities created by new Zionist enterprises and
the general stimulus to the local economy resulting from coloniza-
tion.7'
three percent of the desert area they inhabited was eventually expropriated. Jakubowska, supra
note 47, at 89. Jakubowska states: "Sedentarization of the Bedouin was publicly presented as
modernization and expressed in the language of paternalism. My interviews with government
officials who were carrying out the settlement project yielded contemptuous phrases: 'The
Bedouin have progressed 1,000 years during the 35 years of Israeli rule.'" Id. at 91.
Expropriation of large tracts of Bedouin land was accomplished via a special law enacted in
1980, following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, when Israeli military bases were moved from
the Sinai Peninsula into the Negev region. Negev Land Acquisition (Peace Treaty with Egpt) Law,
34 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 190 (1980/81).
70. See KAMEN, supra note 23, at 261 (concluding that Arab farmers were forced to make
way forJewish settlement).
71. See KAMEN, supra note 23, at 261 (discussing howJewish agricultural planners sought to
reduce amount of land cultivated by Arabs by planting certain crops).
72. See ZUREIK, supra note 8, at 45 (stating that Jewish writers attempted to blame Arab
opposition to Jewish settlers on upperclass Arabs). While it is true that the politically articulate
and visible Palestinian leadership in the opposition to Zionism was largely of upper class origins,
see ANN MOSLEY LESCH, ARAB POLrrIcs IN PALESTiNE 1917-1939, at 55-75 (1979) (analyzing
Palestinian politics between 1917 and 1939); MANDEL, supra note 6, at 77-79 (examining
opposition to Zionist land purchases), the early and consistent resistance to Jewish settlement
of the Palestinian peasantry is now well documented. See Mark Buheiry, The Peasant Revolt of
1858 in Mount Lebanon: Rising Expectations, Economic Malaise and the Incentive to Arm, in LAND
TENURE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 291, 291-301 (Tarif Khalidi ed., 1984);
Ted Swedenburg, The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939), in ISLAM,
PoLrIcs, AND SociAL MOVEMENTS 169, 169-203 (Edmund Burke III & Ira M. Lapidus eds., 1988)
(arguing that peasants played substantial role in limiting expansion of Ottoman empire,
Zionism, and British occupation).
73. SeeJewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 188 (stating that "Palestine has become
[a country) of Arab immigration"). This theme has since been reiterated by many writers
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The Zionists marshalled evidence that purported to demonstrate
that colonization was a boon to the local population.74 They pointed
to the expansion of production and consumption,75 and the corre-
sponding increase in income levels, 71 the declining infant mortality
rates,77 the higher standards of hygiene and health,7' and the
spread of modem education. 79  According to the Zionists, Jewish
immigration and colonization provided the stimulus for these
improvements in the standard of living in Palestine."
Implicit in the discussions by Alfred Bonne and others of Arab
feudalism was a conception that combining labor and property
establishes ownership in the property, and that an administration
establishes legitimacy in governance by creating the conditions
necessary to realize the full productive, economic potential of the
land." By this measure, indigenous political structures were wholly
sympathetic to Israel. See, e.g., AVNERI, supra note 8, at 24-25 (stating that economic
development in Palestine was due to Zionist settlement) ;JOAN PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL:
THE ORIGINS OF THE ARABJEWISH CoNFar OVER PALESTINE 225-322 (1984) (analyzing Arab
immigration into Palestine); Fred M. Gottheil, Arab Immigration into Pro-state Israe4 in PALESTINE
AND ISRAEL IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES 143, 147-50 (Elie Kedourie & Sylvia C. Haim eds.,
1982) (concluding that Arab immigration into pre-state Israel was partly due to increased
economic activity). But see MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at 40-41 n.20 (maintaining that
immigration into Palestine from adjacent countries was limited and labeling Peters' work
"demographically worthless"); Edward W. Said, Conspiracy of Praise, in BLAMING THE VICTIMS 23,
23-31 (Edward W. Said & Christopher Hitchens eds., 1988) (criticizing Peters' work for denying
claims of Arabs to Palestine). Another demographer, Israeli Roberto Bacchi, concluded that
from 1931 to the end of the Mandate, approximately only 200 Muslim immigrants per year
entered Palestine, yielding a relatively small portion of the population of Palestine. ROBERTO
BACCHI, THE POPULATION OF ISRAEL 388-89 (1974).
Africander settlers fielded a narrative similar to that of Zionist writers. An official publication
of the South African Government states: "Three and a quarter centuries ago the whites entered
South Africa from the south at Table Bay.... It was a Dutch-speaking stream which for more
than a century made no significant contact with Blacks. Only in about 1770 was it stopped..
. by a Black stream moving southwards." Mertz, supra note 5, at 664 (quoting official
publications of South African Government).
74. See Jewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 185-200 (demonstrating that Zionists
attempted to adduce evidence to show that health conditions, employment, standard of living,
and general welfare of Arab residents of Palestine had improved virtually in direct proportion
to their proximity to Jewish settlements).
75. Jewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 196.
76. Jewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 188.
77. Jewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 198-99.
78. Jewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 199-200.
79. Jewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 196.
80. Jewish Agency Memorandum, supra note 66, at 200. Kamen, in one of the most judicious
treatments of the effects ofJewish colonization on the Arabs of Palestine, concludes that, in fact,
the development of Arab agriculture was stunted by Zionist exclusionary practices, see infra note
122 (discussing how redemption of Jewish labor meant that Arabs would be excluded from
employment in settlements), of the new settlers. KAMEN, supra note 23, at 258-59.
81. See Bonne, supra note 54, at 221-31 (describing methods, such as education and
democracy, thatJewish state foster to create economic drive).
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illegitimate.82 In addition, citizenship itself is a function of engaging
the land in productive enterprise.83 In the words of Zionist author
Israel Zangwill: "[T] here is no Arab people living in intimate fusion
with the country, utilizing its resources and stamping it with a
characteristic impress: there is at best an Arab encampment. "'
Zionists were well aware that Palestine was not literally uninhabited.
But because the Arab population had failed to develop Palestine, their
moral claim to possess it was thereby weaker than that of the Jewish
settlers who were committed to its refructification.' The Arab
population of Palestine, still in the process of defining for itself a
national identity,6 was depicted alternately as a collection of
individuals, a collage of ethnically diverse minorities, s7 or part of a
82. Bonne, supra note 54, at 224-25 (asserting that Arab style of governance, including
landless peasantry and feudal structure, did not maximize use of land).
83. Bonne, supra note 54, at 221-31 (enumerating ways in which Jewish utilization of land
has improved living conditions for all).
84. ISRAEL ZANGWILL, THE VOICE OFJERUSALEM 109 (1921).
85. See KAMEN, supra note 23, at 99-100 (discussing Zionist views toward Palestinian land).
European settiers' confidence in their ability to put land to "superior" use is one of the most
common justifications for their appropriation of native peoples' lands. As the Governor of the
Indiana Territory William Henry Harrison expressed it: "Is one of the fairest portions of the
globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages, when it seems
destined by the Creator to give support to a large population and to be the seat of civilization,
of science, and of true religion?" Hagan, supra note 5, at 68 (quoting ALBERT K. WEINBERG,
MANIFEST DESTINY 79 (1935)). And the inimitable Theodore Roosevelt stated: "[T]he settler
and pioneer have at bottom justice on their side; this great continent could not have been kept
as nothing but a game preserve for squalid savages." Washburn, supra note 5, at 23 (quoting 1
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST 90 (1889)).
86. See MUSLIH, supra note 6, at 86-87 (tracing origins of Palestinian nationalism to pre-
World War I period, but explicitly noting that it was exclusively elite phenomenon). Ylana
Miller maintains:
Palestinian Arab villagers acquired their specific national identifications under the
mandate. Between 1920 and 1948 they remained a distinct social group and were
never fully identified with the interests or concerns of the urban population, which
furnished political leadership to the nationalist movement. Instead, villagers entered
the period with a largely passive orientation toward both official and nationalist action.
Yet in the course of the mandate, more and more villagers were forced to act in their
own interests and to assert their own understanding of what it meant to be Palestinian
Arab.
YLANA N. MILLER, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN RURAL PALESTINE, 1920-1948, at 163 (1985).
Competing with the growing sense of national identity were deeply held feelings of localism, or
identification with one's village community. See George Bisharat, Displacement and SocialIdentity:
Palestinian Refugees in the West Bank, in POPULATION DISPLACEMENT AND RESETILEMENT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST (S. Shami ed., forthcoming 1994) (describing lasting attachments among
Palestinian refugees to original towns and villages that they left in 1948); Elias Shoufani, The Fall
ofa Village, 1J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1972, at 108, 108-21 (relating changes in composition
of village life after 1947-48 War).
87. See YEHOSHUA BEN-ARIEH, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE HOLY LAND IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 5 (2d ed. 1983) (describing experiences of Western explorers and conquerors in
Palestine and among Palestinian people). The following quote from Zionist author Yehoshua
Ben-Arieh's book illustrates the claim of Palestine's ethnic heterogeneity, and recapitulates many
of the themes in Zionist writings on Arab feudalism:
At the beginning of the 19th century Palestine was but a derelict province of the
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great, indistinct Arab mass, with no particular attachment to the land
of Palestine.' In short, the Zionists portrayed the Arab residents of
Palestine as anything but a national group posing rival claims of
sovereignty over the country. Nor was Arab society, in any sense, seen
as worthy of preservation-least of all at the expense of frustrating the
creation of a new and patently superior Jewish society.
II. LAND TENURE IN PALESTINE BEFORE 1948
It is difficult to understand the forms and directions that Israel's
acquisition of Palestinian lands took without some grasp of the status
of land tenure in Palestine in the pre-state period. This section,
therefore, will outline the status of land tenure in both the late
Ottoman and British Mandate periods.
A. The Late Ottoman Period
Palestinian society at the turn of the century was predominantly
rural and peasant.89 The heart of rural society, the units within
which the most important social relations were organized, were the
decaying Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte only showed interest in it because of
the holy places and the meager revenue extorted from the wretched inhabitants. The
country was badly governed, having no political importance of its own; its economy was
primitive; the sparse, ethnically mixed population subsisted on a dismally low standard;
the few towns were small and miserable; the roads few and neglected. In short,
Palestine was but a sad backwater of a crumbling Empire-a far cry from the fertile,
thriving land it had been in ancient times.
Id. at 11.
Israeli policies later institutionalized the emphasis on the diversity of the Arab community by
classifying non-Jewish citizens by both "religion"-as Muslims and Christians-and "nationali-
ty"-as Druze and Bedouins. See KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 41-44 (discussing classification of
residents in Israel under Population Registry Law of 1965). Virtually all Muslims and Christians
in Israel are of Palestinian Arab ethnicity (approximately 2500 Circassian Muslims, and a slightly
larger Armenian Christian group excepted), seeAvruch, supra note 8, at 120 (discussing religious
composition of Israel), as are all Druze (followers of a religious offshoot of Islam), see GABRIEL
BEN-DOR, THE DRUZEs IN ISRAEL 97-107 (1979) (analyzing political and historical position of
Druzes in Israel), and all Bedouins (who represent a small subset of Arab society), see MARX,
supra note 47, at 3 (discussing origins of Bedouins); see also Avruch, supra note 8, at 120
(discussing ethnic composition of Israel).
South Africa has attempted to deflect Black African nationalist claims with similar policies,
emphasizing the ethnic heterogeneity of local tribes, and enacting the "homelands" policy based
on this supposed diversity. Mertz, supra note 5, at 664; see also LEONARD THOMPSON, THE
POLITICAL MyrHoLoGY OF APARTHEID 26-30 (1985) (discussing how "Afrikaner National Myth"
has attempted to establish legitimacy of European settiers' claims over those of natives).
88. See NUR MASALHA, EXPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS: THE CONCEPT OF TRANSFER IN
ZIONIST POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1882-1948, at 19-20 (1992) (discussing how Zionists attempted to
downplay notion that Palestinians were distinct national group). The author goes on to point
out that if "[alfter all, Palestinians did not constitute a distinct, separate nation and were not
an integral part of the country with profound historical ties to it, but instead belonged to the
larger Arab nation, then they could be shifted to other territories of that nation without undue
prejudice." Id.
89. STEIN, supra note 14, at 3.
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hundreds of villages that dotted the Palestinian landscape.'
Occasionally, merely clusters of the homes of several lineages or
extended kin groups formed these villages, although many villages
had populations ranging up to several thousand inhabitants. 9
The system of land tenure in Palestine during the late Ottoman
period was in a state of flux. In keeping with practices established in
the early periods of Muslim conquest and gradually systematized by
successive Islamic states, only dwelling and limited appurtenant areas
were regarded as vested in absolute private ownership (mulk). 2
Rural land in Palestine for the most part belonged to the Mr
3
category (from amiriyeh, or princely), 4 according to which the state,
as representative of the umma muhammadiyeh,9" or entire Muslim
community, retained ultimate ownership (raqaba).o9 An individual
could gain a right of possession and usufruct (tassaruj) on the
condition that the grantee cultivate the land.97 The state treasury
then levied a tithe against the grantee.98
In practice, the village as a whole, or its constituent patrilineages,o
and not individuals held rights in agricultural land through a formally
unrecognized customary system of land tenure called musha "1°'
Particular plots of land within the village or lineage holding were
rotated periodically among individual nuclear families."° During
one rotation, a period generally not exceeding two or three years,
each family separately farmed a particular plot. 0 2 According to
some estimates, as much as seventy percent of the land in Palestine
90. Ruedy, supra note 5, at 120-22.
91. Ruedy, supra note 5, at 120-22.
92. See FREDERIC M. GOADBY & MOSESJ. DouKHAN, THE LAND LAW OF PALESTINE 6 (1935)
(detailing development and evolution of Palestinian land law from Middle Ages through end
of Ottoman Empires).
93. Id.
94. DOREEN WARRINER, LAND REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 67 (2d ed.
1962).
95. Ruedy, supra note 5, at 2.
96. GOADBY & DOUKHAN, supra note 92, at 3-4.
97. GOADBY & DOUKHAN, supra note 92, at 7.
98. GoADBY & DOUKHAN, supra note 92, at 7. In miri lands, the fact that the state was vested
with absolute ownership did not mean that it could determine the ultimate use of the land; it
only meant that the state could receive taxes or labor from people who possessed the land.
WARRINER, supra note 94, at 67.
99. A patrilineage is an extended kin group that traces descent through the father.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1656 (1981).
100. See STEIN, supra note 14, at 14-15 (discussing origins and effects of musha'land tenure
system).
101. STEIN, supra note 14, at 14.
102. STEIN, supra note 14, at 14.
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was held in musha' tenure at the end of the nineteenth century.10 3
The Ottomans, however, struggled to eliminate musha' tenure. In
1858, the Ottoman Sultan enacted legislation establishing a Land
Code that explicitly prohibited customary collective land rights in an
attempt to reorder the tenure system in the Empire.' 4 The Code
divided all lands in the imperial domain into five categories: (1)
mulk, or land held by absolute private ownership;0 5 (2) miri, land
held by absolute ownership vested in the state, but usufruct to the
103. Raphael Patai, Musha'a Tenure and Co-operation in Palestine, 51AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 436,
441 (1949). The origins and function of communal land tenure in Palestine are matters of
some discussion. Communal land tenure has been seen as an adaptation to political and
economic instability, a vestige of tribal society in recently sedentarized communities, and as a
device for the maintenance of group solidarity. See SrEmI, supra note 14, at 14-15 (maintaining
that communal land tenure was adopted to encourage cooperation and preservation of land
within tribe); VINOGRADOV, supra note 5, at 87 (noting that communal land tenure was
established to better defend ownership of land); WARRINER, supra note 94, at 58 (claiming that
communal land tenure is means of overcoming economic instability of farming); Ya'akov
Firestone, The Land-Equalizing Musha' Village: A Reassessment, in OTTOMAN PALESTINE, 1800-1914:
STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY 91, 127-29 (Gad G. Gilbar ed., 1990) (concluding
that musha'villages were response to political and economic pressures of Mandate); Ruedy, supra
note 5, at 2 (claiming that Algerian concept of land ownership flowed from notion of group
consensus). Synthesizing these points, one commentator argues that musha' tenure,
characteristic of the "marginal areas" between permanently settled and nomadic communities,
represented a "transitional" form of ownership that permitted tribally organized peasants to
retreat from temporary settlement into a nomadic life style to avoid intensive taxation or
conscription into the army of the central government. J. Held, The Effects of Ottoman Land
Laws on the Marginal Population and the Musha' Village of Palestine, 1858-1914 (1979)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Texas (Austin)). Variants of communal land tenure were
extremely widespread in the Middle East in this period, as they were in a number of other non-
capitalist societies settled by European settlers worldwide. See, e.g., KAWASHIMA, supra note 21,
at 13-14 (asserting that European concepts of private land ownership conflicted with American
Indian notions of communal ownership and contributed to breakdown in American Indian tribe
lifestyle); VINOGRADOV, supra note 5, at 79-92 (laying out legal status of land and land tenure
among Moroccan tribes before French colonization); Lam, supra note 5, at 104-08 (discussing
land tenure system in Hawaii and impact of Western notions of land ownership on it);
Olmesdahl, supra note 5, at 286-88 (describing communal land tenure among natives in South
Africa); Ruedy, supranote 5, at 98-105 (documenting tensions between Algerian land tenure and
French colonists' notion of individual ownership).
104. WARRINER, supra note 94, at 69. In the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman state
found itself pressed to streamline and centralize its bureaucracy in order to facilitate the
collection of revenues. Kemal H. Karpat, The Transformation of the Ottoman State 1798-1908, 3
INT'LJ. MIDDLE E. STUD. 243, 257 (1972). This change was necessitated by the Empire's loss of
a major economic base with the opening of the Black Sea (which had been an exclusive
Ottoman trade area) to Russian trade in the late eighteenth century. Id. at 246. Furthermore,
Europe's Industrial Revolution, bringing urbanization, changes in consumptive habits, and
advances in the military and technological spheres, combined to alter the balance of trade
between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The latter's exports shrank to agricultural
commodities, and new manufactured items purchased from European markets began to replace
local goods. Id. Thus, the Ottoman government embarked on a program of sweeping reforms
collectively known as the "Tanzimat," which was inaugurated in 1839. BERNARD LEWIS, THE
EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 107 (1961). The new system of administration, however, never
became fully operative. Id. at 386. See generally Esin Orficii, The Impact of European Law on the
Ottoman Empire, in EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW 49-51 (Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Jaap de
Moore eds., 1992) (outlining legal reforms instituted during Tanzimet period).
105. WARRINER, supra note 94, at 66.
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individual holder;1°6 (3) waqf, land dedicated to pious purpose, and
controlled by the Supreme Muslim Council;0 7 (4) matruka, land
owned by the state but preserved for public use (such as roadbeds, or
village threshing floors);..8 and (5) mawat, barren or unclaimed
lands owned by the state (forests, mountainous areas, etc.).109 The
Code partitioned and registered musha'holdings as the properties of
individual family members." 0
The Ottomans enacted a series of other laws to compel registration
of individual titles to rights in miri land in newly established Land
Registry offices."' This measure was intended primarily to aid in
affixing tax liabilities to specific individuals, thereby minimizing tax
evasion, and to facilitate enforcement of military conscription."
2
The Palestinian peasantry, ever distrustful of state authority,
appeared to be well aware of these intentions. Villagers attempted to
avoid full taxation by understating the size of their lands, by disavow-
ing claim to the lands, or by simply evading the land registrars of the
Ottoman government."- To escape conscription, groups of villagers
would vest title of village lands in the hands of a few village leaders or
register them in the name of a fictitious or long-deceased individu-
al." 4  As a result, discrepancies between official titles and the
realities of occupancy widened. Local notables, now with legally
106. WARINER, supra note 94, at 66-67.
107. WARRINER, supra note 94, at 67; see also STEIN, supra note 14, at 12, 29-30 (describing
how British Mandate government created Supreme Muslim Council as counterweight to Jewish
organization in political affairs).
108. WARRINER, supra note 94, at 67.
109. WARRINER, supra note 94, at 66-67.
110. WARRnER, supra note 94, at 68. Coupled with the provisions for direct collection of
taxes by state officials, this code provision was designed to strike at the growing local autonomy
of village sheikMs and other local notables. Id. at 69. By outlawing private ownership and vesting
all legal title in the state, the government could create a strong central administration to control
individual musha' shares, thereby eliminating other sources of power and maximizing revenue
collection. Id. By replacing the intermediation of local notables between the central authority
and individual cultivators with a direct relationship, the provision was intended to eliminate the
problem of the siphoning off of state revenues, which had become rampant under the prior
system of tax farming. Id. at 68.
111. ABRAHAM GRANOVSKY, THE LAND SYSTEM IN PALETNE 73-75 (1952).
112. Id. at 75. One commentator maintains that the musha' holdings were the principal
targets of the Land Code: "The majority of productive lands in the Empire were, at the time
of the Land Code, already under cultivation and subject to taxation. In order to increase state
revenue, marginal areas were the focus of endeavor, because the additional effort to result from
stabilization could produce the greatest relative gain." Held, supra note 103, at 124. The
Ottomans also aimed to prevent further conversion of miri lands into waqf holdings, a common
but illegal practice (only mulk or private property, could legally be dedicated to waq) in
Palestine. GRANOVSKY, supra note 111, at 128-55. Waqf lands were not taxed, so these illegal
conversions deprived the state of precious revenue. See id. (detailing implications of waqf
system).
113. GRANovsKY, supra note 111, at 74.
114. GRANOvSKy, supra note 111, at 75.
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enforceable rights in land, actually gained in power, transforming
themselves into landlords and their co-villagers into tenants.1 5 The
consolidation of large estates in Palestine developed into a long-term
trend.'
1 6
At the beginning of the British Mandate period following World
War I, Great Britain established special Land Courts to address the
complex land situation. 7 These courts maintained the effort to
enforce the Ottoman Land Code, including the drive for individual
registration. 118
B. Zionist Land Acquisition in the Pre-state Period
By the end of the Mandate period in May 1948, Jewish land
holdings in Palestine totalled approximately 1.8 to 2 million
dunums.119 While this amounted to a relatively scant five percent
115. GRANoVsKY, supra note 11, at 75. In other colonial societies, such as the United States,
settlers systematically "misunderstood" the extent of the powers of indigenous leaders,
"recognizing" their authority to alienate collectively held lands. KAWASHIMA, supra note 21, at
14. In some cases, this misperception of the relationship between tribal leaders, communally
held land, and tribal members was used to rationalize the seizure of such lands. This was true,
for example, in both Rhodesia under British conquest and Algeria under the French. See Barsh,
supra note 5, at 28-29 (documenting relationship between colonial powers and natives in regard
to land ownership in Rhodesia and Algeria); M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-CLASSICAL LAWS 206-07 (1975) (describing how misunderstanding
of tribal relationships lead to "confiscation" of land by colonial French). Of the sequestration
of lands in Algeria, colonial officials asserted:
It was a political measure ... sanctioned in the eyes of the Muslims by the original
right and the constant practice of the sovereign. What we would call confiscation is
really for them repossession, whose effect is to terminate the right of usufruct, the only
one that the prince, the image of God on earth, may and did alienate.
HOOKER, supra, at 206-07. Traces of this reasoning are identifiable in Israel's techniques of land
acquisition in the Occupied Territories, as will be discussed infra.
116. See GRANOVSKy, supra note 111, at 54-77 (chronicling emergence of large estates in
Palestine). The same situation occurred in other parts of the Empire as well. See Nur Yalman,
On Land Disputes in Eastern Turkey, in 2 RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 269-75 (George
Dalton ed., 1979) (discussing consolidation of land into hands of landlord class in eastern
Turkey). The development of large private estates in the late Ottoman Empire doubtless had
economic and other causes that were not simply a function of the 1858 Land Code. See Peter
Sluglett & Marion Farouk-Sluglett, The Application of the 1858 Land Code in Greater Syria: Some
Preliminary Observations, in LAND TENURE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 413-
17 (Tarif Khalidi ed., 1984) (attributing increase in large estates to broadening of public
security). It does appear, however, that in some instances the Code actually strengthened
precisely that segment of the population that it had been calculated to weaken-namely, the
local notables in Palestine and other outlying provinces. See also id. at 417.
117. ALBERT M. HYAMSON, PALESTINE UNDER THE MANDATE 1920-1948, at 78-79 (1950).
Substantive law during the Mandate period was based on: (1) existing Ottoman codes; (2) newly
legislated ordinances; and (3) English common law, where neither of the first two were
applicable. Norman Bentwich, The Legal System of Palestine Under the Mandate 2 MIDDLE Ej. 33,
39 (1948).
118. Id.
119. STEIN, supra note 14, at 38-39; see alsoABRAHAM GRANOVSKY, LAND FOR THEJEWISH STATE
4 (1948) (providing figure of 1.8 million dunums).
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of the total land area of Palestine, it may have constituted as much as
one-fifth of the total cultivable land. 2 ' Thus, Jewish land purchases
certainly affected the Palestinian population to a greater extent than
mere numbers might suggest.121  The threat to indigenous rural
society was not simply the displacement of Palestinian peasants from
the land,122 but also the greater danger caused by preventing Arabs
from cultivating arable land in the future, "thereby hastening the time
when population pressure on existing land would require alteration
of the cropping system. 23
Zionist colonization in Palestine began in 1881, when a group of
Russian Jewish immigrants founded the Rishon-le-Zion colony in the
vicinity of present-day Tel Aviv.124  Over time, a variety of groups
formed, primarily in Europe, to provide funds and institutional
120. KAMEN, supra note 23, at 193; see also id. at 28 (estimating that in 1944Jews held 12%
of cultivable land); STEIN, supra note 14, at 39 (estimating that in 1948, Jews held 20% of
cultivable land).
121. The purchase of Arab lands by Jews greatly affected the consciousness of Zionist
functionaries and activists:
Whether it was avarice or need, self-preservation or greed, Palestinian Arab land sales
breathed life into Jewish aspirations and advanced Zionist goals. Indeed, Jews
purchased only a small percentage of the total area of Palestine under the Mandate.
The critical variable for Zionist motivation was Arab readiness to part with a portion
of their patrimony. Palestinian Arab land sales meant the absence of true commitment
to Palestinian nationalism. At a time of feverish anti-Zionist and anti-British sentiment,
Palestinian Arab land sales to Zionists showed that individual priorities were equal to
or more important than an emerging national movement.
STEIN, supra note 14, at 70. Kenneth Stein relates that "of the eighty-nine members elected to
the Arab Executive [the leading representative institution in the Palestinian Arab community
at the time] between 1920 andJune 1928, at least one quarter can be identified, personally or
through immediate family, as having directly participated in land sales tojews." Id at 67. Arab
and Jewish middlemen mediated land transactions between Arabs and Jews, attempting to
minimize contact between Jewish purchasers and Arab vendors to protect the prestige of the
latter. Id. at 71. In one method of transaction, an Arab landowner would "borrow" from the
Jewish National Fund, then default on the loan, leading to a court action for a "forced" sale of
the property used as collateral. Id. at 72. Many Arabs did not feel that they were selling their
homeland; rather, many were motivated by economics and not a desire to desert Palestine.
KAMEN, supra note 23, at 270. Moreover, many of the absentee owners who sold land to Zionists
were not, after the delineation of the Mandate, Palestinians. Ruedy, supra note 37, at 134.
122. The displacement of Palestinian peasants from the land area was exacerbated by the
practices adopted by the new settlers. The commitment to the redemption of Jewish labor
meant, for the most part, thatJews would work newly settled land and would exclude Arabs from
employment in the settlements. KAMEN, supra note 23, at 125, 272 (describing how Zionist
ideology of "self-labor" required exclusion of Arabs from employment in Jewish enterprises).
As previously mentioned, this commitment was not always honored. See supra note 37
(discussing how Zionists often employed Arab workers despite their ideological opposition to
Arab labor). In an effort to enforce this principle of Jewish labor, the organized Labor-Zion
faction advocated a radical separation betweenJewish and Arab economies. KAMEN, supra note
23, at 125.
123. KAMEN, supra note 23, at 259.
124. Jewish Colonization in Palestine, 1 PALESTINE Y.B. 205, 205 (1944-1945). Several aborted
attempts to establish Jewish colonies actually preceded the establishment of Rishon-le-Zion by
a few years; the date of 1881 thus marks the first permanent Zionist settlement in Palestine. Id.
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backing for the immigration of Jews to Palestinian agricultural
colonies." The most important of these organizations were the
PalestineJewish Colonization Association, established by Baron Hirsch
and later funded by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, which became the
most active agency devoted to Jewish acquisition of land in Palestine
in the pre-World War I phase;126 the Jewish National Fund, founded
in 1905 pursuant to a directive of the First Zionist Congress to form
a special institution for buying land as the property of the Jewish
people;127 and the Palestine Land Development Company, orga-
nized in 1909 to "satisfy the impulse of the individual Jew to buy a
plot of land" in Palestine.
128
Initially, Zionist colonization proceeded at a slow pace, both in
terms of the number ofJewish immigrants who came to Palestine and
of the amount of land purchased by Jews. 29 The pace of immigra-
tion and land acquisition quickened, however, with the formalization
of the British obligation to aid the Zionist movement and with the
incorporation of the Jewish Agency into the administrative structure
of the Mandate government,"' which was charged with the function
of facilitating the "ingathering" of Jewish immigrants.1 2 Article 6
of the Mandate stated:
The Administration of Palestine, while insuring the rights and
position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced,
shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and
shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency... close
settlement by Jews on the land, including state lands and waste
lands not required for public purposes.
33
Because the British administration was more vigilant and efficient
than its Ottoman predecessor, the growing class of large Arab
landowners lost the ability to accumulate property through privilege,
125. See AVNER, supra note 8, at 74-76 (outlining different methods of funding Jewish land
purchases in Palestine).
126. AVNERI, supra note 8, at 75.
127. See supra note 30 (discussing genesis ofJNF and its role in governing Israel).
128. A. GRANovsKY, AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE RECORD OF IsRAEL 27 (1956).
129. See GRANOVSKY, supra note 25, at 91 (establishing Jewish land holdings in Palestine in
1914 at only 418,000 dunum). TheJewish population during the 1900s, however, had risen to
38,754, an increase of about 15,000 from the inception of Zionist colonization in 1882.
McCARTHY, supra note 25, at 10, 13-14. The total population of Palestine in 1914-15 was
722,143. Id. at 10.
130. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 600-01.
131. See supra note 6 (discussing role ofJewish Agency in mandatory system).
132. Mandate for Palestine (and Transjordan), art. 6, reprinted in WRIGHT, supra note 6, at
601; see HYAMSON, supra note 117, at 115-16 (discussing incorporation of Jewish Agency into
British Mandate Government).
133. MANDATE FOR PALESTINE (AND TRANSJORDAN), art. 6, r7rinted inWRIGHT, supra note 6,
at 601.
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access to information, and mastery of informal political structures as
they had done during the Ottoman period.1 14 As a result, many of
these Arab landowners opted to sell their estates, and found willing
purchasers in the various Zionist settlement organizations. 3 5  A
number of these estates, the titles to which were legally vested in the
individual landowners, still were being cultivated under the customary
musha'system."6 Upon sale of the estate, villagers found themselves
subject to eviction, and without legal recourse.
137
Early in the period of British rule, administrators recognized the
potential dangers of a landless Palestinian peasantry."8 The princi-
pal contributing factor to the transformation of the Palestinian free
peasantry into tenants and agricultural laborers was rural indebted-
ness. i"9 Beginning in the nineteenth century, Palestinian peasants
relied increasingly on moneylenders who were based in the towns and
who charged usurious rates for loans needed to pay taxes and
purchase seed and other implements necessary to cultivate the
land.141 When the Palestinian peasants could not repay the loans,
the creditors took possession of the debtor's property.141  The
economic disruptions to Palestine's rural economy caused by World
War I, a series of bad harvests due to poor rainfall, and the benefits
large estate holders derived from selling their land to Zionist
purchasers all served to hasten the process of "proletarianizing" the
Palestinian peasantry during the Mandate period.1
4 1
To forestall the growing crisis in the agricultural sector, the
government enacted a Land Transfer Ordinance in 1921 that
provided tenants with formal legal protection from evictions. 43 The
134. See STEIN, supra note 14, at 33-34 (describing how more highly educated Jews had
advantage over Arabs in dealing with British bureaucracy); see also supra notes 92-116 and
accompanying text (discussing state of land law in Palestine under Ottoman rule).
135. SeeSTEIN, supra note 14, at 33-34 (noting that under efficiency of British Mandate, Arabs
lost control of their lands to Jews).
136. See STEIN, supra note 14, at 33-34 (describing how presence of large shareholder in
musha' village, as well as notable control over peasants, hindered land reform by mandatory
government); see also supra notes 103-116 (discussing implications of musha'system).
137. Khalidi, supra note 6, at 211.
138. See Kenneth Stein, Legal Protecion and Circumvention of Rights for Cultivators in Mandatory
Palestine, in PALESTINIAN SOC'Y & POL 233, 238 (Joel S. Migdal ed., 1980) (noting that British
attempted to halt loss of land to Arabs by closing Land Registry office in 1918).
139. STEIN, supra note 14, at 19.
140. STEIN, supra note 14, at 19.
141. STEIN, supra note 14, at 19 (listing tithe and heavy taxes among reasons for poverty and
debt of rural Palestinians). Another practice, in which Palestinian peasants informally
mortgaged their properties in order to bribe Ottoman conscription officers for exemptions from
military service, also caused rural Palestinian indebtedness. Id.
142. See KAMEN, supra note 23, at 133-35; STEIN, supra note 14, at 65-70.
143. Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920-1921, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATION OF PALESTINE 1918-
1925, at 62-65 (Norman Bentwich ed., 1926) [hereinafter Transfer of Land Ordinance). Britain,
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ordinance required the parties to submit a petition for disposition of
immovable property to a Land Registry Office, and to show that the
transaction would leave tenants with enough land for their subsis-
tence. 144 Vendors and purchasers eventually developed techniques
for circumventing the ordinance, often by paying or pressuring
tenants to leave the land prior to transactions for sale.
145
In 1929, a new ordinance providing compensation for "disturbed"
tenants virtually legalized the aforementioned evasive practices
adopted in response to the 1921 ordinance by requiring payments to
displaced tenants instead of requiring that tenants retain sufficient
land for sustenance. 14' Although the Mandate Government contin-
ued to tinker with policies directed toward the protection of agricul-
tural tenants, it failed to provide the alternative source of capital that
would have aided the peasantry in breaking its reliance on the
moneylenders, merchants, and landlords.'47 As a result, fellaheen1e
frequently sold land to Jewish purchasers in order to maintain
financial solvency.
149
Until the early 1930s, the majority of Zionist land purchases in
Palestine were from large estate holders. 15°  After that period,
in extending legal protection to Palestinians for rights and interests in land, was acting well
within the traditions of colonial administrations. According to Merry, "[T
] he law provided a way
for the colonial state to restrain the more brutal aspects of settlers' exploitation of land and
labor." Merry, supra note 10, at 891; see also Barsh, supra note 5, at 45 n.10 (stating that
provincial officials often removed unruly settlers) (citing 1 OYSTER BAYTOWN REcoRDs 520 (Cox
ed., 1916)). In South Africa, for example, the Black Land Act of 1913 recognized the existing
state of land ownership by Africans, demarcated reserves, and prohibited (by criminal sanctions)
land transfers by sale or lease to Europeans. Olmesdahl, supra note 5, at 287. In North
America, the colonies, and later the U.S. Federal Government, sought to regulate land transfers
between American Indians and Europeans, and generally to monopolize the power to extinguish
American Indian title. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 14243 (1810) (holding that
state may extinguish title held by American Indian); KAWASHIMA, supra note 21, at 70 (observing
that Puritan governments oversaw sale of land to Indians in effort to control land and protect
rights of American Indians); Springer, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that colonial governments
forbade direct purchases of land from American Indians). The same practice was adopted in
the Native Land Purchase Ordinance of 1846 in New Zealand. Williams, supra note 5, at 428.
144. See Transfer of Land Ordinance, §§ 5, 8, supra note 143, at 62-63.
145. Ruedy, supra note 37, at 131.
146. Draft Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
PALEFIsNE No. 237,June 16, 1929, 710-14 (enacted as Protection of Cultivators Ordinance No.
27 of 1929, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PALEsTiNE No. 240, Aug. 1, 1929, 860).
The ordinance required one year notice for the termination of any tenancy in land of greater
than two years duration, and required compensation for any loss or expense directly attributable
to quitting the land. Id.; see also KAMEN, supra note 23, at 153, 157 (describing effects of 1920
and subsequent land transfer ordinances).
147. STEIN, supra note 14, at 64. Another Protection of Cultivators Ordinance (POCO) was
issued in 1933, then substantially amended in 1936. See id. at 249-55 (detailing extent and effect
of 1933 POCO).
148. STEIN, supra note 14, at 4 (describingfellaheen as Palestinian agricultural laborers).
149. STEIN, supra note 14, at 189.
150. STEIN, supra note 14, at 178.
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however, small owner-occupiers and musha'shareholders provided an
increasing share of land to Zionist buyers."' In fact, funding was
the only substantial limitation on Zionist land acquisition during the
entire Mandate period; there was never a shortage of willing
vendors.152
The British Mandate's "dual obligation," as it became known, to the
Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine became a primary policy
dilemma. British actions oscillated in favor of one community or the
other, depending on political expediencies within and outside of
Palestine, and on the personal political sympathies of British Mandate
officers.'53  The ordinances of 1921 and 1929,154 for example, were
adopted in the aftermath of severe Arab riots against Zionist
colonization. 55 In 1939, with the Second World War looming, the
British Government issued a White Paper that narrowly restricted
Jewish land purchases to specific zones in Palestine, a move that
reflected British fears that its support of the Zionist movement would
drive the Arab states into the Axis camp. 156
On the other hand, the failure of the Mandate Government to
enforce legislation implemented in 1941 to annex water rights to land
to which the water rights would naturally appertain was the conse-
quence of local Jewish opposition.1 7 ManyJews had procured water
in areas that the 1939 White Paper had prohibited Jews from
151. STEIN, supra note 14, at 178. Nevertheless, it appears that most of the land purchased
by Zionist settlers in Palestine was through transactions with large, and often absentee, owners.
Rashid Khalidi presents evidence that between 1878 and 1907, 58% (143,577 dunums) of all
land sales to Jews were by non-Palestinian absentee landlords; 36% (88,689 dunums) were by
Palestinian absentee landlords; and only 6% (15,200 dunums) by local landlords or peasants.
Khalidi, supra note 6, at 225. Khalidi suggests that this pattern was likely maintained through
1948. Id. His suggestion is partially corroborated by estimates of Walter Lehn, based on reports
from the Jewish Agency that, of the total land purchased by Jews by 1936, 52% was from large
absentee owners, 24.6% from large but local landowners, 13.4% from institutions such as
churches, foreign companies, and the like, and only 9.4% from small farmers. Walter Lehn, The
Jewish National Fund, 3J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1974, at 74, 94-95.
152. KAMEN, supra note 23, at 150; STEIN, supra note 14, at 37.
153. See HuREwrrz, supra note 15, at 24 (describing indecisiveness of British mandatory
policy); STEIN, supra note 14, at 35-79 (chronicling oscillating policy of Mandate period).
154. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (describing 1921 and 1929 ordinances as
British effort to assist Palestinian peasants retain land).
155. QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 18. The causes of the 1929 riots, which resulted in the deaths
of 133 Jews, were investigated by the Shaw Commission, appointed for that purpose by the
Mandate Government. Id. The commission identified two principal causes of the riots: alarm
thatJewish immigration and land purchases would lead to Arab destitution, and fears of political
subjugation to the new colonizers. Id. at 19. Both the 1921 and the 1929 ordinances were
strongly criticized by the Jewish sector in Palestine as unwarranted restrictions on land
acquisitions and as violations of the terms of the Mandate spelled out in Article 6. See HYAMSON,
supra note 117, at 80-87.
156. See generally HUREWrrz, supra note 15, at 94-111 (describing Britain's reasons for
adopting 1939 White Paper and its impact on Arab nationalists).
157. DOREEN WAR iNER, LAND AND POVERTY IN TriE MIDDLE EAST 73-74 (1948).
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purchasing; theJews sought to neutralize this prohibition by maintain-
ing control over the water supply in these areas, which was vital to the
cultivation of the land.
58
The Zionist movement enjoyed considerable advantages over the
Palestinian community in pressing its case before the British adminis-
tration. The Zionists' mastery of English and other European
languages, their familiarity with British culture, and their experience
in dealing with complex bureaucracy assisted the movement in
gaining a substantial voice in administrative affairs.'59 The Jewish
agency, for example, successfully lobbied the Mandate Government
to concede or lease approximately 195,000 dunums of state domain
to Jewish settlers by 1947.1'
While the five percent of Palestine acquired via the program of
Zionist land acquisition by the end of the Mandate period represent-
ed a geographical nucleus for the establishment of a Jewish state,'61
the viability of the future state was contingent upon significant
expansion beyond this nucleus. 162 The partition plan for Palestine,
adopted by the United Nations in November 1947,163 had been
drawn to encompass as much land under Jewish ownership into the
158. Id. at 74.
159. STEIN, supra note 14, at 214 (maintaining that "[t]he Arabs' primary experience was of
survival against nature, and they had little experience in confronting the bureaucratic and
legislative machinery introduced by the Ottomans and the British").
160. Ruedy, supra note 37, at 133. This was, of course, an obligation of the British under
Article 6 of the Mandate. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing incorporation of
Jewish Agency into administrative structure of Mandate Government). The Jewish Agency,
however, did not hesitate to classify large tracts of lands that were occupied by permanent Arab
tenants as vacant in order to allow the Mandate Government to open them for Jewish
colonization. Ruedy, supra note 37, at 133. This practice is reminiscent of land classification
in Hawaii:
Legal documents after 1839 often speak of "waste land" when referring to wild or
fallow land which, in a swidden system, must remain that way for many years. This
conceptual confusion, which itself reflects a puritanical compulsion to view anything
at rest, or in its natural state, as waste, has done much to justify the separation of
Hawaiians from their lands for it encouraged the view that the maka'ainana
[commoners] did not use and therefore could not claim, such lands.
Lam, supra note 5, at 123 n.19.
161. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussingJewish landholdings in Palestine
in 1940s).
162. ABRAHAM GRANOvsKY, LAND FOR THEJEWISH STATE 4 (1948). That the state would need
to expand beyond its geographical nucleus was true not only because the limited Zionist land
purchases were insufficient to support the anticipated large scale Jewish immigration, but also
because of the dispersion, and resultant military vulnerability, of the 305 Jewish colonies
scattered throughout Palestine. Id. This dispersion occurred despite the Zionist movement's
best efforts, especially beginning in the late 1920s, to purchase contiguous plots. Id. Finally,
these settlements were relatively sparsely populated; as late as 1946, seventy percent of theJewish
population lived in urban areas. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, The Demographic Transformation of
Palstine, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE 139, 153 (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod ed., 1971).
163. See supra note 15 (discussing 1947 U.N. partition plan for Palestine, withdrawal by Great
Britain, and subsequent actions by new Israeli state to acquire land).
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Jewish state as possible.'" Nonetheless, even within that area, which
in aggregate amounted to fifty-six percent of the total land area of
Palestine,"' only eleven and one-half percent was controlled by
Jews."  With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, "the Jewish
national movement had achieved sovereignty over the land, but it did
not possess the ownership of land needed to pursue its immediate
goals.""6 Jewish acquisition of more land was, therefore, virtually
inevitable. 1"
III. LAND ACQUISITIONS IN ISRAEL AFTER 1948
Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, the same day
that Great Britain terminated mandatory rule and evacuated its troops
from Palestine.1" 9 The following day, the surrounding Arab states,
bent on preventing Israel's establishment, formally declared war
against Israel; this 1948 conflict would prove to be the first of a series
of Arab-Israeli wars. 7 °  In fact, fighting had begun in earnest
between irregular Zionist and Arab forces as early as January
1948.171 By the end of the hostilities, forces of the new state of
Israel controlled over 20,000 square kilometers of former mandatory
Palestine, or about seventy-seven percent of Palestine's land area.
172
164. GRANOVSKy, supra note 162, at 4. Only 30 of the 305Jewish settlements in Palestine fell
outside of the area controlled by the Jewish state. These settlements constituted only about
seven percent of Jewish landholdings in former Palestine (132,000 dunums out of 1,822,00).
Id.
165. SAMI HADAWI, BITTER HARvEST 78 (1989) (observing that remaining 44% was
apportioned between proposed Palestinian state and international regime overJerusalem and
its immediate environs). One of the primary reasons that the Arabs rejected the partition plan
was because the plan allocated more than half of the country, including its most fertile areas,
to the Jewish state when at the time Jews constituted approximately one-third of the population.
Id. at 76. Even with the partition plan's gerrymandering, Jews would have constituted a bare
majority within the prospective borders of the Jewish state, which would have included a
substantial Arab minority of 497,000 persons. Id.
166. In absolute terms,Jews owned 1.7 million dunums of 14.5 million dunums allocated to
the Jewish state. GRANOVSKY, supra note 162, at 12.
167. KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 50.
168. These future acquisitions would necessarily come from Arab owners, as the state domain
in the prospective Jewish state was a meager 420,000 dunums. GRANOVSKY, supra note 162, at
23.
169. QUIGLEY, supra note 7. at 64.
170. See ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 50-51 (discussing rising tensions between
Arabs and Jews beginning with fears of Arabs in regard to overwhelming recognition of and
support for newJewish state).
171. See BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949, at 29
(1987) (stating that inJanuary 1948, Arab Liberation Army and Arab volunteers went into Israel
and launched attack); see also SIMHA FLAPAN, ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINIANS 297 (1979) (stating
that by May 12, 1948, several days before outbreak of formal war, Zionist forces controlled nearly
all territory assigned to Jewish state by the partition plan, and were already moving into other
areas).
172. QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 89.
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The remaining 8000 square kilometers, distributed in Gaza and the
West Bank, fell within Egyptian or Jordanian control, respectively.""
A. Opportunity: The Palestinian Mass Exodus of 1948
The massive flight of Palestinian refugees in the 1948 war presented
Israel with an unprecedented opportunity for land acquisition. The
land abandoned by the refugees constituted an estimated eighty
percent of the territory falling within Israeli jurisdiction at the
conclusion of the 1949 truce agreements. 74 Between December
1947 and November 1948, some 770,000 to 780,000 Palestinians left
the areas of Palestine that would fall under the authority of the new
state of Israel. 7" Some Palestinians, particularly those of middle-
and upper-class background, had made a relatively orderly retreat
from Palestine in the few months directly following the passage of the
UN partition plan in late 1947.17' The vast majority of Palestinian
villagers and urban poor, however, fled in nearly complete disarray in
the few months surrounding the formal outbreak of war between
Israel and the Arab states in May 1948.177 Still others left their
173. See QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 89 (discussing Israel's armistice agreements and resulting
territorial gains). Although most of this territory was either allocated to Israel in the partition
plan or was won by military conquest, an Arab populated area not originally allocated to the
Jewish state, known as the "Triangle," was ceded to Israel by Jordan in the 1949 Armistice
Agreements. Id. at 97; see also Baruch Kipnis, Regional Deveplment and Strategy Considerations in
Multi-Community Land ofIsrae in ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS IN ISRAEL 21, 28-29 (John E. Hoffman
et al. eds., 1988) (stating that "Triangle," together with Upper Galilee, another area not slated
for Jewish state but conquered in 1948 war, held 83% of Israel's Arab population in 1948).
174. See Ruedy, supra note 37, at 135 (discussing United Nations Conciliation Commission
for Palestine's estimate regarding land ownership).
175. See Abu-Lughod, supra note 162, at 161 (estimating number of persons displaced as
result of 1948 war); see also EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, THE U.N. AND THE PALESTNiAN REFUGEES: A
STUDY IN NONTERRrrORIAL ADMINISTRATION 38-39 (1971) (discussing United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) established by United Nations to provide emergency services to
Palestinian refugees). UNRWA estimated its charges at nearly 900,000, some of which were not
"genuine refugees in need," but rather residents of Arab-controlled border regions whose lands,
nonetheless, fell under Israeli control, or who had otherwise lost their livelihoods as a result of
the war. BUEHRIG, supra; see alsoAVI PLASCOV, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES INJORDAN 1948-1957,
at 5-8 (1981) (discussing how Israeli wartime occupation of areas falling outside Jewish state
created "Jordanian citizens," "Israeli Arabs," or "Stateless Palestinians").
176. See Erskine B. Childers, The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees, in THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF PALESTINE, supra note 37, at 181 (explaining exodus of well-to-do Palestinians to
surrounding Arab countries). Perhaps 30,000 such persons left Palestine in late 1947 and early
1948. Id.; see also Bisharat, supra note 86 (recounting that 75,000 middle- and upper-class
Palestinians had relocated from areas slated to become Jewish state to West Bank before 1948
War).
177. SeeMORIS, supra note 171, at 128-31 (discussing collapse of rule of law, administration,
and communication in Arab cities and towns). The causes of the Palestinians' mass exodus
during this period represent a continuing controversy in the history of the region. For many
years, Israeli and other writers uniformly disavowed anyJewish responsibility for the Palestinians'
flight. See, e.g., A. GRANOTr, AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE RECORD OF ISRAEL 86 (1956) (stating
that "Jews were not responsible for ... Arab flight");JOSEPH SCHECHTMAN, THE ARAB REFUGEE
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homes and villages for other locales within Palestine, finding
themselves, in the aftermath of the war, under either Israeli, Egyptian,
or Jordanian rule.
78
Initially, Israeli policies toward the refugees were ambivalent. In
the months directly following the cessation of the war, the Israeli
Government permitted tens of thousands of Palestinians to return to
their homes and villages in Israel.179  The Government's reluctance
to permit the repatriation of all refugees, however, soon hardened
into firm resolve to bar such repatriation.1 81 Israeli sympathizers
defended this policy by characterizing the Palestinian exodus, and the
massive influx ofJews to Israel from Arab countries in the immediate
PROBLEM 4-10 (1952) (discussing Palestinian flight as reaction to Arabs' failure to defeat state
of Israel). One claim advanced was that the Arab states, via radio broadcast, exhorted refugees
to vacate Palestine in order to facilitate the military operations of the Arab armies. Speech of
Abba Eban (Nov. 17, 1958), reprinted in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLicT 151, 152-53 (Walter Laqueur ed., 1971) ("As early as the first
months of 1948 The Arab League issued orders exhorting the people to seek a temporary refuge
in neighboring countries, later to return to their abodes in the wake of the victorious Arab
armies and obtain their share of abandoned Jewish property.") (quoting The Research Group
for European Migration Problems). But see Erskine B. Childers, The Wordless Wish: From Citizens
to Refugees, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE, supra note 37, at 181 n.59 (concluding, based
on study of those broadcasts monitored by BBC, that claims were baseless).
Arab writers have consistently maintained that the Palestinian community was deliberately
driven out according to a preconceived Zionist campaign of expulsion. See, e.g., Walid Khalidi,
Zionist Military Operations in Palestine, 1 April 1948-15 May 1948, Within the Framework ofPlan Dalet,
in FROM HAVEN TO CONQUEST: READINGS IN ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM UNTIL
1948, at 856-57 (Walid Khalidi ed., 1971) (listing military operations designed to expel
Palestinians). Acts of terrorism against Palestinians by Zionist paramilitary organizations, such
as the April 1948 massacre of over 250 Arabs in the village of Deir Yassin, clearly played a role
in stimulating Palestinian flight. See Jon Kimche, Deir Yassin and Jaffa, in FROM HAVEN TO
CONQUEST: READINGS IN ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM UNTIL 1948, supra, at 775-78.
A recent body of literature emerging from Israel, based partly on newly opened archives and
whose authors are dubbed "revisionists" for their efforts to augment or counter traditional Israeli
historiography, suggests that, while many causes contributed to the Palestinian exodus, Zionist
military forces expelled a large percentage of refugees with the tacit, if not explicit, approval of
the Zionist political leadership. MORRIS, supra note 171, at 128-29 (stating that while Jews were
surprised at vast numbers of Arabs that left, it was "phenomenon to be exploited"); see also
SIMHA FLAPAN, THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL: MYTHS AND REALITIES 81-118 (1987) (discussing voluntary
and involuntary exodus of Arabs). Certainly one of the reasons for the disorderly mass flight
of the villagers and urban poor in 1948 was the very fact that it had been preceded by the
departure of significant portions of the Palestinian community's leadership. Benny Morris,
Debate on the 1948 Exodus: Response to Finkelstein and Masalha, 21 J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn
1991, at 98, 100.
178. FLAPAN, supra note 171, at 344. Approximately 450,000 Palestinian refugees in Jordan
were granted citizenship; of these, perhaps 350,000 settled in the portion of Palestine occupied
by Jordan that became known as the "West Bank" or the portions ofJordan lying to the west of
the Jordan River. PLASCOV, supra note 175, at 16, 32-33.
179. Abu-Lughod, supra note 162, at 161 (discussing demographic changes in Palestine).
180. DON PERETZ, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE ARABS 72-79 (1956) (discussing strong Israeli
opposition to repatriation); TOM SEGEV, 1949: THE FIRST ISRAELIS 30 (1986) (describing
opposition to Palestinian refugees' return).
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post-independence years, as an "exchange of populations."181 The
Israeli Government also pointed to other such exchanges, such as
between India and Pakistan, as precedent for its stance.
18 2
B. Added Incentives: Challenges of the Formative Years
The exigencies facing the new state of Israel only intensified the
Zionist movement's impetus for land acquisitions in the pre-state
period. In the formative years of the state and its economy, Israel
faced tremendous infrastructural and financial challenges, in addition
to the costs of defense and security.183 Among the most pressing of
these challenges was providing for the massive influx of new Jewish
immigrants. 8 4 During the first three years of Israel's existence, the
country's Jewish population doubled with the arrival of 684,000 new
immigrants.185  Abandoned Arab land and other property clearly
played an important role in providing for the needs of these
newcomers. Indeed, 350 of the 370 new Jewish settlements estab-
lished between 1948 and 1953 were located on absentee Arab
property."S In 1954 alone, nearly one-third of the new immigrants
were settled in urban absentee areas.187  Land acquisitions also
provided the fledgling Israeli Government with a vital source of
revenue, and thus a measure of economic stability, in a period fraught
181. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 90-91 (stating that Israeli newspapers described Jewish
immigration and Arab emigration as "exchange of populations"); see SCHECHTMAN, supra note
177, at 91 (pointing out that airlift of more than 120,000 IraqiJews to Israel in 1950-51 made
room for 120,000 refugees who "could now enter Iraq, occupy the abandoned homes, and find
opportunities to earn their livelihood"). For a recent expositor of this view, see Malvina
Halberstam, Sf-Determination in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Meaning, Myth, and Politics, 21 N.Y.UJ.
INT'L L. & PoL. 465, 477-80 (1989) (explaining why Arab countries do not solve Palestinian
refugee problem).
182. SEGEv, supra note 180, at 81 (noting several precedents of expropriations, including
Turkey's expropriation of Greek and Armenian properties, Bulgaria's expropriation of Greek
properties, and Romania's expropriation of German properties).
183. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 52-53.
184. LusriCu, supra note 30, at 100-01.
185. QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 101-02 (stating that roughly half of these immigrants were
from European countries and half were from Middle Eastern countries); see also KRETZMER, supra
note 28, at 3 (stating that many "arrived destitute, and were totally dependent on the institutions
of the new state and of theJewish people to provide them with housing, employment, and basic
services, such as education and health").
Periods of rapid population growth elsewhere have also stimulated demands for land. See, e.g.,
JANET A. McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1887-1934, at 4 (1991)
(reporting that U.S. population soared from 63 million to 106 million between 1890 and 1920,
prompting settlers to push into arid and semi-arid regions of West and placing renewed pressure
on Native Americans to yield their lands).
186. PERET, supra note 180, at 143.
187. PERETz, supra note 180, at 143. Peretz further notes that the Arabs left "338 towns and
villages and large parts of 94 other cities and town, containing nearly a quarter of all the
buildings in Israel. Ten thousand shops, business and stores were left in Jewish hands." Id.
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with difficulties, including the Arab states' economic boycott against
Israel.1
88
In the aftermath of the 1948 war, infiltration into Israel (armed and
otherwise) from adjacent regions occurred regularly; military concerns
were, therefore, the driving force behind many land seizures by Israel
in the border areas.1 89  The Israeli Government designed land
seizures both to create buffer zones along the borders that were clear
of Arab residents and to facilitate the upbuilding of ajewish presence
along these borders.9 0
As the Palestinian minority within Israel began to regroup politically
and to assert nationalist aspirations, especially in the 1960s and
1970s,191 Israeli land seizures prevented the Palestinians from
establishing important metropolitan centers in their areas. Further-
more, Israeli land acquisition prohibited the development of
territorially contiguous population centers that might have become
seats of agitation for Arab political autonomy. 92  In the northern
district of Galilee, home to a large proportion of Israel's total Arab
population and to relatively few Jews, the Arabs had a particularly
strong fear that such land seizures would occur.
x93
188. See PERETZ, supra note 180, at 143 (describing how abandoned property contributed
greatly to making Israel viable). According to Peretz:
In 1951-52, former Arab citrus groves produced 1.25 million boxes of fruit of which .4
millions were exported... which provided for 10% of the country's foreign currency
earnings from exports in 1951. In 1949, the olives produced from abandoned Arab
groves was [sic] Israel's third largest export, ranking after citrus and diamonds.
Id.
189. Abner Cohen, Arab Border Villages, in ISRAEL: A STUDY OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 17 (1965).
190. See WILLIAM W. HARRIS, TAKING ROOT 67 (1980) (discussing Israeli Government's
colonization of these border area settlements (nahalim) with young, able-bodied Israelis who
were intended to serve as first line of defense against invasion and infiltration); cf Andr6 Dirlik,
The Algerian Response to Settlement, in SETTLER REGIMES IN AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: THE
ILLUSION OF ENDURANCE 76 (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod & Baha Abu-Laban eds., 1974) (discussing
failure of conventional warfare against Algerian tribes' irregular forces and how this first induced
French civilian settlement of country's interior because larger presence was regarded as
necessary to hold hinterland, given manpower limitations of army).
191. SeeMOSHE SHEMESH, THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY, 1959-1974: ARAB POLITICS AND THE PLO
171 (1988) (discussing rebirth of Palestinian nationalism on West Bank beginning in 1968); see
alsoALAIN GRESH, THE PLO: THE STRUGGLE WITHIN 244-48 (1983) (summarizing rise in political
activity by Palestinian organizations during 1960s and 1970s).
192. Oren Yiftachel, State Policies, Land Contro and an Ethnic Minority: The Arabs in the Galilee
Region, Israe, 9 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING D: SOCIETY AND SPACE 329, 335-36 (1991). In
comparing Israel to other deeply divided societies, Yiftachel argues that Israel's attempt to break
up and physically segregate its Arab population into small enclaves may in fact be counterpro-
ductive, stimulating rather than mitigating hostility toward the state. Yiftachel, supra note 4, at
130-33.
193. Kipnis, supra note 173, at 28-29. A confidential memorandum from the Galilee District
Commissioner, Israel Koenig, to then Prime Minister Rabin, found its way into the Israeli press
in September 1976 and reflected Israeli consternation over the Arab population of Galilee:
There is ground for serious apprehensions that within the next decade an Arab
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C. New Justifications: The Cant of Conquest
The Zionist movement added the war of 1948 to the already
considerable array of arguments that the movement used to justify its
land acquisition in the pre-state period. The Zionists concluded that
the Arab residents of Palestine had forfeited any entitlement to the
protection of their land by their violent opposition to Israel's
founding.1 14 This view was, of course, a somewhat careless and self-
serving attribution. Irrespective of the subjective feelings of the
indigenous Palestinians regarding Zionism and the creation of an
Israeli state, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians had
nothing to do with the decision of the Arab states to attack the new
Jewish state"5 and played no role in the actual fighting in 1948;
indeed, most Palestinians became the war's victims.' Because of
the strong antipathy many Israelis felt toward the Arabs on account
of the war, it is not surprising that such distinctions were never
drawn.
197
The Israeli Government has not employed as an official or legal
political and demographic takeover of the Acre and Nazareth areas will occur.... It
must be taken into account that at one of the stages of the hostile political activities
a demand of some kind will be raised to hold a referendum in northern Israel where
the Arab population is in the majority.
Translated from the Hebrew daily Al Hamishmar, September 7, 1976, and reproduced in full as
The Koenig Report, 6J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 1976, at 190-93. Koenig's suggestions for policy
responses to these perceived trends included the expansion ofJewish settlement in areas where
"the contiguity of the Arab population is prominent," and the examination of the "possibility
of diluting Arab population concentrations." Id. Similar concerns have directed Israeli
settlement patterns in the Occupied Territories. See Ibrahim Matar, Israeli Settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, 6 J. PAIESTr STUD., Autumn 1981, at 93, 93-94 (examining Israeli
Government's policies and tactics for acquiring land).
194. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 71 (discussing passions and temptations that led some Israelis
to loot). Not infrequently, indigenous peoples' violent resistance to the imposition of colonial
rule has provided a rationale for colonial land expropriations. This was true in Algeria. See
Ruedy, supra note 5, at 54 (describing increased French interest in seizing plains after Abd el
Kader declared war against French in 1939). Following the massacre of English settlers in
Virginia in 1622, a colonial leader expressed this view:
Our hands which before were tied with gentlenesse and faire usage, are now set at
liberty by the treacherous violence of the Sausages [Savages] .... So that we, who
hitherto have had possession of no more ground then their waste, and our purchase
at a valuable consideration to their owne contentment, gained; may now by right of
Warre, and law of Nations, invade the Country, and destroy them who sought to
destroy us .... Now their cleared grounds in all their villages (which are situate in the
fruitfullest places of the land) shall be inhabited by us ....
Washburn, supra note 5, at 21.
195. JOHN KIMCHE & DAVID KIMCHE, A CLASH OF DESTINIES: THE ARAB-JEWISH WAR AND THE
FOUNDING OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 149-54 (1960) (discussing Arab leaders' blueprints for
attacking Israel).
196. IsRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 51-52 (stating that by October 14, 1948,
Arab forces included no more than 5000 fighters from Hajj Amin al Husayni's Palestine
Liberation Force).
197. LUSTICK, supra note 30, at 86.
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justification for the takeover of Arab property in Israel the argument
that the Palestinians' rights to their lands had been compromised by
their hostility to Zionism and Israel. On the other hand, it was a
strongly held popular sentiment, and no doubt triggered the
widespread looting of Arab property byJews that occurred during and
immediately following the war.'98 "[T]he moral sense of the few
who were attacked by the many and managed to survive, justified the
looting of the enemy's property," wrote an Israeli official in a secret
report on the problem.199 The sentiment thus contributed to an
ideological climate that Israel later found congenial when seizing
Palestinian lands.2
Israel's establishment occurred three years after the conclusion of
World War II. Even without Arab hostility to Zionism, the events of
the Holocaust lent a strong sense of urgency, and even moral
imperative, to Zionist efforts.2 1  The Zionists might have acknowl-
edged and rationalized injustices to individual Arabs as regrettable but
inevitable costs of achieving the higher goals of rescuing individual
Jews from persecution and reconstituting a Jewish society.
202
Moreover, many EuropeanJews viewed Arab hostility toward Zionism,
and later toward the state of Israel, as part of the continuous threat
to the existence of the Jews-a virtual extension of the Holocaust.
23
As an Israeli mizrachi (Jew of Middle Eastern background), Ella Shohat
has stated:
The master narrative of universal Jewish victimization has been
crucial for the Israeli "ingathering" of peoples from such diverse
geographies, languages, cultures, and histories, as well as for the
claim that the Jewish nation faces a common historical enemy in
Muslim Arabs. Associating Arabs with Nazis . .. projects a Jewish
European nightmare onto the structurally distinct political
dynamics of the Middle East. Sephardi ["Spanish" Jews, or
descendants ofJews who fled the Spanish Inquisition, generally to
198. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 68-72 (discussing looting of property by Israeli soldiers during
war).
199. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 70-71 (quoting Custodian of Abandoned Property).
200. Another justificatory argument occasionally employed by the Israeli press was that
because many Jews left Middle Eastern countries after 1948 amidst an atmosphere of hostility
and distrust, they were forced to abandon property or sell it at abnormally depressed rates. Just
as the Palestinian exodus and influx of Jewish immigrants constituted an "exchange of
populations," there was also a concomitant "exchange of properties" in 1948. SEGEV, supra note
180, at 90-91.
201. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 48-49.
202. See DAVID K. SHIPLER, ARAB ANDJEW: WOUNDED SPIRITS IN A PROMISED LAND 352 (1986)
(discussing Holocaust as it relates to Arab-Israeli conflict).
203. See Davis, supra note 27, at 42-43 (discussing Zionist reactions to Arab hostility and Arab
rhetoric).
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the Ottoman Empire] Jews experienced an utterly different history
within the Arab world than that which haunts the European
memories of Ashkenazi [Central and Eastern European Jews] Jews;
the conflation of the Muslim-Arab with the archetypical European
oppressors of Jews strategically understates Israel's colonial-settler
dispossession of Palestinian people."'
The wartime events thus provided the new state of Israel with a
historic opportunity to expand its land base. As this Article explores
in the following subpart, the war also left Israel with authority over a
Palestinian Arab minority that was incapable, then and now, of
effectively resisting the erosion of its land base in favor of Jewish
settlement.
D. Israel's Control of its Arab Minority
Defeat had fragmented, demoralized, and traumatized2 5 the
120,000 or more Palestinians who remained in the areas falling under
Israeli jurisdiction after truce arrangements in 1949.206 These
Palestinians were largely adrift without the guidance of their departed
traditional political leadership.0 7 In such conditions, Israel's new
Arab minority was ill-equipped to resist or influence any state policies.
While the social and political position of the Palestinian minority
in Israel has changed in the forty-five years since Israel's establish-
ment, its status in the Israeli nation has continued to be marginal.2 8
While enjoying nearly full formal equality as citizens,21 Israeli Arabs
continue to face private and institutional forms of discrimination in
many spheres of social and political life, 6 including employ-
204. Ella Shohat, RethinkingJews and Muslims; QuincentennialReflections, MIDDLE E. REP., Sept.-
Oct. 1992, at 25, 27-28.
205. Khalil Nakhleh, Cultural Determinants of Palestinian Collective Identity: The Case oftheArabs
in Israe NEW OUTLOOK, Oct.-Nov. 1975, at 31, 34 (describing Palestinian identity as result of
1948 war).
206. Abu-Lughod, supra note 162, at 160.
207. Nakhleh, supra note 205, at 31, 34.
208. Sandra A. Garcia, Israeli Arabs: Partners in Pluralism or Ticking Time Bomb?, 7 ETHNIcrIY
15,18-26 (1980) (detailing changes within Israeli-Arab community and suggesting that Arabs are
not true partners with Israel in democratic pluralism).
209. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 121 (stating that Declaration of Establish-
ment of state of Israel grants and guarantees to Israel's Arab population equal religious, social,
and political rights). The sole Israeli law that explicitly discriminates on the basis of ethnicity
or national origin is the Law of Return, which grants Jews automatic citizenship upon
immigration to Israel. KRETRMER, supra note 28, at 36.
210. SeeKRETZMER, supra note 28, at 116 (focusing on three spheres of discrimination against
Arabs by Israeli Government: budgetary discrimination, resource allocation, and implementa-
tion of laws). One dimension of the problem relates to the nature of Israeli administrative
culture. After completing an extensive study on the Israeli bureaucracy, David Rosenbloom
commented that the Israeli bureaucracy "is characterized by the lack of a service ethic, weak
formalization, and a high degree of personalization," and that, as a result, the bureaucracy does
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ment,21 education, 21 2 housing,213 financial support for local gov-
ernment,214 government services, 215  military service, 216  access to
land and water resources,
21a7 and the criminal justice system.
21 8
The relative acquiescence of the Palestinian minority in Israel to its
marginal status in Israeli society has been notable 9.2 " Taking this
acquiescence as his point of inquiry, Professor Ian Lustick explains
Israel's success in controlling its Arab citizens by reference to Israeli
policies of "segmentation" (the physical and institutional isolation and
fragmentation of the Arab population), 221 "co-optation" (the "cap-
ture" of traditional Arab elites) ,22' and "dependence" (the economic
not display a commitment to the rule of law sufficient to protect Arabs' property and civil rights
or their rights to equal treatment and to procedural justice. David H. Rosenbloom, Israel's
Administrative Culture, Israeli Arabs, and Arab Subjects, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 435, 447
(1987).
211. RAJA KHALIDI, THE ARAB ECONOMY IN ISRAEL: THE DYNAMICS OF A REGION'S DEVELOP-
MENT 68 (1988) (asserting that Arab agriculture suffered in 1950s because Arabs were excluded
from market); Elia Zureik, Transformation of Class Structure Among the Arabs in Israe From
Peasantry to Proletaria4 21J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 1976, at 39, 51-54 (citing wage differentials
between Arabs and Jews).
212. SAMI K. MAR'i, ARAB EDUCATION IN ISRAEL 137 (1978) (citing studies suggesting that
Arab students believe that they are discriminated against in education); see also ZUREIK, supra
note 8, at 155-56 (suggesting that discrimination in funding for Arab educational facilities exists
in Israel).
213. See generally R. KHAMAYASI, PLANNING AND HOUSING POLICY IN THE ARAB SECTOR OF
ISRAEL (1990).
214. See KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 119-22 (discussing differences in funding between Arab
andJewish municipalities).
215. KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 119-22 (discussing wide discrepancy in resource allocation
between Jews and Arabs in areas of reviving neighborhoods, educating children, monitoring
children with truant officers, and providing telephone services).
216. KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 98-107 (discussing disguised discrimination against Arabs
in armed forces). By law, the Israeli Minister ofJustice is entitled to conscript any able-bodied
Israeli into military service, including Arab citizens. Id. at 98. In practice, this discretion has
been exercised only as to Druze and Bedouin Arabs in Israel. Id. While this may seem natural
in light of the existing state of hostilities between Israel and the surrounding Arab states, a
number of important government benefits, not to mention subsequent opportunities for
employment in the substantial Israeli arms and security industry, hinge on fulfillment of
.national service." Id. at 100-04. Meanwhile, exemptions from these effects are made for non-
serving religious Jews. Id. at 107.
217. Ghazi Falah, Arabs Versus Jews in Galilee: Competition for Regional Resources, 21.4
GEOJOURNAL 325, 328-34 (1990).
218. Elia Zureik et al., Perception of Legal Inequality in Deeply Divided Societies: The Case
of Israel 28 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing perceptions of
Arabs andJews regarding legal system and stating that there exists differential treatment in legal
system of Arabs and Jews).
219. LUSTICM, supra note 30, at 77 (stating that Arabs are susceptible to Israeli control);
ZURBIE, supra note 8, at 29 (asserting that Israeli Arabs, like other native populations, have
internalized negative stereotypical images); Sammy Smooha, Control of Minorities in Israel and
Northern Ireland, 22 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 256, 269-70 (1980) (discussing vulnerability of
Arab minority in Israel and why Israeli Government has maintained social control of Arab
population).
220. LUSTCK, supra note 30, at 77.
221. LUSTICK, supra note 30, at 77.
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and political reliance of the Arabs on the Jewish population).22
The state, by imposing military government in areas of Arab
population concentration and using forces for internal security, has
prevented the Palestinian minority from organizing and expressing
itself as a national group.22 3 Until the mid-1970s, Arab participation
in the Israeli political system was through networks of patronage,
which linked traditional leadership in the Arab villages to the major
Israeli political parties and through which many Arabs exchanged
votes for tangible favors.224
In sum, the position of the Palestinians in Israel reflects their
absorption into the framework of a state committed to upbuilding a
Jewish nation. Given this commitment, the Palestinians' status is
unlikely to undergo significant change and will remain that of a
nonassimilating minority.
22
In light of the ample justifications for land acquisition discussed
above, 6 one would have expected the Israeli Government to have
seized Arab lands by summary actions. It is all the more remarkable,
therefore, that the Government did not take precipitous measures.
On the contrary, the form for the dispossession of Palestinian lands
that the Israeli administrations assumed was complex, legalistic, and
222. LUSTICK, supra note 30, at 77; see also Sammy Smooha, Existing and Alternative Policy
Towards the Arabs in Israe4 5 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 71, 95 (1982) (referring to Israeli policies
vis-A-vis its Arab citizens as "machinery of control").
223. SABRiJiRYs, THE ARAMs IN ISRAEL 185 (1976); Michael Saltman, The Use of the Mandatory
Emergency Laws by the Israeli Government 10 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 385, 391-92 (1982).
In addition, Ronen Shamir maintains that, with respect to freedom of expression, the Israeli
Supreme Court has developed a dual standard: content-based limitations imposed on Jewish
Israelis, and speaker-based limitations imposed on Arabs. Ronen Shamir, Legal Discourse, Media
Discourse, and Speech Rights: The Shi from Content to Identity-The Case of Israel, 19 INT'LJ. SOC.
L. 45, 56-62 (1991). Jewish Israelis thus are permitted to express beliefs that Arabs may not,
based simply on their respective identities. Id.
224. See COHEN, supra note 189, at 161-64 (stating that many Arabs bartered their votes for
material gains); LUSTICK, supra note 30, at 60-61 (describing competition for Arab votes by
Jewish political parties); see also ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 227 (discussing Arab
political parties). Since the 1970s, Arabs have supported two predominantly Arab political
groups in Israeli national elections: Rakah (the New Communist List), and the Progressive List
for Peace. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra, at 227. Another contender for Arab votes in local
level politics has been Abna' al-Balad (Sons of the Village). Id.
225. Garcia, supra note 208, at 16. It is noteworthy that the Intfada, the uprising against
Israeli rule that has convulsed the Occupied Territories since late 1987, has not resulted in a
similar movement within Israel. Israeli Arabs, while supportive of the Intifada and of Palestinian
calls for national self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have not as yet voiced the
same demands for themselves. Elia Zureik & Aziz Haidar, The Impact of the Intfadah on the
Paetinians in Israel, 19 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 475, 475-99 (1991).
226. See supra notes 194-224 and accompanying text (discussing opportunity for expansion
afforded by Palestinian exodus, pressing needs for land in post-independence years, proliferation
ofjustifications for land acquisition, and absence of effective resistance from Palestinian quarter
as justifications for Israeli land acquisition).
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executed cautiously over a period of years.2 27
IV. THE LEGAL REGIME FOR LAND AcQUISMONS
Jewish kibbutzim and agricultural settlements228 near Arab villages
carried out a process of de facto land expropriation in the confusion
and anarchy of the 1948 war and during the early months of the
consolidation of the authority of the Israeli state. 229 These Jewish
settlements took over large areas of Arab land and enclosed them
with barbed wire.2 0 To bring some regularity to this chaos, the
Israeli Government set up mechanisms for the administration of
abandoned properties shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. In
March 1948, the Haganah (the paramilitary arm of the mainstream
Zionist movement) created a "Committee for Arab Properties in
Villages" to establish control over lands left vacant by Arab own-
ers.231 After the occupations of the cities of Haifa in April and Jaffa
in May, the Haganah formed custodianships for these areas.232
A. The Absentee Property Law
In December 1948, the new Israeli Minister of Finance issued the
"Emergency Regulations Relative to Property of Absentees" to
standardize measures taken with regard to Arab properties.3 3 The
Government renewed these regulations periodically until the Israeli
Knesset passed the "Law of the Acquisition of Absentees' Proper-
ty." 234 This law defined the legal status of vacant property and
transferred control of it to a Custodian.3 3 The law defined an
absentee as any person owning land in Israel who:
(i) was a national or citizen of the Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, or the Yemen, or
(ii) was in one of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside
the area of Israel, or
227. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 55-57 (discussing Israeli laws passed over 20
year period to expropriate lands).
228. The two basic forms of Jewish agricultural colonies are the kibbutz, a communal
settlement owned and worked as a common enterprise and with collective housing and finances,
and the moshav, in which property is collectively owned and worked, but residence and domestic
life are based on the nuclear family. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 128-29.
229. SabriJiryis, The Legal Structure for the Expropriation and Absorption of Arab Lands in Isra4
2 J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1973, at 82, 83.
230. Id. at 82 (describing process of de facto expropriation). The Jews took over land
belonging to refugees as well as land belonging to Arabs still remaining in Palestine. Id. at 83.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 85-86.
234. Absentees' Property Law, 4 L. ST. ISRAEL 68 (1949-1950).
235. Id. § 4(a).
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(iii) was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place of resi-
dence in Palestine (a) for a place outside Palestine before Septem-
ber 1, 1948; or (b) for a place in Palestine held at the time by
forces which sought to prevent the establishment of the State of
Israel or which fought against it after its establishment .... 6
The law also included in the definition any company, partnership,
association, or the like that was "decisively controlled" by individual
absentees.3 7
By this definition, all Arabs in Palestine who had left their towns or
villages for any reason after the operative date of the law, November
29, 1947, the date of the passage of the U.N. Partition Plan for
Palestine, could be classified as "absentees."23  This definition
included as many as 75,000 internal refugees, Palestinians who had
moved from one part of Israeli territory to another without ever
crossing its prospective borders, as well as the residents of areas that
Arab states ceded to Israel pursuant to armistice agreements. 39
These latter areas had enjoyed open access to and from adjacent Arab
states until the Arab forces withdrew from them on September 1,
1948.240 Under this law, the Custodian, in his discretion, could
declare as "absentees" as many as half of the Palestinian Arabs who
were present in Israel in 1949, the vast majority of whom had never
left the area of Israel at any time prior to this date.241  Following
this declaration, their property could be made subject to confisca-
tion. 42
A written declaration by the Custodian classifying a person as an
"absentee" or property as "absentee" raised a legal presumption of the
accuracy of the classification.2 43 Only a court could compel the
Custodian to divulge the sources of information on which a classifica-
tion was based.2 4  The statute barred pleas that circumstances
beyond the person's control had caused the "absence."245 As long
as the Custodian had made the decision "in good faith," courts could
236. Id. § (b)(1).
237. Id. § 1 (b).
238. SeeJiryis, supra note 229, at 87.
239. KRETzmER, supra note 28, at 57. These Palestinians eventually earned the ironic
sobriquet "present absentees." Id.
240. SAUL B. COHEN, THE GEOPOLITICS OF ISRAEL's BORDER QUESTION 27 (1986) (relating
that, from 1949 to 1967, Israel closed its borders with its Arab neighbors).
241. LusTIcK, supra note 30, at 173-74.
242. LUsTICK, supra note 30, at 174; see also PERETZ, supra note 180, at 149-53 (discussing
Custodians' broad powers vis-a-vis Arabs whose land had been taken under absentee property
law).
243. Absentees' Property Law, 4 L. ST. ISRAEL § 30(a)-(b) (1949-1950).
244. Id. § 30(f).
245. Id. § 30(i).
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not overturn decisions even if the "absentee" classification was later
proven to be inapplicable.2' The law provided the Custodian with
discretion to return lands to their owners if so requested by the
owner."47 By 1958, however, the Custodian had issued only 209
certificates releasing Arab property to its original owners.248 Later,
in 1950, the Government moved to include all waqf lands and other
assets of the Muslim religious endowment, except strictly religious
shrines and buildings, within the category of "absentee" property.49
Why was this contorted definition of an "absentee" adopted?
Originally, a Ministry of Justice draft of the law proposed a literal
definition of "absentee" as a person who was no longer present in the
territory of the state.25  When the draft came before the Ministerial
Committee, the Committee learned that thousands of Palestinian
refugees had left their villages and settled in Nazareth, and that,
under such a definition of "absentee," these refugees would be able
to return to their homes. 51 The Committee thus defined "absen-
tee" as anyone who had left his home after a certain date. 2 Using
this definition, the Custodian, by the spring of 1950, had gained
control over approximately one million dunums of land, including
66,724 rooms in abandoned buildings and 7800 shops, offices, and
stores.253
B. Emergency and Security Regulations
Israel inherited the legal structures and the substantive laws that
were in force under the Mandate, including the Ottoman Land Code
246. Id. § 17.
247. Id. § 28. Section 27 authorized the Custodian to confirm the non-absentee status of a
person who had left his residence for fear of harm from the "enemies of Israel" or for reasons
other than fear of military operations. Id. § 27. Section 29 required that any exercise of the
Custodian's power under either section 27 or 28 be approved by a special committee established
by the government. Id. § 29. Upon release of any property, section 32 also required payment
to the Custodian of an amount equal to four percent of the property's value, in addition to
repayment for any expenses incurred by the Custodian in "safeguarding" the absentee's real
estate. Id. § 32.
248. PERETZ, supra note 180, at 155.
249. LUSTICK, supra note 30, at 59 (discussing Government's taking of large quantities of
Arab waqf land for use by newJewish immigrants).
250. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 80.
251. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 80.
252. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 80. Moshe Sharett, then Knesset member and later Prime
Minister of Israel, also raised the "reasonable likelihood" that Israel might one day seize Nablus
on the West Bank. In that case too, "thousands of refugees would come within Israel's
jurisdiction and they would demand to return to their homes and take back the properties they
had abandoned." Id.
253. SCHECHTMAN, supra note 177, at 100-01.
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of 1858. 4 The new state also adopted a body of laws entitled the
"Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 19 4 5 ."25  These regulations
were an updated version of laws originally invoked in 1936 by the
British to suppress the Palestinian revolt of 1936-39.6 The regula-
tions were amended repeatedly, reaching their final form during the
years that Zionist paramilitary organizations actively resisted British
rule. 7
The Defense (Emergency) Regulations empowered the Israeli
Defense Minister to appoint, as he deemed necessary, military
commanders as governors over any territories.258 Upon appoint-
ment, the Governor became the competent authority to enforce the
Defense Regulations in the territory under his jurisdiction. 9 The
Governors possessed a considerable array of discretionary powers:
they could impose travel restrictions, order administrative detention
without charges and for indefinite periods, and requisition proper-
ty.2" Violations of the regulations were tried in special Military
Courts.26 The judges in the Military Defense Regulations Courts
were, like the Governors, appointed by the Defense Minister from the
army officer corps.
262
Immediately after the 1948 war, the Israeli Government established
military governates in the predominantly Arab areas within Israel.263
Some of these areas were adjacent to borders and were believed to
provide a hinterland in which armed infiltrators might find ref-
uge.Y Although the Defense Regulations were neutral on their
254. See Norman Bentwich, The Legal System of Palestine Under the Mandate, 2 MIDDLE E.J. 33,
40 (1948) (describing use of Ottoman law during British rule).
255. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945.
256. PERET, supra note 180, at 119 n.22.
257. The Palestine Jewish Bar Association protested these regulations in 1947 as "counter to
the principles of law and justice ... and which deny the fundamental rights of man, thus
constituting a grave danger to the life, liberty, and property of the individual. These regulations
deliver the citizen to the mercy of the Executive Authority, the Police and the Army, and set up
an arbitrary rule of lawlessness, not amenable to effective judicial control." GEORGE E. BISHARAT,
PALEsINIAN LAWYERS AND ISRAELI RULE: LAW AND DISORDER IN THE WEST BANK 185 n.31 (1989)
(quoting Israel State Archives, "Societies: Jewish Bar Association," File AG 2715, 3-736).
258. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, pt. I, § 6.
259. Id.
260. See SEGEV, supra note 180, at 50-52 (detailing use of military powers against Arab
population and emphasizing arbitrary nature of enforcement).
261. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, pt. II, §§ 12-15. These courts should be
distinguished from Israeli courts martial, which tried soldiers for violations of the military law
of Israel.
262. Id. § 13.
263. IsRAE: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 55.
264. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 52 (stating that initial reason for instituting military rule was
to prevent infiltration by refugees). The country was divided into Northern, Central, and
Southern military areas, each governed by military governors appointed by the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff. Davis, supra note 27, at 36. These military governates were
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face, applying equally to all persons present in the designated areas,
in practice the Governors rarely invoked them against Jews, who
typically comprised only a small number of the people in the areas
designated for military rule."5
Article 125 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations empowered
the Military Governor of a region to declare any portion of land
under his jurisdiction "closed," such that entry to it and exit from it
could be undertaken only with a written permit from the Governor
or his representative. 6  In tandem with several other laws, this
provision allowed the Israeli Government to further appropriate Arab
lands.267  The Knesset passed the "Emergency Regulations for the
Exploitation of Uncultivated Lands," also known as the Cultivation of
Waste Lands Ordinance, in January 1949.268 The law empowered
the Minister of Agriculture to take possession of uncultivated lands or
any land with respect to which the Minister "is not satisfied that the
owner of the land has begun or is about to begin or will continue to
cultivate the land."
269
Professor Lustick describes the interaction between Article 125 of
the Defense (Emergency) Regulations and the Cultivation of Waste
Lands Ordinance as follows:
Typically the process works in the following way: An area encom-
passing Arab-owned agricultural lands is declared a "closed area."
The owners of the lands are then denied permission by the security
authorities to enter the area for any purpose whatsoever, including
cultivation. After three years pass, the Ministry of Agriculture issues
certificates which classify the lands as uncultivated. The owners are
notified that unless cultivation is renewed immediately the lands
will be subject to expropriation. The owners, still barred by the
security authorities from entering the "closed area" within which
their lands are located, cannot resume cultivation. The lands are
then expropriated and become part of the general land reserve for
Jewish settlement.27 °
maintained until 1966, when they were abolished. Id. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations,
however, remain in force.
265. Cf LusTIcK, supra note 30, at 177-78 (describing way in which Emergency Regulations
were used by Government against Arabs).
266. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, § 125.
267. LusncK, supra note 30, at 178 ("By making use of Article 125, on which the Military
Government is to a great extent based, we can directly continue the struggle for Jewish
settlement andJewish immigration.") (quoting Shimon Peres, Director General of the Ministry
of Defense in 1962).
268. Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) (Extension of Validity) Ordinance,
2 L. ST. IsRAEL 36 (1949). The 1949 law continued, in amended form, regulations initially
issued in 1948. Id.
269. Id. § 4.
270. Lusnce, supra note 30, at 178.
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The "Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) of 1949"2'1
achieved a similar effect. These regulations empowered the Minister
of Defense to declare a "security zone" within ten kilometers of
Israel's border in the northern half of the country, and within twenty-
five kilometers of the borders in the southern half.27 2 Entry into or
exit from the area was thereafter barred without permit.2 The
regulations further permitted competent authorities appointed by the
Minister of Defense to require a resident of a security zone to leave
that area.274 Pursuant to the Cultivation of Waste Lands Ordinance,
the government seized lands left fallow.
275
Still another law, the "Emergency Land Requisition Law of
1949, "276 gave the government the right to acquire land whenever
a "competent authority" appointed by the government regarded that
land as "necessary for the defense of the State, public security, the
maintenance of essential supplies or essential public services, or the
absorption of immigrants or the rehabilitation of ex-soldiers or war
invalids. 277 Initially, the government legally defined the seizure as
a temporary requisition, limited in duration to a period of
months. 8 Subsequent amendments to the law eliminated the time
limitations, effectively transforming the initial requisition into
permanent expropriation. 9
C. The Transfer of Ownership
All of the above-mentioned laws for expropriation shared two
characteristics. First, their validity and enforcement were contingent
upon the existence of a legally declared state of emergency.
280
Second, although de facto expropriation had occurred on a wide
scale, none of these laws transferred legal ownership of the affected
271. Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) (Extension of Validity) (No.2) Law, 3 L. ST.
ISRAEL 56 (1949).
272. Id. § 1(a).
273. Id. § 6(a).
274. Id. § 8(a).
275. See LusTicK, supra note 30, at 178 (stating that Israeli Government used this law to
expropriate large amount of Arab lands).
276. Emergency Land Requisition Law (No. 1), 4 L. ST. ISRAEL 3 (1949-1950).
277. Id. § 3(b).
278. See KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 55 (stating that Emergency Land Requisition Law of
1949 applied only for limited time).
279. Emergency Land Requisition Law (No. 61), 6 L. ST. ISRAEL 103 (1952).
280. SeeJiryis, supra note 229, at 82-104; PERE=Z, supra note 180, at 142 (stating that land
expropriation laws codified emergency legislation). Such an emergency was declared on May
19, 1948 by the Provisional State Council-the precursor to the Israeli Knesset-and has never
since been rescinded. Ruth Gavison, The Controversy over Israel's Bill of Rights, 15 IsRAELI Y.B.
HUM. RTs. 113, 138 (1985).
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lands. Instead, they only enabled the government to have control of
the lands, or to take possession of them, or to assign control to the
Custodian.8 1
In the earliest measures for expropriation, the Knesset began to lay
the groundwork for the resolution of the legal ambiguity inherent in
nominal Arab ownership of land that had for some years been under
exclusive control of the Israeli Government. Thus, the Absentee
Property Law contained a provision allowing the Custodian to "sell"
properties to a "Development Authority," 82 which the Knesset
would subsequently form by enacting, five months later, the "Develop-
ment Authority (Transfer of Property) Law, 1950. "283 The law
empowered the Development Authority to receive properties from the
Custodian or others.284 The law, however, forbade the Development
Authority from transferring properties to any parties other than the
state, the Jewish National Fund, an institution authorized by the
government to settle "landless Arabs," or a local authority.21
Moreover, the Jewish National Fund enjoyed first option for purchase
of any lands the Development Authority offered for sale.286
The Knesset's passage of the "Land Acquisition (validation of Acts
and Compensation) Law of 1953 1282 was the final step completing
the process of formal transfer of ownership of expropriated lands
from their Arab owners to various Israeli state institutions. This law
permitted the Minister of Finance to vest ownership in the Develop-
ment Authority of lands expropriated pursuant to the various laws
mentioned above.' The Development Authority could, in turn,
sell these lands under the limitations specified in its charter, provided
that three conditions were met: (1) that on April 1, 1952, the
property was not in the possession of its owners; (2) that within the
period from May 14, 1948 to April 1, 1952, the property was used or
assigned for purposes of essential development, settlement, or
security; and (3) that the property was still required for any of those
purposes.8 9 The law effectively permitted the retroactive validation
281. LUSTICI, supra note 30, at 174.
282. Absentees' Property Law, § 19(a), 4 L. ST. ISRAEL (1949-1950).
283. Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law (No. 62), 4 L. ST. ISRAEL 151-53
(1950).
284. SeeKRETZMER, supranote 28, at58 (stating that Transfer of Property Law made transfers
of property from Custodian to Development Authority possible).
285. Development Authority Law, supra note 283, §§ 3, 4(c).
286. Id. §§ 3, 4(a).
287. Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law (No. 25), 7 L. ST. ISRAEL
43-45 (1953).
288. Id.
289. Id. § 2(a).
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of any prior illegal expropriations because written certification by the
Minister of Finance that these conditions had been fulfilled was
sufficient to permit transfer of ownership to the Development
Authority.2°
The law also stipulated that compensation had to be paid to any
expropriated owner in such manner and amount as the Minister of
Finance determined."' The law provided for two methods of
compensation: cash payments, and the granting of alternative
lands. 2  Most Palestinians whose lands had been expropriated,
however, remained in exile and were consequently unaffected by the
compensation scheme.293
Of those few Palestinians who had remained in Israel, very few
opted for cash compensation.294  This refusal to accept cash com-
pensation was based primarily on the perception in the Palestinian
community that accepting compensation would legitimate the
expropriation and extinguish claims that the Palestinians still desired
to press. 295 Moreover, the terms for the cash compensation were
not favorable. The government offered payment on the basis of the
assessed value of the expropriated property in Israeli pounds as of
January 1, 1950, plus three percent of that value per year thereaf-
ter."6 In 1950, the value of the Israeli pound was equal to that of
the British pound sterling.297 At the time of the enactment of the
law, inflation had decreased its value relative to the British pound by
eighty percent.298 Retroactive valuation thus permitted government
acquisition of lands at far less than their current market value.2'
Provisions for compensation by exchange of alternate lands also
limited the efficacy of the compensation scheme. Under the terms of
the Land Acquisition Law, a claimant could receive land as compensa-
tion only "where the acquired property was used for agriculture and
was the main source of livelihood of its owner," and then only by
290. Id.
291. Id. § 3.
292. Id.
293. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 55.
294. JIRYIS, supra note 223, at 126.
295. Jiryis, supra note 229, at 45 n.1.
296. Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law (No. 25), § 5(a)-(b), 7
L. ST. ISRAEL 44-45 (1953).
297. Jims, supra note 223, at 76.
298. JIRYIS, supra note 223, at 76.
299. JIRYis, supra note 223, at 99. In the early 1970s, rates of compensation for absentees'
property were linked to a cost of living index used in Israel to determine wage and other
increases. KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 73 n.54.
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agreement with the Development Authority."°0 Through administra-
tive interpretation of this provision, Israel offered compensation in
land only when the land owner had supported himself primarily from
agriculture. 31 Thus, a farmer whose sons had worked as wage
laborers-a common occurrence within the land-short Palestinian
community-would not qualify for compensation through alternate
lands. Finally, government policy limited the amount of land that
could be given to a family in compensation to three hectares.0 2
Although under the Land Acquisition Law claimants were entitled to
judicial review of the compensation terms offered by the Development
Authority, courts were authorized by the law only to grant compensa-
tion in cash.
303
D. The Law of Prescription
Although the bulk of the expropriation of Arab lands in Israel
occurred in the period between 1948 and 1953 through the
above-described legal regime,0 4 the "Prescription Law of 1958 "s°5
was another measure that adversely affected Arab land rights. This
seemingly innocuous statute lengthened from ten to fifteen years the
period of time for which occupiers of unregistered lands were
required to demonstrate unchallenged possession of land in order to
establish prescriptive rights to land.3 6 In the case of registered
lands, the law increased the term from fifteen to twenty-five years.
3 1
7
Under the British Mandate, the program for settlement of titles had
concentrated first in those areas in which Arab and Jewish claims
conflicted.0 8 Thus, the Law of Prescription primarily affected the
purely Arab areas of Israel where large areas of land were still in the
300. Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law (No. 25), § 3(b), 7 L. ST.
ISRAEL 46 (1953).
301. Yitzhak Oded, Land Losses Among Israel's Arab Villagers, 7 NEW OUTLOOK, Sept. 1964, at
10, 18 (stressing that provisions of Land Acquisition Law are subject to multiple interpretations).
302. Id. at 18-19. Yitzhak Oded also points out that the government's operational definition
of "family" as one nuclear family has caused frequent problems because, by Palestinian custom,
married and unmarried sons continue to reside in the household of their father until his death.
Id. Therefore, confiscated land that had supported an extended family could be replaced only
by the amount deemed to be sufficient for one nuclear family. Id.
303. LUSTIC, supra note 30, at 180.
304. PERETZ, supra note 180, at 181 (describing process through which, by 1953, 2,373,677
dunums had passed from Custodian to Development Authority and then to Jewish National
Fund).
305. Prescription Law (No. 38), 12 L. ST. ISRAEL 129-33 (1958).
306. Id. art. 5.
307. Id. art. 5.
308. See Oded, supra note 301, at 13.
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process of being registered."° In the words of one author:
[S]ubject to overriding needs such as afforestation, the lands
surrounding a village were considered the patrimony of the local
population and constituted a reserve for future development....
Since 1948 the opposite attitude has prevailed: all land is national
patrimony except what the villagers can prove is theirs under the
narrowest interpretation of the law.310
The government apparently adopted a variety of legal strategies in
opposing villagers' claims of prescriptive rights to cultivation. In
many cases, the state claimed that the land in dispute belonged to the
Ottoman mawat or waste category, with respect to which entry and
cultivation cannot confer prescriptive rights without specific authoriza-
tion from the state.311 Elsewhere, the government required cultiva-
tors to submit either a deed or proof of continuous cultivation since
the operative date under the Law of Prescription. 12 The state
claimed that other lands were in the possession of absentees, a
presumption that the state maintained until convincing evidence of
sale or transfer could be produced.13
E. The Role of Israeli Courts
Israeli courts have provided only intermittent protection to
Palestinian landowners capable of marshaling the resources for a legal
defense against expropriation. 34 The reasons for such sporadic
protection derive in part from the general character of the Israeli
legal system, and in part from the specific character of the laws for
land acquisition.1 5 Of course, as a practical matter, the great
majority of Palestinians who lost land never had the opportunity to
test Israeli judicial waters because they remained exiles outside the
309. The British had completed registration of about one-quarter of the land area that fell
within Israeli control in 1948. See Sabri Jiryis, Settler's Law: Seizure of Palestinian Lands, 2
PALEsTINE Y.B. INT'L L 17, 28 (1985).
310. Oded, supra note 301, at 14.
311. KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 52.
312. LUSTICK, supra note 30, at 176 (discussing how new law required Arabs to produce
records of ownership from period of British mandate).
313. See KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 53 (citing uncorroborated claims that up to 205,000
dunums of Arab land were acquired through enforcement of prescription law).
314. See KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 71 n.26 (citing case of village of Rabesia). In the case
of Rabesia, the government first closed the lands under Article 125 of the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations. Id. Subsequently, the Israeli Supreme Court overturned the military order for
closure on procedural grounds. Id. Ultimately, the military governor cured the procedural
defect and the Court eventually upheld the order but recommended that something be done
to address the plight of the displaced villagers. Id.
315. IsRAEu A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 183-84 (stating that Israeli courts are
responsible for ensuring human rights, but have been faulted in some occasions).
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territory of the state.
3 16
Israel has never adopted a written constitution, notwithstanding the
commitment enunciated in the state's declaration of independence
to do so within a few months.3 17  The legislative acts of the Israeli
Knesset are therefore not subject to judicial review." 8 Courts have
consequently been restricted to hearing challenges against the
applicability of land acquisition laws to specific factual circumstances,
or charges of abuse of discretion by responsible government
agents.31 ' The latter claim could be appealed directly to the Israeli
Supreme Court, in its capacity as a high court of justice, entitled to
hear original applications for complaints against government officials
alleging unjust treatment.2 °
In regard to appeals against actions of civilian administrators acting
under any of the various land expropriation laws, however, the
legislation itself largely protected discretionary decisions. 21 As
mentioned above, Article 17 of the Absentees' Property Law stipulates
that any transaction made "in good faith" by the Custodian in
designating property as "absentee" property cannot be invalidated
even following a showing of error.22 Provisions erecting conclusive
presumptions of fact existed in other laws, effectively barring legal
316. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 55 (discussing number of Palestinians
outside Israel's boundaries).
317. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, in CONSTrrUTIONAISM: THE ISRAELI
AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 210 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1990); see also Nathan Yanai, Politics and
Constitution-Making in Israel: Ben-Gurion's Position in the Constitutional Debate Following the
Foundation of the State, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES, supra,
at 108 (discussing how David Ben-Gurion opposed adoption of constitution in part because he
saw maintenance of military government over Arabs in Israel as both necessary and irreconcil-
able with bill of rights).
The declaration stated that a constitution should be adopted by October 1, 1948. Declaration
of the Establishment of the State ofisrael, supra, at 211. Later discussions over a bill of rights have
focused on how to address the issue of legal equality between Jews and Arabs. Minister ofJustice
Nissim, in the late 1970s, proposed a provision that no law would be deemed discriminatory as
the result of Israel being either a Jewish state or the state of the Jewish people. Amnon
Rubinstein, The Struggle over a Bill of Rights for Israe4 in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ISRAELI AND
AMERICAN EXPERIENCES, supra, at 141. Ongoing controversy over the status of the Arabs in Israel
may be the principal reason why Israel has failed to enact a bill of rights to this day. Gavison,
supra note 280, at 150.
318. HENRY E. BAKER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 11 (1968) (stating that Knesset has no
restrictions on its powers).
319. See generally KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 49-69 (citing and analyzing Israeli Supreme
Court decisions in broad discussion ofJewish land-control policy in Palestine since early 20th
century).
320. Jeffrey M. Albert, Constitutional Adjudication Without a Constitution: The Case of Israel, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1969).
321. See supra part VA-B (discussing specific details of Israeli land expropriation legislation).
322. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing Article 17 of Absentees' Property
Law).
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recourse for owners suffering land losses.323
The courts were still less inclined to overturn actions taken by
Military Governors pursuant to their extensive powers under the
Defense Emergency Regulations. Particularly in the early years of the
state, when security fears were greatest, the Israeli Supreme Court
tended to defer to the judgments of military authorities about when
security interests were implicated and how they were to be defend-
ed.324 As years passed without major disturbances in the Arab areas
of Israel, security concerns became less compelling and the Supreme
Court began to demonstrate a greater willingness to overturn
decisions of Military Governors." In addition, the Court began to
require a more narrowly circumscribed definition of "security," a
move that curtailed somewhat the extensive powers of the Military
Governors. 26
Expropriation of Arab lands in Israel continues to be a significant
facet, materially and symbolically, of the relationship between the
Israeli Government and the Israeli Arab minority.32 But with the
establishment of Israeli control over the West Bank, the Gaza Strip,
323. For example, Article 30(c) of the Emergency Land Requisition Law provided that a
certificate signed by a competent authority that certain land was lawfully requisitioned "shall be
conclusive and sole evidence of such fact." Emergency Land Requisition Law, art. 30(c), 4 L.
ST. ISRAEL No. 1, at 12 (1949-1950).
324. SEGEV, supra note 180, at 51 (stating that, more often than not, Israeli Supreme Court
believed arguments made by army representatives regarding security).
325. Cf.Joseph L. Ryan, Refugees Within IsraL The Case of the Villagers of Kaft Bir'im and Iqrit,
2 J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1973, at 55 (discussing cases where Israeli Supreme Court
overturned decisions of military government).
326. JIRYIS, supra note 223. In several instances in which the Supreme Court overturned land
acquisition orders of the military governors, the Court's judgments met with resistance and
sometimes outright defiance. The celebrated cases of Iqrit and Kafr Bir'im, two Palestinian
Christian villages near Israel's border with Lebanon, are two examples of cases that elicited such
reactions. Ryan, supra note 325, at 59-63. Inhabitants of the villages were evacuated under
Article 125 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations in 1948-49. Id. The Supreme Court upheld
the villagers' right to return to the villages based on a technical defect in the military order, a
defect that was subsequently cured. Id. While another appeal was pending, the military
dynamited all of the homes in Iqrit. Id. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court eventually
upheld the legality of the villagers' expulsion, but also affirmed that the military should return
the lands of the villages to their owners. Id. Despite this holding, the lands were transferred
to the ownership of the Development Authority under the terms of the Land Acquisition Law
in 1963. Id.
327. One of the last major expropriation orders took place in March, 1976 when the Israeli
Government took over 20,000 dunums in the Galilee district as part of its program of the
"Judaization" of Galilee. KRETZMER, supra note 28, at 52. Jiryis suggests that another factor
leading to the order was the Government's desire to retaliate against the series of 1974
resolutions in the United Nations recognizing Palestinian rights and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), culminating in the address given by Chairman Yasser Arafat to the General
Assembly on November 13, 1974. SabriJiryis, The Arabs in Israe4 1973-79, 8J. PALESrWE STUD.,
Summer 1979, at 31, 45-46.
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and the Golan Heights in 1967,128 the focus of Israeli settlement
activity has for the most part shifted to those areas.
V. ISRAELI LAND ACQUISITION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
A. The Aftermath of the 1967 War
Israel's resounding defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war gave
it control over the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and
the Sinai Peninsula. 29 For important practical, legal, and political
reasons, the course of Israeli land acquisition in the Occupied
Territories, while bearing substantial similarities to the land acquisi-
ton that occurred in Israel,3 30 has taken a somewhat different
direction. While some Palestinians fled the areas eventually occupied
in the 1967 fighting, most did not. The continued presence of large
numbers of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in large part
compelled Israel to take this different approach.
Israel took control of areas inhabited by an estimated one million
Arabs after the 1967 war.3 31 Hence, Israel was not presented with
the same windfall of wide expanses of vacant lands that it had
received from the mass exodus of Palestinians in 1948.32 While the
occupation authorities were able to take immediate possession of
substantial lands registered to the Jordanian Government and lands
"abandoned" by refugees from the 1967 war,33 ultimately these
328. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Israel's acquisition of land as result
of 1967 war).
329. The victory was striking evidence of Israel's development from a fledgling nation to a
regional power.
330. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (discussing Zionist acquisition of land in
Palestine from indigenous Arabs).
331. See Abu-Lughod, supra note 162, at 163 (quoting Israeli estimates of 600,000 Arabs
remaining in West Bank and 350,000 Arabs in Gaza Strip for period of August through
September 1967). Approximately 525,000 Palestinians, mostly from the West Bank, left the
Occupied Territories in 1967 and moved to Jordan's East Bank. BUEHRIG, supra note 175, at 40-
41. Included in this group were 175,000 Palestinians who had already fled their homes once in
1948. Id.
332. JACOB C. HuREwrrz, THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE 321 (1950). In addition, the 1948
war was preceded by the gradual relocation of the Palestinian intelligentsia and social leadership,
a move that did not occur prior to the outbreak of fighting in 1967. Mark Heller, Politics and
Social Change in the West Bank Since 1967, in PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS 185, 185-87 (Joel
S. Migdal, ed., 1980). On the contrary, the population of the Occupied Territories had the
advantage of the presence of its established leadership. Id. at 185. The presence of a
Palestinian leadership accounts in part for the relative rapidity with which the Palestinian
community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rebounded from the shock of the war, and engaged
in organized protest against Israeli rule. Id. at 201-02. Lawyers, for example, were in the
vanguard of nationalist opposition to the occupation in the months following the 1967 war.
BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 145.
333. See Ben Cashdan, Colonial Law and Ideolog--Israel and the Occupied Teritories, in
PALESTINE: PROFILE OF AN OCCUPATION 57, 60-61 (Khamsin ed., 1989).
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lands were insufficient, both in quantity and location, to satisfy Israeli
aims. s  Because the greatest proportion of land in the Occupied
Territories was privately owned,-35 further dispossessions of Palestin-
ian private landholders were inevitable.
The presence of a large Palestinian population did not thwart
Israel's efforts to acquire land in the Occupied Territories. Israel's
occupation administration certainly faced unremitting local opposition
to its rule for twenty years. 6  Its authority, however, was not
seriously challenged from within the territories during the initial two
decades of occupation. Even after the commencement of the
Intifada in late 1987, it was Israeli and international politics that
constrained Israel's response to the uprising, not the distribution of
power between the occupiers and the occupied.3   On the other
hand, Israeli administrators have encountered different problems in
contending with present Palestinian landowners, instead of exiled
ones.33 9  These conditions have generated somewhat different
334. See &g., ESTER COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 1967-1982,
at 152-53 (1985) (reporting that Israel immediately possessed 730,214 dunums, out of total of
six million dunums, in West Bank and 119,244 dunums, out of a total of 362,923 dunums, in
Gaza); ANTHONY COON, TOWN PLANNING UNDER MIITxARY OCCUPATION 161 (1992) (showing
that lands immediately possessed by Israel consisted of approximately 52,700 hectares (580,000
dunums) and were located mostly in Jordan Valley); RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW 26-27 (2d
ed., 1988) (explaining that land was placed under custodianship by Military Order No. 59, issued
shortly after 1967 war); Cf. COON, supra, at 158 (noting that small amount of land, approximately
33,000 dunums, had been purchased by Jews in West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to 1948).
335. See U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm. on the Palestine Question, 2d Sess., app. V, U.N.
Presentation B (1950) (detailing U.N. survey of West Bank in 1950 that found that nearly 88%
of West Bank was "privately owned by Arabs"). The term "privately owned" is somewhat
misleading, as it comprehends two distinct categories of interests in land in the applicable
Ottoman law: mulk (roughly equivalent to fee simple in Anglo-American jurisprudence), and
miri (state-owned land in which the occupant enjoys a heritable right of usufruct). See supra
notes 104-18 and accompanying text (reviewing Ottoman land code).
336. See Heller, supra note 332, at 201-09 (detailing continuous opposition by various
Palestinian social and economic classes to Israeli rule).
337. See generaly OCCUPATION: ISRAEL OVER PALESTINE 3, 3-27 (Nasser H. Aruri ed., 1983)
(relating historical overview of Palestinian resistance); THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE WEST BANK
UNDER ISRAEL OCCUPATION (Jan Metzger et al. eds., 1983) (discussing history of Palestinian
resistance to Israeli occupation).
338. See Mark Tessler, The Impact of the Intifada on Israeli Political Thinking, in ECHOES OF THE
INTIFADA: REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAEL CONFLICT 43, 43-56 (Rex
Buynan ed., 1991) (explaining internal and international concerns that guided Israeli policy in
Intifada response). For a discussion of the roots of the Intifada, see generally DAVID GROSSMAN,
YELLOW WIND (1988) (noting Arab andJewish causes of Intifada); INTIADA: PALESTINE AT THE
CROSSROADS (Jamal Nassar & Roger Heacock eds., 1990) (examining internal and external
sources of uprisings in Occupied Territories); Helena Cobban, The PLO and the Intifada, 44
MIDDLE EJ. 207 (1990) (detailing political relationships involved in launching, sustaining, and
defending uprising).
339. Israel cannot as readilyjustify taking land as "abandoned" when landowners are present,
although such an action is, in limited circumstances, possible. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 34-
36. Israel has always taken great pains to claim that its land acquisitions are legal. Id. at 41-43.
In addition, present landowners can physically and legally attempt to block land acquisitions.
Id. at 47-49.
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techniques of land acquisition.
Notwithstanding some differences in particulars, the occupation
administration's strategy in acquiring Arab land in the Occupied
Territories has been, in its reliance on law, consistent with the
approach taken to land acquisition in Israel proper.' Israel has
successfully used a relatively complex array of legal principles and
practices to effectuate land acquisitions since 19 6 7 ." It is difficult
to calculate precise figures as to the extent of Israeli land acquisition
in the Occupied Territories. Several sources have estimated, however,
that as of the early 1990s, Israel had appropriated approximately two-
thirds of the West Bank.' Concurrently, occupation authorities
held over thirty percent of the land area of the Gaza Strip.
43
B. The Legal Framework for the Occupation
The Israeli Government rejects the use of the term "Occupied
Territories" in reference to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Instead, it prefers the appellation "administered areas" and no longer
considers these areas to be "enemy territories.""' In fact, Israel's
formal legal treatment of the territories-with the exception of
340. See supra notes 119-68 and accompanying text (discussing Zionist approach to land
acquisition in pre-state Israel). A strong legal orientation typifies the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Indeed, as author Emma Playfair points out: "The military
government invariably seeks to defend its actions in the Occupied Territories with reference to
legal provisions or principles, whether of international or local law." Emma Playfair, Playing on
Principle? Israel'sJustificationfor its Administrative Acts in the Occupied West Bank, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 205-38 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
Elsewhere, this author has characterized Israel's administration of the West Bank as "Orientalist
Despotism" to highlight the paradoxical duality of the military government's reliance on legality
and the subject Palestinian population's experience of that government as arbitrary and uncon-
strained, and to focus attention on the role of Israeli "experts" on Arab society, or "Orientalists."
BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 47-69.
341. See SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 22-41 (listing and explaining methods such as
declaration of state land, declaration of abandonment, military requisition, security closure,
taking for public purposes, and purchase).
342. See COON, supra note 334, at 160-67 (estimating that 60% of land area of West Bank was
under Israeli dominion by 1992 and presenting breakdown of amounts of land acquired under
each variety of legal means). A report commissioned by the civil administration in the West
Bank in 1991 stated that 3470 of 5300 square kilometers, or two-thirds, of the region were under
Israeli control. Land Expropriation, HUM. RTS. UPDATE (Palestine Hum. Rts. Info. Ctr.,
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1991, at 55.
343. Jewish Settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in SURVEY OFJEWISH AFFAIRS 1990, at 42-
59 (William Frankel ed., 1990). The regional council representing the Jewish settlements in the
Occupied Territories reported that at the end of 1991, theJewish population of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip exceeded 114,000. ISRAEL YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC, 1991/1992, at 242. This
figure excludes Jewish residents of annexed portions ofJerusalem, or about 124,000 persons in
1987. Emma Playfair, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAWAND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES, supra note 340, at 1, 7.
344. EVERETT MENDELSOHN, A COMPASSIONATE PEACE: A FUTURE FOR ISRAEL, PALESTINE AND
THE MIDDLE EAST 45 (1989) (noting Israeli change in terminology was based on illegality of
Jordanian occupation).
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annexed Jerusalem and the Golan Heights -- is as occupied
territory under the international law of belligerent occupation.8 4
Since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, Israel has adminis-
tered the West Bank and Gaza through the military government
established during the hostilities. 7
Knesset legislation does not apply to the West Bank or Gaza Strip.
By military order, the military government has arrogated to itself full
legislative and executive powers in the Occupied Territories."~ By
proclamation in June 1967, the Commander of the Israel Defense
Forces in 'Judea and Samaria" 9 declared that "any power of
government, legislation, appointment, or administration with respect
to the Region or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me
345. See Playfair, supra note 343, at 14 (explaining that Golan Heights were effectively
annexed in 1981, when Israeli law was extended to region); see also HENRY CAaTAN, JERUSALEM
71-72 (1981) (detailing Israeli annexation ofJerusalem in several stages).
346. See Meir Shaagar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the lsraeli Military Government-The Initial
Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE
LEGAL ASPECTS 3, 27-43 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982) [hereinafter MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE
TERRITORIES] (explaining how Israel's laws for Occupied Territories have followed laws of
belligerent occupation). But see Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner. Reflections on Status of
Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L.RL 279, 301 (1968) (articulating view echoed by government that
law of belligerent occupation, created to protect reversionary rights of displaced sovereign, is
inapplicable to "Judea and Samaria" (the West Bank) as sovereignty had never vested properly
in Jordan, itself an illegal occupier of region). Several commentators have refuted Blum's
theory. See, e.g., SALLY MALLISON & WILLIAM T. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND WORLD ORDER 253-61 (1986) (rejecting Blum's theory as unfounded
in law and misreading of text); Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and
Human Rights, 8 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTs. 104, 106-07 (1978) (dismissing theory and claiming that
protections of 1949 Geneva Convention apply to occupied territories); infra notes 408-31 and
accompanying text (noting that Blum's position has not been accepted by Israeli courts).
347. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 68-69. The military government underwent several
reorganizations, including one in 1981 that Israel presented as a shift to a "civil administration"
in the Occupied Territories. Military authority, however, was then, and continues to be,
paramount. See JONATHAN KuTAB & RAJA SHEHADEH, CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE
OCCUPIED WEST BANK: ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORDER NO. 947, at 14-18
(1982) (detailing creation of civil administration and describing it as organ of military
government); Joel Singer, The Establishment of a Civilian Administration in the Areas Administered
by Israe, 12 ISRAELY.B. HUM. RTS. 259, 271-73 (1982) (showing that military officers pervade civil
administration).
348. English translations of Israeli military orders applicable to the Occupied Territories are
not, to the knowledge of this author, systematically compiled. In fact, until 1982, the orders
were not compiled in any language. See RAJA SHEHADEH &JONATHAN KuTrAB, THE WEST BANK
AND THE RULE OF LAw 43-44 (1980) (explaining that inconsistent and haphazard distribution
of military orders within Occupied Territories was sharply criticized by local lawyers); see also
Shamgar, supra note 346, at 450-506 (reproducing selected military orders and translating them
into English); Raja Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation, in
INTERNATIONAL lAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 340, at 151-
52 (noting that, even after 1982, when compilation was issued, many orders were not distributed
to local lawyers); cf. Majmou'at al-Awamir al-'askariya al-Muta'alliqa b'il-Mahakim al-'askariya w'as-
Sujun (1982) (publishing, in Arabic, selection of military orders concerned with military courts
and prisons).
349. Israel uses the names "Judea and Samaria" to refer to the West Bank because that term
is claimed to grant legitimacy to the area's annexation in 1950 byJordan (the "East Bank").
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alone."15 The same proclamation announced the continued validity
of prior existing law in the area, insofar as it comported with that
proclamation and any future proclamation issued by the military
government.
3 51
This last clause purportedly intended to bring the military
government into conformity with the requirements of international
law. International law requires an occupying power to apply all laws
formerly in force in occupied territories, although it permits
amendments of prior existing law on the basis of military necessity, or
changed circumstances that require the amendments to preserve
public interests.31 2  This requirement has rarely inhibited the
military government. Since 1967, the military government has issued
over 1200 military orders introducing extensive changes in the
administrative structures and substantive laws of the Occupied
Territories. 5 3
Though the Israeli military government does not deem itself
politically accountable to the Palestinian residents of the Occupied
Territories, s 5 it does not possess unfettered power. For instance,
after the 1967 war, an international consensus quickly coalesced
around the concept of Israel returning the Occupied Territories in
exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors.355 This principle was
350. Proclamation No. 2 (Proclamation on Law and Administration) ofJune 7,1967, r7pinted
in Shamgar, supra note 346, at 450-51 [hereinafter Proclamation No. 2]. Identical proclamations
were issued in Gaza, Golan, and the Sinai peninsula. Shamgar, supra note 346, at 450. The title
"proclamation" was later dropped in favor of "military order."
351. Proclamation No. 2, reprinted in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note
346, at 450.
352. Article 43 of the Fourth Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
reads:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country.
1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 629 (James B. Scott ed., 1920). As to
the applicability of the Hague Convention and other bodies ofinterational law to the Occupied
Territories, see Mazen Qupty, The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territorien as
Reflected in the Judgments of the High Court of Justice in Israel in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 340, at 87-124.
353. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at viii.
354. Unlike the Palestinian minority in Israel, the Palestinian residents of the Occupied
Territories are not Israeli citizens and cannot participate in Israeli national elections (although
Arab residents of annexed Jerusalem have been offered Israeli citizenship and do participate in
municipal elections there). There is no institutionalized forum for Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories to articulate their views to the military government, although some informal consulta-
tion occurs between Israeli authorities and such bodies as local chambers of commerce. See
BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 136-38.
355. See William Quandt, American Proposals forArab-Israeli Peace, in MIDDLE EAST PEACE PLANS
69, 70-71 (Willard Beling ed., 1986) (noting quick international response to occupation and
development of land-for-peace concept).
1994] LAND, LAW, AND LEGITIMACY IN ISRAEL
codified in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 in November
1967.356 Thereafter, Israel functioned under the watchful eye of an
international community that did not accord it sovereignty over the
Occupied Territories.
International attention has focused on Israel's program of land
acquisition in the Occupied Territories because of the close nexus
between this program and the use of these lands for seemingly
permanent civilian Jewish settlements. 57 The international commu-
nity, including the United States, has repeatedly criticized these
settlements as violations of international law and impediments to a
comprehensive and lasting peace in the region. 58
The Israeli Supreme Court, in its capacity as the high court of
justice, has supervised Israel's compliance with international law in the
Occupied Territories. The Court's authority to review petitions
arising in the Occupied Territories is based on the tenuous theory
that it exercises personal jurisdiction over all military government
personnel operating in their official capacities, even when outside the
State of Israel.359 Admittedly, the efficacy of the Supreme Court's
supervision of the military government is questionable. During the
first eighteen years of occupation, only five of the sixty-five petitions
356. The resolution affirmed in pertinent part:
[T]hat the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of ajust and
lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the
following principles:
i. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
ii. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledg-
ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State
in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries
free from threats or acts of force;
S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/Rev.2 (1967).
357. Not all lands acquired by Israel in the Occupied Territories have been used for
purposes ofJewish settlement. For example, substantial expanses of land have been taken for
military training and maneuvers. COON, supra note 334, at 164.
358. See COHEN, supra note 334, at 160-63 (noting that many critics of Israel's settlement
policy charged that settlements violated international law, including Fourth Geneva Convention
and Hague Regulations).
359. See Eli Nathan, The Power of Superwi'on of the High Court ofJustice over Military Government
in Shamgar, supra note 346, at 109-20 (setting forth domestic and international legal sources of
policy); see also Moshe Negbi, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Occupied Territories, 27 JERUSALEM
Q. 33, 33-47 (1983) (discussing mix of pragmatic, political, and moral reasons underlying policy
ofjurisdiction over military personnel). The decision to permit petitions from the Occupied
Territories has often been hailed as unprecedented, and palpable evidence of Israel's
enlightenment and commitment to the rule of law. See, e.g., ISRAEL NATIONAL SECrION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OFJURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL
41-42 (1981) (claiming that allowing such petitions demonstrates that military government must
abide by rule of international law); Raphael Israeli & Rachel Ehrenfeld, Between the Peak and the
Pit: Human Rights in Israel 13 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L & COM. 403, 426 (1987) (noting that petition
system in Occupied Territories is unprecedented in history of occupations); Justus Weiner,
Terrorsm: Israel's LegalResponses, 14 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 183, 199 (1988) (asserting that
Israel's legal system in Occupied Territories helps to preserve human rights in these territories).
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from the territories that reached adjudication were resolved in favor
of the petitioners."6 Nonetheless, the military government has had
to consider the possibility of Supreme Court intervention in formulat-
ing its policies. 6 Moreover, two Supreme Court decisions, which
will be discussed in detail below, significantly altered the form and
direction of land acquisitions in the Occupied Territories. 6 '
C. Israel's Settlement Policies in the Occupied Territories
As discussed above, Israeli's policies of land acquisition in the
Occupied Territories are, for the most part, a function of its promo-
tion of Jewish settlement in these areas.36 The ostensible purposes,
intensity, and geographical distribution ofJewish settlement activity in
the territories have varied over time according to the agenda of the
ruling party in Israel." Yet, land acquisition has remained the
official policy of every Israeli Government during the last twenty-six
years.
3 65
During the first decade of occupation, Labor Party governments
focused on land acquisition andJewish settlement efforts in annexed
Jerusalem and in border areas away from Palestinian population
centers.366 The Israeli Government, for example, set up border-area
settlements, called nahalim,167 that were populated with young
360. See Ronen Shamir, Litigation as a Consummatory Action: The Instrumental Paradigm
Reconsidered, 11 STUD. L., POL., & SOc'y 41, 48-49 (1991) (showing that from 1968 to 1986, total
of 557 petitions from Occupied Territories were filed with court and noting that, of 65
adjudicated, fivejudgments were rendered in favor of petitioners); see also Qupty, supra note 352,
at 124 (surveying Supreme Court's decisions vis-A-vis Occupied Territories and concluding that
in great majority of cases Supreme Court did not apply laws of war to Occupied Territories, and
that when it did so, it "interpret[ed) international law to condone the actions of the military
government").
361. Nathan, supra note 359, at 163. The efficacy of the Supreme Court's oversight is not
adequately measured by the success rate of Palestinian litigants, as the Court may exercise a
deterrent influence over the military government. Even the dismissal of petitions have, on
occasion, been followed by changes in military government practices. Such a change occurred
when the Supreme Court rejected a petition in the late 1980s that challenged the absence of
a formal avenue of appeal from judgments of Israeli military courts in the Occupied Territories.
Moshe Negbi, On Occupation, Intifada, and Constitutional Crisis in Israe4 52 JERUSALEM Q. 18-31
(1989). Within a year of the petition, the military government established a military court of
appeals. Id.
362. See infra notes 408-31 and accompanying text (discussing Beit El-Toubas and Elan Moreh
cases).
363. COON, supra note 334, at 157.
364. See DON HOROW1TZ & MOSHE LISSAK, TROUBLE IN UTOPIA: THE OVERBURDENED POLrIY
OF ISRAEL 48-50 (1989) (detailing how varying governments changed Israel's settlement policies).
365. COON, supra note 334, at 157.
366. Ibrahim Matar, Exploitation of Land and Water Resources forJewish Colonies in the Occupied
Territories, in INTERNATIONAL Lkw AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra
note 340, at 443, 444-45.
367. See supra note 190 (discussing types of Israeli settlements).
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Israelis and were intended to help stem infiltration of Palestinian
guerrillas and provide a first line of defense against conventional
attack by Arab armies." Israel also established settlements on the
highland ridges of the West Bank overlooking the Jordan Valley.
69
The placement of these settlements reflected the publicly maintained
policy of the Labor Party, which favored territorial compromise with
the Arab states, to withdraw eventually from areas of heavier Arab
population concentrations and to retain other areas sufficient to
ensure militarily defensible borders."' 0 This policy began to erode
in the later years of Labor Party rule because of the "spontaneous"
settlement drive launched by the Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the
Faithful"), a group of Jewish settlers ideologically committed to
"redeeming" the Land of Eretz Israel by annexing the Occupied
Territories. 7' In 1975 and 1976, the settlement-building wing of
the movement (the Amana) established a number of civilian Jewish
settlements in the Occupied Territories without government sponsor-
ship and often in defiance of Labor Party policies.
72
The settlement efforts of the Gush Emunim gained the full weight
of government support with the accession to power of the Likud
Bloc 73 led by Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1977.3' 4 The
Likud government mounted a concerted effort to settle Jews in
massive numbers in and around Palestinian population centers in the
Occupied Territories, with the ultimate aim of irreversibly bonding
the territories to Israel.175  The government made extensive land
368. MICHAEL BAR-ZOHAR, FACING A CRUEL MIRROR: ISRAEL'S MOMENT OF TRUTH 26-28
(1990). Until the PLO uprising of 1970 ("Black September"),Jordan was one of the principal
staging grounds for guerrilla attacks against Israeli forces. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note
8, at 276. Consequently, many of the nahalim were set up in the Jordan Rift.
369. See HARRIS, supra note 190, at 105-09 (providing detailed discussion of Israeli settlement
activities in Jordan Rift).
370. This plan was known as the "Allon Plan," after its originator, Yigal Allon, a Labor Party
government minister. See BAR-ZoHAR, supra note 368, at 26-27 (explaining that Allon designed
plan so as to keep Israel out of areas that would be returned to Jordan).
371. Shafir, Institutional and Spontaneous Settlement Drives: Did Gush Emunim Make a Difference?
in THE IMPACT OF GUSH EMUNIM: POLITICS AND SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK 153-54 (D.
Newman ed., 1985). For a comprehensive study of the Gush Emunim, see LAN LUSTICK, FOR THE
LAND AND THE LORD: JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL (1988).
372. LUSTICK, supra note 371, at 45-46.
373. The Likud Bloc was a political coalition created in 1970 that combined a number of
previously independent political parties. Likud has been dominated by right-wing Herut. Ian
Peleg, The Legacy of Begin and Beganism for the Israeli Political System, in ISRAEL AFrER BEGIN 19, 26
(Gregory S. Mahler ed., 1990).
374. LUSTIC, supra note 371, at 4647.
375. See Matar, supra note 366, at 446 (discussing Likud's ideological platform and programs
concerning Occupied Territories). Likud policies were designed not only to fuel ideological
settlement, but also to lure middle-class Israelis to the Occupied Territories with a variety of
financial incentives and with the appeal of "suburban" living in settlements within commuting
distance of major Israeli cities. IAN PELEG, BEGIN'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1977-1983: ISRAEL'S MOvE
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376acquisitions during its tenure.
The Likud Bloc lost exclusive control of the reins of power in 1984,
when inconclusive elections led to the formation of a "National Unity"
government in which Likud and the Labor Party shared authority.
77
From 1984 to 1990, Israel's settlement campaign consisted of
establishing a limited number of new colonies in the Occupied
Territories and the territorial expansion and "thickening"-meaning
increasing the population-of existing ones.
Settlement activity again intensified following the demise of the
National Unity government in 1990 and the return to power of the
Likud Bloc. 79 For the first time, however, Israel faced sanctions
harsher than international reproval of its settlement program. In
1991, President Bush withheld loan guarantees of $10 billion from the
Israeli Government until Israel promised that its settlement activities
would cease."' 0 The Likud Bloc's refusal to provide such a commit-
ment was one of the main factors leading to its electoral defeat and
the return to power of a Labor Party government in June 1992."8'
The new government, under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, agreed
not to undertake new settlements in the Occupied Territories,
promptly securing the suspended loan guarantees from the United
States. 82  Israeli land acquisitions in the Occupied Territories have
since slowed, but have not totally abated, 3' even with the signing of
TO THE RIGHT 114-15 (1987); see also Vitullo, supra note 17, at 24-26 (revealing some methods
used by Israelis to effect demographic changes).
376. See COHEN, supra note 334, at 147.
377. MICHAEL WOLFFSOHN, ISRAEL: POLICY, SOCIETY, ECONOMY 1882-1986, at 17 (1987).
378. Matar, supra note 193, at 447.
379. Jackson Diehl, Settlers Assert Role ofIsrael in Nablus Rit WASH. POST, May 4, 1990, at A29,
A29-30.
380. Leon T. Hadar, The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the "Second Israeli Republic,"
46 MIDDLE E.J. 594, 604 (1992).
381. See id. at 604-05 (discussing U.S. actions and their implications in internal Israeli
politics).
382. You Take $10 Billion, I'll Take California, TIME, Aug. 24, 1992, at 12.
383. From July 13, 1992 to January 31, 1993, Israel confiscated 5303 dunums in the
territories. Interview with Peter Lems, Director, Palestine Human Rights Information Center
International, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2, 1993). Israel has reportedly used most of this land
for road building, although a recent practice has been to expropriate 100-meter swaths of land
around Jewish settlements against which there has been a Palestinian attack of some kind. Id.
Whether such measures are for purposes of security or are merely punitive is difficult to assess.
In October 1993, Palestinian landowners in an area adjacent to the West Bank city of Hebron
learned of an Israeli project to establish a quarry, requiring confiscation of 4526 dunums of their
land. Land Confiscation, HUM. RTS. UPDATE (Palestine Hum. Rts. Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C.),
Oct. 1993, at 17.
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization have, however, agreed to move toward
Palestinian self-rule. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-P.L.O. (on file with The American University Law Review). The Declaration
provides for Palestinian authority over the West Bank and Gaza Strip during a five-year
transitional period, during which time negotiations over the permanent status of those reasons
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the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrange-
ments on September 13, 1993, by the Government of Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization.
D. Methods of Land Acquisition
Although international law, in some senses, has constrained Israel's
efforts to gain land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupation
authorities have found ways to overcome this obstacle. International
law requires the occupying power to maintain the laws that were in
force on the eve of occupation."8 4 Israel used this principle as an
invitation to exploit the laws of Jordan, Mandate Palestine, and the
Ottoman Empire to advance its program of land acquisition.3
85
Where such laws have not sufficed to meet this end, Israel has issued
new laws and military orders to serve its purposes. 86
In the 1970s, for example, Israeli authorities used theJordanian law
of eminent domain8 7 to expropriate land for Jewish residence.
Since 1980, Israel has invoked that law to gain land for access roads
to settlements.' Israel amended the law through the promulgation
of military orders that eliminated the requirement of publication of
the intention to expropriate3 89 and transferred jurisdiction over
appeals against expropriation matters from the West Bank civil
courts390 to Israeli military "objections committees."3 9' Staffed by
will take place. Id. arts. V-VI, at 3-5. The precise structure and powers of the Palestinian
authority are themselves yet to be negotiated. Id. art. VII, at 5-6. Specifically exempted from
Palestinian jurisdiction, however, and left subject to further negotiation, are "Jerusalem,
settlements, military locations, and Israelis." Id. art. IV minutes, at 21. Article VII refers to
"independent Palestinian judicial organs" that will be created for the interim period, without
specifying their form orjurisdiction. Id. art. VII, at 5. It seems evident, therefore, that Israeli
authorities, including the Israeli Supreme Court, will continue to exercise considerable authority
in the Occupied Territories during the five-year interim period, if not permanently. This, of
course, assumes that an interim agreement on self-government is even implemented. As of the
time of publication, the initial phase of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza andJericho, due to begin
on December 13, 1993, had not yet started. Chris Hedges, Arafat Must Ask Wo's a Friend, Who's
an Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at A3.
384. See supra note 352 and accompanying text (discussing occupying powers' obligations
under Hague Peace Conference).
385. COON, supra note 334, at 40-42.
386. For instance, in annexed Jerusalem, the only legal means of expropriation of Arab lands
has been the Israeli law of compulsory acquisition for public purposes. COON, supra note 334,
at 162.
387. See COON, supra note 334, at 60-61 (showing that Israeli land acquisitions under
Jordanian eminent domain law have exceeded takings occurring under post-1967 Israeli law).
388. COON, supra note 334, at 160.
389. COON, supra note 334, at 162.
390. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 125-44 (explaining that West Bank'sJordan-created civil
courts resumed operations in West Bank after 1967 war, and have continued to function to
present day, although in altered form and with greatly truncated jurisdictions).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSiTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:467
Israeli army officers, objections committees initially defined ad hoc
rules of procedure and evidence.392 In 1984, in response to repeat-
ed allegations by Palestinian litigants of the injustices of the objections
committees' modes of operation, the committees promulgated their
formal codes of evidence and procedure.93
The military government has also claimed that the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations, 94 in force in all of Palestine on the eve
of the 1948 war, were never subsequently abrogated by Jordan in its
rule of the West Bank. 95 Israel thus claimed the right to enforce
the Regulations as part of its obligation to enforce the law in place at
the time of the occupation. 96 The Israeli Government wielded
Article 125 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations as a tool for land
acquisition in the Occupied Territories, just as it had done within
Israel itself.9 7  By 1984, Israel had converted an estimated 1.11
million dunums of land in the West Bank into restricted military
areas." 8 The Israelis "requisitioned" another 35,000 dunums for
military purposes by declaring, through unnumbered military orders,
that the land was required for essential military needs.' 9
In 1967, the occupation administration also promulgated local
391. SeeBISHARAT, supra note 257, at 126-27 (explaining that Military Order 1060 transferred
jurisdiction over certain land appeals); SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 87-91 (discussing how these
committees came to be tribunals to which Palestinian complainants were routed for wide range
of matters, including tax assessments, customs duties, registration of companies, appointments,
and pensions for civil servants).
392. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 140-41 (arguing that flexible procedural rules of
objections committees, while presented by Israel as more just than formal court rules, actually
produced unfair and arbitrary results).
393. See EYAL BENVENISTI, LEGAL DUALISM: THE ABSORPTION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
INTO ISRAEL 73 n.254 (1990) (noting that 1986 version of objection committees' rules were
different from earlier ones, which were never published).
394. See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text (discussing Defense (Emergency)
Regulations of 1945). These laws function as the "major portion of the local law dealing with
security offenses." COHEN, supra note 334, at 94.
395. COHEN, supra note 334, at 94. But see SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at xiv-xv (contending
that regulations were revoked by British, superseded by Jordanian law, and invalidated by
international law).
396. See Zvi Hadar, The Military Courts, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra
note 346, at 171-216 (reviewing military court and Supreme Courtjudgments upholding Israel's
claim that it is entitled to enforce Regulations).
397. See supra notes 254-79 and accompanying text (discussing Defense (Emergency)
Regulations).
398. MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF ISRAEL'S POLICIES 23
(1984). Such areas are used by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as firing ranges, training
grounds, and defensive positions facingJordan. Id. Land initially closed for military purposes
under Article 125 has been subsequently transferred to other agencies, particularly for
settlement purposes. See COON, supra note 334, at 164 (explaining that many of these lands
taken for "military training" are later given to preexisting settlements or used to create new
ones).
399. BENVENISTI, supra note 398, at 31.
534
LAND, LAW, AND LEGITIMACY IN ISRAEL
versions of the Absentee Property Law' in both the West Bank and
Gaza Strip."°  A subtle difference between the 1967 orders and
their legal progenitor in Israel enables the occupation administration
to continue using the Absentee Property Orders in the Occupied
Territories today. 2  While the Absentee Property Law in Israel
defined an absentee as one who had left certain regions before
September 1, 1948, o3 the newer military orders defined an absentee
as one who left the region "on or before the appointed date (June 7,
1967] or subsequently thereto." 4  Furthermore, the 1967 orders,
unlike the Absentee Property Law, allowed the seizure of land
belonging to Palestinians who were in a country not at war with
Israel." 5 Thus, by 1984, 430,000 dunums had passed under the
control of the Custodian for Abandoned Property in the West
Bank. °
Unlike in Israel, no laws have been enacted in the Occupied
Territories that affect the formal transfer of title to lands acquired in
the above-mentioned methods. In practice, of course, much of the
land has been put to uses that appear to be permanent, such as the
settlement of Israeli civilians. The formal legal status of these lands,
however, remains that of temporary military requisition, closure, or
vestment in the hands of the Custodian of Absentee Property. °7 In
a pair of 1979 decisions, the Israeli Supreme Court confirmed that
legally, Israeli control of land in the Occupied Territories is tempo-
rary.
1. The Beit El-Toubas case
The Beit El-Toubas case was actually the consolidation of two
400. See supra notes 233-53 and accompanying text (discussing Israel's promulgation of
regulations to standardize action taken by administration with regard to Arab property).
401. Military Order No. 58: Abandoned Property of Private Individuals Order, in Shamgar,
supra note 346, at 465-69. The Gaza version is identical but numbered differently.
402. See COON, supra note 334, at 163 (discussing ways in which "abandoned lands" continue
to be identified and appropriated).
403. Absentees' Property Law, § 1 (b), 4 L. ST. ISRAEL 5710 (1949-1950); see supra notes 234-42
and accompanying text (discussing Absentees' Property Law and setting forth law's language).
404. Military Order No. 58, supra note 401, at 465.
405. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 35. Israel, however, has not yet used this broad definition
in defining West Bank absentees. Id.
406. BENVENISTI, supra note 398, at 30. The occupation administration has been able to
identify more abandoned property due to legal and administrative regulations that require a
license from the Custodian of Absentee Property for all transactions in land. Upon registration
of title in the name of heirs to a deceased owner, for example, the Custodian will place any
share which devolves upon an "absentee" under his or her control. SHEHADEH, supra note 334,
at 36.
407. The exception is land, believed to be of small quantity, that has been legitimately
purchased by Israeli individuals or organizations in the Occupied Territories. The topic of
Israeli land purchases is treated infra notes 464-77 and accompanying text.
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separate cases that presented the Court with common legal issues.4"
In the first case, the petitioners, Palestinians who owned private lands
near the West Bank village of Beit El, initiated a suit when the military
government seized their land for purposes of Israeli civilian settle-
ment.' The lands in question, which were adjacent to an Israeli
(formerly Jordanian) army post, had been requisitioned in 1970 for
expansion of the military installation.41 ° In the summer of 1978,
however, the Government of Israel authorized Israeli civilian settlers
to enter and begin the construction of housing on the petitioners'
lands.4n
The second of the two consolidated cases involved agricultural land
in a sparsely populated area of the Jordan River Valley north of
Jericho, close to the village of Toubas.412 In 1975, the area com-
mander issued a seizure order, based on security needs, for the
petitioners' lands. 41 ' The owners did not learn of the order until
1978, when they attempted to enter the land to cultivate it and
discovered that it had been plowed by settlers of a nearby civilian
moshav. 414 The petitioners in both cases challenged the legality of
the military's conversion of land, seized on the pretext of military
needs, to civilian use, claiming that the seizure was motivated by
political, rather than military, concerns.
415
Although the Court rejected both petitions,416 it clarified several
previously disputed questions. The Court's decision, written byJustice
Alfred Witkon, noted that a state of belligerency existed between
Israel and the Arab countries, and that the status of the military
government vis-A-vis the occupied territory was that of an occupying
power.4' 7 As such, the Court concluded that the military govern-
408. The official titles of the cases were Ayoub v. Minister of Defense (Beit El), and Mattau'a
v. Minister ofDefense (Toubas). UnofficialEnglish Translation of theJudgment in HCJ606/78 and HCJ
610/78 [hereinafter HCJ].







416. Id. at 8, 14.
417. Id. at 4. The court stated:
Hitherto, we have discussed the question of the legality of the respondents' actions in
terms of the 'municipal' law, i.e., the military law operative in the occupied territory.
However, as we pointed out, the petitioners have based their petitions also (or even
mainly) on international law relating to the rights and duties of an occupying power
in occupied territory, on one hand and to the rights and duties of the populace, on
the other .... No one disputes that the petitioners are such protected persons,
according to the meaning of this term in international law.
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ment was bound to follow customary international law pertaining to
belligerent occupation, including the Hague Convention of 1907.418
According to Article 52 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, the occupying power is entitled to
temporarily "requisition" private lands only where justified by military
necessity.419  In return, the occupying power must make rental
payments to owners, whose formal title is thereby undisturbed. 20
In dismissing the petitioners' claims, the Court maintained its
traditional deference toward military authority in judgments relating
to security concerns 42' and found that the terms of the Hague
Convention had not been violated.422
2. The Elon Moreh case
The Elon Moreh case423 represents another instance where Israel
seized private land for "military purposes," and then turned the land
over to Israeli civilian settlers of the Gush Emunim.424 The petition-
ers, who sought the return of approximately thirty-one acres of land,
challenged the legality of the settlement on the grounds that
international law prohibited confiscation of private land for settlement
purposes.4' This case was different from prior similar cases because
it divided Israel's military establishment. 426  IDF Chief of Staff
Raphael Eitan supported the rationale that the settlement served
418. Id. at 6; see also Brigadier-General Benzion Farhy, Current Legal Trends in the Area
Administered by Israel, 113 MIL L.R. 47, 59 (1986) (noting that Israeli Supreme Court has
generally adhered to principle that occupation authorities are also subject to rule of Israeli
administrative law).
419. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, supra note 352, at 630.
420. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, supra note 352, at 630.
421. See HCJ, supra note 408, at 10 (detailing past and present Court policy of limiting
judicial intervention in military matters to very narrow circumstances).
422. HCJ, supra note 408, at 8. The decision also differentiated between customary
international law, which was held to be part of Israeli municipal law, and international treaty law,
which is not part of municipal law unless introduced to it by national legislation. Id. at 4-5. On
this basis, the Court held that the 1949 Geneva Conventions (of which Israel is a signatory),
while binding on the military government in the Occupied Territories, are not justiciable in
Israeli municipal courts. Rather, they are enforceable only as between the signatory states. Id.
at 5-7. The Israeli Government has claimed that it voluntarily observes the "humanitarian
provisions" of the Geneva Conventions. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 43. Ironically, a military
order issued in the earliest days of the occupation stipulated that military authorities would be
bound to conform to the Geneva Conventions. Id. Within five months, the provision was
repealed by another military order. Id.
423. Formally, the case is entitled Dweikat et al. v. The Government of Israel, reprinted in Ian
Lustick, Israel and the West Bank AfterElan Moreh: The Mechanics of De Facto Annexation, 35 MIDDLE
EJ. 557, 559 n. 5 (1981).
424. Id. at 600.
425. See LUSTICK, supra note 371, at 48.
426. See Lustick, supra note 423, at 560-61 (arguing that Israeli High Court of Justice used
disputes as impetus to deeply probe motivations in appropriating land in question).
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military interests, while Defense Minister Ezer Weizman disagreed.
2 7
With mixed signals emanating from the military, the Court was
forced to determine on its own whether the Elon Moreh settlement
had military value. It found that the military government's impetus
in establishing the settlement had come from the Gush Emunim,
whose paramount aim was not to assist the occupation army, but to
colonize the land in question.428 The Court based its conclusion,
in part, on the fact that the Gush Emunim justified the settlement
explicitly on ideological, as opposed to military, grounds.429 Accord-
ingly, the Court ordered the evacuation of the settlers and the
dismantling of all structures erected by them on the petitioners'
land.4"' In so doing, the Court also held that the Hague Conven-
tion barred the location of permanent settlements on land that had
been only temporarily requisitioned by the military.4"1
E. The "Redemption of State Land"
As a legal matter, these court decisions significantly undermined
the basis of Israel's settlement policy in the Occupied Territories.
Interestingly, the Court rendered these decisions at a time when the
Israeli Government, under the Likud administration of Menachem
Begin, most actively supported a program of settlement in the
Occupied Territories.4 2 Consequently, the Likud administration
expended considerable effort to elaborate a new legal basis for Israeli
settlement. In December 1979, the Israeli Cabinet decided to
increase funding for a comprehensive survey of the ownership and
registration status of all land in the West Bank.433 By the spring of
1980, the Cabinet and the Attorney General's office had investigated
a variety of legal alternatives that would have protected existingJewish
settlement in the Occupied Territories from court challenges and
permitted unencumbered future settlement.
43 4
427. Lustick, supra note 423, at 560-61.
428. See Lustick, supra note 423, at 561 (stating that Israeli Cabinet and Defense Ministry, as
well as Gush Emunim, sought to use settlement in furtherance of goal to achieve dominion over
Greater Israel).
429. See Lustick, supra note 423, at 561 (explaining that Court also based its decision on
vagueness of 'security' concerns and fact that military's justification came from International
Settlement Committee, not Defense Committee).
430. LuSTICK, supra note 371, at 48.
431. Lustick, supra note 423, at 561-62.
432. See supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text (explaining goals of Likud government
in Occupied Territories).
433. Lustick, supra note 423, at 568.
434. See Lustick, supra note 423, at 564-65 (detailing various legal methods considered and
rejected by Attorney General in Israel).
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The administration found a legal basis for Israeli settlement in the
indeterminacy of title to large portions of the West Bank . 35 Prior
to Israeli occupation, the Jordanian administration had worked
steadily but unhurriedly at a program of surveying and registering
land in the West Bank." 6 Thus, by the time of the Six-Day War in
June 1967, theJordanian authorities had settled title for approximate-
ly 37.5% of the West Bank.17 In 1979, the Israeli team began a new
survey, which revealed that private claims existed for a majority of the
populated hill country in the West Bank. 8 The Israelis concluded,
therefore, that their only option was to assert claims of state owner-
ship and to designate the land as "state land." '439
A category of "state land," in which the state held ultimate
ownership and possession did not exist under Ottoman law," and
was only introduced during the British Mandate period."1 The
Order-in-Council enacted by the British defined the category referred
to as "public lands" as "all lands in Palestine subject to the control of
the government" and those "which are or shall be acquired for the
public service or otherwise."" 2  It is clear that the British did not
intend for this definition to subsume the Ottoman category of miri
lands," 3 under which possessory rights (tasarruf) were granted to
individuals subject to a condition of cultivation."4  It is unclear
whether the British also intended to exclude categories of matruka
and mawat lands by the Order-in-Council definition." 5
Jordanian law, presumably the law that Israel was obligated to
enforce in the realm of land law, had also treated miri land as the
approximate equivalent of private property. 46 Undaunted, the
435. See Lustick, supra note 423, at 568-69 (listing disorganized document collections and
inefficiency of registry service as two reasons for indeterminate nature of West Bank titles).
436. Lustick, supra note 423, at 569.
437. Lustick, supra note 423, at 569.
438. See Lustick, supra note 423, at 569 (reporting estimates that approximately 88% of land
was privately owned by Arabs).
439. See Lustick, supra note 423, at 69-70 (explaining that Israel adopted policy of using
disorganization in land registry system to deny legal validity of many private claims).
440. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 24.
441. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 24.
442. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 24 (quoting Order-in-Counci 3 LAWS OF PALESTINE 2569
(1933)).
443. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 25 (noting British Mandate courts' interpretation of miri
category of land ownership as not falling within "state land" category).
444. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (explaining Ottoman Code's categories
of land ownership).
445. Cf. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 25 (claiming that Mandate state land law did not
encompass matruka and mawat categories).
446. This view was stated by Aziz Shehadeh, a lawyer whose practice spanned the British
Mandate, Jordanian rule, and Israeli occupation, in an affidavit in the "Tarqumiyeh case" in
1981:
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military government in mid-1980 began to issue an increasing number
of "declarations of state land" to Palestinian cultivators. 7 Initially,
the government made these declarations only with respect to land
that the land survey team had carefully scrutinized." 8  Eventually,
the government became less discriminating and, according to one
observer, issued more declarations of state land between mid-1979 and
early 1980 than it had in the preceding twelve years of occupa-
tion." 9 It became apparent, moreover, that the military government
intended to lay claim to all lands that fell within the Ottoman
categories of miri, matruka, and mawat.45°
The new tactic of "redeeming state land" required no legislative
innovation. Rather, Israel issued the declarations pursuant to a 1969
military order making the written declaration of the Custodian of
Government Properties that a particular parcel was "state land"
presumptively valid.451 Palestinian cultivators who wished to appeal a
declaration of state ownership for lands within their possession could
do so before one of the "objections committees."
45 2
Under the procedures followed by the objections committees,
petitioners had to file their appeal within twenty-one days of the
initial declaration, and had to submit within another twenty-four days
survey maps prepared by licensed surveyors for all claimed lands, as
well as documents that established proof of ownership. 4 3 The
[W]e arrive at the clear conclusion that miri land is not considered State land under
the laws prevailing in the West Bank which were applied during theJordanian period,
and that the ownership of the raqaba of miri land is a different matter, entirely separate
from and independent of the ownership of the right of possession and permanent
occupancy of such lands. The latter right is in reality an ownership right enabling the
owner to possess the land, build thereon, sell, mortgage, grant, or inherit the land or
exercise all forms of possession thereof. The ownership of the raqaba, on the other
hand, is an entirely theoretical ownership which does not give the government any real
or practical right in the land.
Affidavit of Aziz Shehadeh, al-Nazir v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria
Region (the "Tarqumiyeh case"), HCJ 285/81 (1981), reprinted in The Concept of State Land in the
Occupied Territories (Affidavit of Aziz Shehadeh), in II PALESTINE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 170-71 (1985). The affiant also pointed out that the Jordanian Government paid
compensation for expropriation of miri land. Id. at 171.
447. See SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 28 (discussing how Israel expropriated lands previously
considered miri, matruka, and mawat).
448. Lustick, supra note 423, at 571.
449. Lustick, supra note 423, at 571 (quoting Letter ("The Problem of West Bank Lands")
from Elias Khoury to the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Government, Ministry of Justice,
Jerusalem, Feb. 11, 1981, at 5).
450. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 28.
451. See SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 22 (explaining how Israeli Government used Military
Order No. 364 to facilitate land acquisition).
452. See supra note 391 and accompanying text (explaining mechanics of appeals before
objections committees).
453. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 30.
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committee has refused to accept tax receipts as sufficient proof of
ownership, although prescriptive rights have been recognized upon
demonstration of continuous cultivation for a period of ten years.454
The effect of the legal presumption in favor of state ownership and
of the procedures adopted by the objections committees has been to
shift the burdens of litigation to Palestinian claimants.455 These
burdens can prove substantial, in both a legal and a practical sense.
Many Palestinians have not cultivated their lands continuously;
instead, they havejoined the force of daily migrant laborers who work
in Israel.456 In addition, the costs of a professional survey, particu-
larly for a large plot, and for lawyers, can be exorbitant relative to the
average West Bank resident's income.'7
Finally, the objections committee is authorized to make only
non-binding "recommendations" to the military government.458 As
was the case earlier in Israel with the Custodian of Absentee Proper-
ty,459 transactions conducted "in good faith" by the Custodian of
Government Properties in the Occupied Territories will remain in
force when subsequently adjudged to have been incorrect.
46°
The program of "realizing state land" has permitted the continua-
tion of the military government's acquisition of lands for settlement
in the West Bank and Gaza without running afoul of the restrictions
imposed on it by the Israeli Supreme Court in the Elon Moreh case,
which pertained only to the seizure of private lands.461 Although
the military government presumably holds state lands in the Occupied
Territories in temporary trust for a future sovereign,462 no public
body exists in the Occupied Territories with the standing to challenge
actions of the military government that may be inconsistent with the
454. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 31.
455. This burden is particularly onerous because land acquisition decrees are frequently
conveyed informally with either poor accompanying documentation of their purported reach,
or orally, to village mukhtars (petty village officials). SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 214. These
procedures rely on regulations passed in 1987. Id. The mukhtars, appointed by the Israeli
military government, are frequently on bad terms with fellow villagers. As a result, the decrees
are often delayed in reaching affected owners, and in some instances, never reach the owners
at all. Id.
456. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 31.
457. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 31.
458. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 28.
459. SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 35.
460. SeeSHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 31 (describing author's experience as practicing lawyer
in West Bank town of Ramallah, where he handled case of client whose land was proven to have
been wrongly designated as "absentee" property, but was nonetheless not returned).
461. Lustick, supra note 423, at 571-72.
462. See SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 27 (noting that Military Order No. 59, which gives
Israel control of state lands, intends return of lands at end of occupation).
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temporary nature of that trust." Moreover, the presumption in
favor of state ownership and the sufficiency of the procedures of the
objections committees have received the endorsement of the Israeli
Supreme Court.' Thus, avenues to contest "redemptions of state
land" have become effectively sealed.
E Private Israeli Land Purchases in the Occupied Territories
The purchase of land by private Israeli land development compa-
nies and individuals has received less attention than direct state
acquisition of land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In 1967, the
Israeli Government authorized theJNF and the Israel Lands Adminis-
tration to purchase land in the Occupied Territories." Initially, it
barred purchases by Israeli individuals in order to avoid land
speculation and attendant price increases.
TheJNF followed the practice of buying land through its subsidiary
land development company, Hamnuta, which in turn would deal
either directly with Arab vendors or with Jewish middlemen.6 7 In
a manner reminiscent of the Mandate period,46 a counterpart
group of Arab land brokers developed as well. Despite the prohibi-
tion on individual purchases and the requirement of government
licensure for all transactions in land, hundreds of unlawful purchases
apparently were made, some by Jewish and Palestinian brokers acting
as intermediaries for Hamnuta.469
In 1979, the Military Commander of the West Bank lifted the
prohibition on individual purchases in the Occupied Territories.470
Since that time, lawyers defending Palestinian landowners have made
myriad allegations that Jewish land brokers and Palestinian middle-
men used forged documents purporting to convey the landowners'
interests in land.47' The lawyers also allege the use of trickery or
463. See supra note 458 and accompanying text (explaining that objections committees can
only make recommendation to military, not issue legal orders).
464. See al-Nazir v. Military Commander of the Judea & Samaria Region (1981) (unofficial
English translation of HCJ 285/81) (rejecting claim that insufficient due process in taking of
land constituted violation of owners' rights to contest taking of land).
465. COHEN, supra note 334, at 154.
466. COHEN, supra note 334, at 155 (detailing fines and imprisonment for Israeli nationals
and companies purchasing land in Occupied Territories).
467. COHEN, supra note 334, at 154.
468. See supra note 121 (describing role of Arab middlemen in Mandate period).
469. See COHEN, supra note 334, at 156 (describing Jordanian laws passed after 1967 that
imposed death penalty onjordanian citizens, which included Palestinian residents ofWest Bank,
who sold land to Israelis).
470. See SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 39.
471. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 127; see also COHEN, supra note 334, at 155-56 (reporting
that, in 1977, 10jewish land brokers were revealed to have coerced Arab landowners at gunpoint
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physical intimidation; these tactics are designed to induce Palestinian
landowners to sign documents in Hebrew that grant irrevocable
powers of attorney and authorize conveyance of their land.472
Whether intentional or not, certain procedural and administrative
changes introduced by the occupation administration may have
facilitated these transactions. The West Bank civil courts' jurisdiction
in disputes involving registration of previously unregistered lands, for
example, was removed, and placed under the purview of a military
objections committee.47 The West Bankjudiciary's lack of indepen-
dence474 and the weakness of the civilian police force are also
contributing factors in this situation.4'
Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak suggests that the occupation
administration may have introduced its policy of permitting private
land purchases as a means of boosting the fortunes of the Herut Party
(the major partner in the Likud Bloc):
Since many poor Arab landlords could not resist the magic appeal
of money, the situation created vast opportunities for astute
businessmen who could maneuver among anonymous sellers,
shadowy documents, and encouraging authorities. The issues at
stake were attractive suburban lands bordering on the Green Line
[the former border between Israel and the Occupied Territories],
thirty minutes from Tel Aviv orJerusalem. And the developers who
were ready to help Herut, were promised quick governmental
approval of the only official license needed, a positive resolution by
the settlement committee of the government. By the time the
to sign sales documents and that land gained was then sold to Hamnuta at great profit); COON,
supra note 334, at 163 (describing case of blind Palestinian woman who rented 150 hectares
(approximately 1650 dunums) to neighbor, who, in turn, unwittingly conveyed power of attorney
to collaborator). In the case described by Coon, the collaborator sold the land to an Israeli
company, which used a document purporting to bear the woman owner's fingerprint to register
a sale of roughly four times the amount of land involved in the rental. Id. The woman's lawyer
succeeded in convincing an objections committee that the document was a forgery, but the
committee decided that because the woman admitted signing some document, this document
must have authorized the sale of her property, and thus denied her appeal. Id.
472. See COON, supra note 334, at 163 (describing case of blind Palestinian woman discussed
supra note 338).
473. See SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 87-91 (discussing objections committee's wide-ranging
jurisdictional power). Amendments to the procedures in 1987 also permitted in camera hearings
for disputes over land registration "for reasons relating to the security of the Israeli Defence
Forces or the security of the public." Id. at 214. Shehadeh states that these amendments make
the objections committee's decisions "even more problematic" from the standpoint of fairness.
Id. Other military orders prolonged the validity of irrevocable powers of attorney for land
conveyancing five years underJordanian law, to ten years, and then later to fifteen years. Id. at
40. In addition, the orders authorized Israeli notaries to authenticate signatures on these
instruments. Id.
474. See ISHARAT, supra note 257, at 128 (explaining that since 1967, West Bankjudges have
been appointed by committees of Israeli military officers).
475. See BISMAAT, supra note 257, at 128, 133 (citing interviews with Palestinian lawyers).
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whole land issue was exposed, it was learned that under Herut's
ideological umbrella of settling Eretz Israel, a big industry had
emerged. The promise of large sums of money drove many
"idealists" to forge documents, cheat poor Arab peasants out of
their land, improperly sell unavailable lots to prospective settlers
and advertise the operation as a great Zionist project.47
The total amount of land in the Occupied Territories acquired by
private land purchase is not known, but it is believed to be relatively
limited.4 " It is certain, therefore, that the greatest share of trans-
ferred lands were those placed under state control by the operation
of the various laws described above.47 It is possible that expropria-
tion and military requisitions will again become the dominant modes
of Israeli land acquisition in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the
quantity of lands capable of being declared "state" lands diminishes.
VI. LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN A COLONIAL SOCIETY
Israel has devoted considerable energy and resources to construct-
ing a legal regime for its acquisition of Palestinian lands. This Article
contends that the legitimization of the acquisition of Palestinian lands
in the eyes of the Palestinians was not the goal of the Israeli land laws.
While the land laws have had the greatest impact on the Palestinians,
they were not the subjects to whom the laws were addressed. Rather,
Israel addressed these laws to the international community, and
perhaps more fundamentally, to the Jewish Israeli public itself.
A. Land Expropriations and the Palestinians
Land expropriations, both in Israel and the Occupied Territories,
have caused great hostility toward the government and significant
unrest among the Palestinians living under Israeli rule.4 79 The first
"Day of the Land" was declared on March 30, 1976, in protest of an
476. Ehud Sprinzak, llegalism in Israeli Political Culture: Theoretical and Historical Footnotes to
the Pollard Affair and the Shin Bet Cover Up, 47 JERUSALEM Q. 77, 93 (1988).
477. See SHEHADEH, supra note 334, at 39 (citing difficulties in establishing precise amount
of private land purchase because of military restrictions, but estimating that it is "small
percentage" of settled land).
478. See MERON BENVENIsTT, THE WEST BANK DATA BANK PROJECT, 1986 REPORT:
DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, SoctAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK 26-
32 (1986) (describing total amount of land seized by three basic methods of Israeli land con-
trol-expropriation of ownership, seizure of possession, and restriction on use).
479. Seegenerally LILYWEISSBROD, ARAB RELATIONS WrrHJEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND ISRAEL 1891-
1991: THE HUNDRED YEAR'S CONFLICT (1992) (detailing Palestinian resistance to Jewish
settlement from before establishment of Israel up to present day Intifada).
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expropriation decree affecting land in the district of Galilee. 41'
Thousands of Palestinian Arab residents of Israel participated in
demonstrations throughout the region; attempts by the military to
repress the protests resulted in the shooting deaths of six Arabs.'48
Since 1976, the "Day of the Land" has become an annual event and
has developed into perhaps the most important rallying occasion for
the Arab community in Israel." 2 As Professor David Kretzmer
maintains: "The issue of land expropriation is possibly the most
painful in the relationship between the Arabs in Israel and the Jewish
state. It is an issue that has caused tremendous resentment and
bitterness among Israeli Arabs and has galvanized them into political
action."483 This observation is no less true in the Occupied Territo-
ries, where Palestinians believe that Israeli land acquisitions are part
of an explicit design to permanently disable their plans for national
self-determination.484
In spite of this kind of Palestinian protest, one should not conclude
that a less-mediated application of force would have reached the same
end. While the Palestinians greatly resent the Israeli legal regime,
which is the cause of cynicism rather than legitimacy among Palestin-
ians, it may have engendered less resistance-or less violent resis-
tance-than any other potential mode of land acquisition. The
success rate of legal challenges to the government's land-control
policies may have been low,4' but even a narrow ray of hope has
been sufficient to draw a number of Palestinian landowners into
litigation to defend their claims.486
480. See Israeli Troops KillPalestinian Protester, Reuters, Mar. 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuters File (describing "Land Day" as marking 1976 killings of six Arabs during
protests against land expropriation within Israel).
481. Id.
482. SeeStephen Franklin, Israel FearsArab Unity on Day oftheLand, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1988,
at C6 (describing Arab support for annual "Day of the Land" protest).
483. KRETzMER, supra note 28, at 50-51.
484. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 143 (citing views of lawyers and public in West Bank).
485. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (discussing outcome of petitions filed with
Israeli Supreme Court).
486. See Shamir, supra note 360, at 65 (observing that cases filed in Israeli Supreme Court
from Occupied Territories have increased in face of rather abysmal rate of success, and
suggesting that Palestinians' decisions to litigate cannot be fully grasped from instrumental
perspective). Shamir says a "consummatory" perspective is needed: "The [High Court of
Justice] became a central arena for dispute processing despite its inability to provide petitioners
with concrete remedies.... The mere ability to be heard sufficed to inspire a growing number
of people to choose legal action." Id. While this point should be appreciated, it seems Shamir
underestimates the lengths, even to the point of probable futility, to which Palestinian owners
will go to protect their lands. After all, owners realize that they confront probable permanent
loss of the land to any Palestinian use. Shamir also may overlook the role that others may play
in convincing landowners to mount legal resistance to an expropriation order. A vignette
demonstrating this process is offered in BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 3-5 (recounting agency
worker's role in persuading Palestinian peasant farmer to seek legal redress for physical assault
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As a result of this litigation by Palestinian landowners, a minor
industry of sorts has emerged that employs lawyers, surveyors, and
other professionals who work to defend Palestinian landowners from
expropriations, principally in the Occupied Territories. 7  This
group is almost uniformly nationalist in outlook, and, seeing its work
as an aspect of the Palestinian national struggle, is also strongly and
vocally critical of the Israeli legal system as it pertains to Palestinian
interests. 4 8 At the same time, the lawyers and their auxiliaries are
committed to critiquing and contesting Israeli power in legal
terms.489 One should not doubt this group's fervent commitment
to nationalist ideals, despite the fact that its material interests are
bound up with the pursuit of a non-violent form of struggle.4 °
One may only speculate as to what form this group's resistance
efforts might take, or the effect that its absolute denunciation of the
legal system under Israeli rule might have, were the legal avenues not
open before it, no matter how discouraging they might be. The social
and seizure of land by Jewish settlers).
487. See generally BISHARAT, supra note 257 (detailing role of Palestinian lawyers in West
Bank).
488. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 145 (describing West Bank lawyers as "vanguard of
nationalist opposition to foreign rule"). Perhaps the most prominent of these individuals is Raja
Shehadeh, who has written prolifically in English on matters related to law and the Occupied
Territories. Shehadeh was a co-founder of al-Haqq (formerly Law in the Service of Man), a
human rights organization founded in Ramallah (a town in the West Bank) in 1979. That
organization has produced a bevy of books and pamphlets on the legal status of the territories
in both English and Arabic. Many are listed in Diana Vincent-Davis, The Occupied Territories and
International Law: A Research Guide, 21 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & PoL 575, 605 (1989).
489. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 169 (describing role of lawyers in resistance effort).
It should be mentioned that some lawyers in this group have been accused by Israeli authorities
of being members of "hostile organizations" that are committed to the use of violence against
Israel. Gaza lawyer Raja Sourani, for example, has repeatedly been placed under house arrest,
or in prison, on the accusation that he is a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine. MICHAEL POSNER, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DETENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS AND LAWYERS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND
CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AT KETZIOT 59 (1988).
490. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 13 (describing Arab states as source of legal funds used
to bolster Occupied Territory residents against Israeli pressure). In the late 1970s and early
1980s, the Arab states provided material support with the amwaal as-sumud ("Steadfastness
Funds") in an effort to promote the sumud, or "steadfastness," of the residents of the Occupied
Territories against perceived pressures from Israel to drive them out of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. Id. AJointJordanian-PLO Committee (al-lajna al-mushtaraka) administered disbursements
from the funds. Id. It was common knowledge among Palestinians that individuals faced with
land expropriation decrees (and relatives of those facing political or security charges in the
Israeli military courts) were able to obtain full reimbursement for legal fees from the Joint
Committee by traveling to Amman and presenting receipts. Id. For a number of years, the
lawyers were able to charge clients far higher fees than they otherwise would have been able to
afford, and some prospered by this method. Id. The amwaal as-sumud dried up in the mid-1980s
as the world oil glut depleted the treasuries of the oil-producing Arab states, the prime
contributors to the fund. Id. at 181 n.23.
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authority of the legal profession,491 and others surrounding it,
exceeds its proportions in numbers.492  The leadership it provides
may carry even more weight when the alternatives to the legal struggle
constitute a step along the road to the potentially greater sacrifices of
violent resistance.49
Meanwhile, litigation serves as a kind of "shock absorber" for the
occupation authorities. The moral outrage of expropriated owners
and their families, greatest in the initial stage, may be diffused in the
course of lengthy lawsuits. Tangible and intangible community
resources-money, time, ingenuity, expertise, emotional energy-are
thus expended in a less threatening form of resistance that is more
easily contained by Israeli authorities.
Of course, the toll exacted by litigation also draws resources away
from other productive activities, not simply other potential modes of
resistance. The countless hours spent in travel from rural sites of land
expropriations to lawyers' offices in the towns and cities are hours not
spent tending crops and livestock. The money invested in surveys and
lawyers fees is money not invested in modernized irrigation systems or
college tuition." 4
It is conceivable, but unlikely, that the effects described above
express a conscious aim of Israeli policy. It is more likely that the
effects are incidental to policies consciously motivated and directed
by other concerns. Hence, there must be alternative explanations for
Israel's legally oriented approach to land acquisition.
B. Israel's Image and the International Community
Many indicators show that Israel is highly sensitive to its image in
the international community and is eager to maintain a reputation as
a democratic nation that venerates and adheres to the ideals of the
rule of law. Israel, for example, waged a protracted and ultimately
successful campaign to reverse the "Zionism is racism" resolution
491. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 168-69 (describing West Bank lawyers'
disproportionately large role in leading nonviolent resistance movement).
492. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 88 (noting that there were only 165 working lawyers
and 250 striking lawyers in 1984-85).
493. See BISHARAT, supra note 257, at 169 (noting irony that lawyers who act as nonviolent
resistors may help Israeli Government).
494. This discussion of the adverse effects of Palestinian litigation in the Occupied Territories
does not constitute a judgment that Palestinians in Israel or the Occupied Territories should
refrain from engaging in legal struggle to defend individuals or groups. In order to make such
a determination, a somewhat more complex balancing of considerations is necessary. This
author has endeavored to do so in George E. Bisharat, Courting Justice? Legitimation in
Lawyering against Israeli Occupation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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passed by the UN General Assembly in 1975."'5 The resolution bore
no practical implications, but was, in a sense, all about image. 9 In
the late 1970s, the Israeli Government established the Human Rights
Division of the Ministry of Justice, primarily to respond to inquiries
from abroad concerning allegations of Israeli human rights viola-
tions.497
There is a substantial body of justificatory literature in English-
language legal periodicals and monographs by Israeli professors and
administrators.49 In 1980, Law in the Service of Man, a Palestinian
human rights organization affiliated with the International Commis-
sion of Jurists, published a study, with a preface by Commission
Secretary-General Niall McDermott, that sharply criticized the Israeli
legal administration in the West Bank. 99 Within a year, a study
nearly identical in binding and outward appearance (but not
authorized by the mother organization) appeared with a foreword
from Haim Cohen, Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court and Chair-
man of the Israel National Section of the International Commission
of Jurists, who stated, in a clear reference to the Palestinian work:
The Israel National Section of the International Commission of
Jurists submits this study to the international legal community,
trusting that the discerning eye and the analytical mind of the
lawyer, trained in the ascertainment and evaluation of facts, will
easily differentiate between a tractatus politicus and a sober
statement of law and fact. Not that a political pamphlet has no
justification, especially if it is overtly presented as such and does not
purport to pose as what it is not; but lawyers, as distinguished from
politicians, are hardly in the habit of contenting themselves too
495. G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2400th plen. mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3379 (1975) (voting 75 to 35, with 32 abstentions, that zionism is form of racism).
496. SeeJohn M. Goshko, U.N. Repeals Resolution Linking Zionism to Racism, WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 1991, atAl (describing U.N. General Assembly's 111 to 25 vote with 13 abstentions to repeal
1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism); see also Avi BECKER, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
ISRAEL: FROM RECOGNITION TO REPREHENSION 55-64 (1988) (describing 1975 U.N. debate and
vote on Zionism is racism resolution).
497. See Weiner, supra note 359, at 201 (explaining that Human Rights Division was
established to respond to inquiries by Amnesty International, news media, lawyers' groups,
academics, and private individuals). The office, along with a parallel agency in the Foreign
Ministry, coordinates its work with legal advisors of the IDF, the General Security Service, the
Prisons Service, and various police agencies. Id. at 202.
498. See, e.g., ISRAEL: THE "INTIFADA" AND THE RULE OF LAW (Colonel David Yahav etal. eds.,
1993); Blum, supra note 346 (defending Israel's role in Occupied Territories); Farhy, supra note
418 (detailing Israeli military's perspective on its role in administering West Bank and Gaza
Strip); Shamgar, supra note 346 (presenting collections of works on legal aspects of Israeli
military government in Occupied Territories); Vincent-Davis, supra note 488, at 575-663
(presenting bibliography of works addressing civil rights in Occupied Territories).
499. SHEHADEH & KuTrAB, supra note 348 (describing and criticizing West Bank legal
system).
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easily with what at best amounts to political argument, unsupported
by evidence and by authority.5"
Zionist awareness of international opinion concerning the specific
issue of land acquisition was evident in a statement, made prior to the
establishment of Israel, by Abraham Granovsky, later to become the
first director of the Land Development Authority:
It is hardly necessary to stress the point, that expropriation of land
without adequate compensation, which would clearly be nothing
but dispossession pure and simple, must be ruled out for many
political and economic reasons. Such expropriation would be the
equivalent of forcible transfer of land from the possession of one
people in the Jewish State to another. Not only would such a
measure be unjust in itself, it would be apt to give rise to serious
complications within the state itself and in its relations with
neighboring countries, and eventually endanger the existence of
our state. Expropriation is, therefore, out of the question as being
in every respect a revolutionary change.501
One may take a cynical view of Israel's concern for its international
image as a democratic nation-that its solicitude for human rights
and attention to legality are motivated by no more than a preoccupa-
tion with public relations. 2 This argument is supported by Israel's
heavy reliance on foreign aid, particularly from Western democratic
nations, and more particularly from the United States." 3 Indeed,
from 1948 to 1990, direct foreign aid expenditures from the United
States to Israel have totaled approximately $47.5 billion.
50 4
500. ISRAEL NATIONAL SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note
359, at xii.
501. GRANovsKY, supra note 162, at 27.
502. See Negbi, supra note 361, at 27 (stating that most members of Israeli press and political
establishment only address human rights when foreign bodies such as United States, United
Nations, and Amnesty International force it on them as "public relations" problem).
503. SeeYash Ghai, The Rule of Law, Legitimacy, and Governance, 14 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 179,194-96
(1986) (pointing out, in reference to several East African states, that attention to legality may
owe more to concerns about continuity of financial and other aid from foreign benefactor than
to desire to win consent of governed).
504. SeeJoel Bainerman, Can Foreign Aid Help Israel?,J. COM.,June 21, 1991, at 4A (describing
history of U.S. aid to Israel and potentially damaging effects on Israeli economy). During the
Bush administration, the United States gave Israel $3 billion annually. U.S. House Cuts Foreign
Aid By $1.3 Billion; Israel Aid Maintained, UPI, June 25, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Kr-finews
File. Israel has also benefited from substantial transfers of private aid, generally in the form of
voluntary donations from Jews across the world. See, e.g., Sue Fishkott, New Sales Tactic: Pitching
Peace to U.S. Donors, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 8, 1993, at 7 (describing fundraising efforts of one
U.S.Jewish group for resettlement of RussianJews in Israel at more than $800 million over three
years); Galit Lipkis, Brazilian Magnate's Visit Stirs Businessmn's Hopes, JERUSALEM POST,June 14,
1991, at 5 (profiling BrazilianJewish millionaire Edmundo Safdie, who donates estimated 10%
of his accumulated profits to Jewish communities worldwide). This hints that a more nuanced
examination of the "international community" as it pertains to Israel (distinguishing between
states, international organizations, private bodies, and the like) is possible. Such an examination
does not seem necessary for this Article, however, as most of Israel's audiences abroad are
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Ultimately, however, the cynical view is unconvincing. First, and
perhaps most critically, Israel frequently has ignored international
opinion, not to mention law, in circumstances in which it believes its
actions are necessary to preserve important national interests. The
December 1992 deportations of more than 400 Palestinians from the
Occupied Territories to Lebanon, 50 5 a move that provoked a storm
of international opprobrium and censure by the United Nations,
5°6
is only a more recent example of this tendency. The seemingly
inexorable march of Israeli settlement activity in the Occupied
Territories since 1967, against constant international condemnation,
is another.
507
The last example, moreover, serves as a reminder that until former
President Bush momentarily suspended loan guarantees to Israel in
1991, '08 Israel had enjoyed a virtually uninterrupted flow of foreign
assistance from the United States.5 9  United States aid flowed
despite practices that, from the perspective of the international
community, are patently illegal." ' Israeli fear of the suspension of
Western and democratic in orientation, and would be similarly, if not equally, disturbed were
Israel to dispense with attentions to legality.
505. See Clyde Haberman, Israel Expels 400 From Occupied Lands: Lebanese Deploy to Bar Entry
of Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at Al (describing government expulsion order backed
by Israeli's Supreme Court).
506. S.C. Res. 799, U.N. SCOR, 47 Sess., 3151st mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/799 (1992)
(strongly condemning deportation and demanding that Israel ensure safe and immediate return
of deportees to Occupied Territories).
507. SeeJohn M. Goshko & Helen Dewar, Israeli Loan Guarantees Appear Doomed; Bush Refuses
to Drop Linkage to Freeze on Jewish Settlements, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1992, at Al (describing
President Bush's indication to Senators that he would veto loan guarantees); Ann Devroy, Bush
Agrees to Support Israeli Loan Guarantees; He and Rabin Press for Resolution of Details, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 1992, at Al (describing meeting between Bush and Rabin, and agreement on $10
billion loan guarantees).
508. See supra note 507 (describing suspension of loan guarantees to Israel).
509. See supra note 504 (describing U.S. foreign aid to Israel).
510. See RobertJ. Caldwell, Israel's Choice: Loan Guarantees or More Settlements, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 1, 1992, at C5 (stating that settlements have been regarded as illegal under
international law); see also COHEN, supra note 334, at 159-60 (citing U.S. State Department view
that settlements are illegal). But see COHEN, supra note 334, at 159-60 (citing opposing view that
occupation and settlements are not contrary to international law). The conventional wisdom
among U.S. policymakers for a number of years was that pressuring Israel in anyway to comply
with U.S. demands (particularly demands to cease settlement activity in the Occupied
Territories) would create a "circling the wagons" effect, and a more obdurate Israeli political
leadership. It is also probable that Israel's power to defy U.S. and international opinion has
varied over time, according, in part, to Israel's perceived value as a "strategic asset" to the United
States. Indeed, during the Cold War years (and under the presidency of Ronald Reagan),
Israel's strategic value was at its peak. See BERNARD REICH, THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL:
INFLUENCE IN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 89 (1984) (quoting President Reagan's Secretary of
State Alexander Halg, who described Israel as strategic asset whose "very existence serves to deter
Soviet aggression"). With the end of the Cold War, that value has declined, and so, one might
expect, has Israel's freedom to flout U.S. opinion. See supra text accompanying note 380
(describing President Bush's opposition to loan guarantees without Israeli guarantee of freeze
on settlements in Occupied Territories).
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aid for most of the period since 1948 cannot, therefore, completely
explain its legalistic approach to land acquisitions.
A discussion of Israel's concern for its international image should
include non-instrumental considerations. Indeed, it is more convinc-
ing to argue that Israeli politicians, administrators, legal academics,
and others view themselves as members of the community of
democratic nations, and that this self-perception has independent
force and value apart from any instrumental aims it may serve."'
This sense of belonging to the international democratic community
emanated from the same ideological perspective that motivated
domestic policy. As Granovsky demonstrated, Israel's concern to
legitimate its program of land acquisition internationally was
inseparable from its concerns to do the same domestically.- 2
C. Land Expropriations and the Constraints of Democracy
Despite some deterioration in recent years, public opinion surveys
indicate that the majority of Israelis support the generalized principles
of law-abiding democracy.5 3 The commitment to democratic
legality is a legacy of the Zionist movement's roots as a struggle for
the liberation of an oppressed group.514  The persistence of this
commitment is evident, for example, in Israel's willingness in 1967 to
extend the jurisdiction of the Israeli Supreme Court to the Occupied
Territories,515 and in the activities of organizations such as the
Israeli Civil Rights Association and BTselem in defense of Palestinian
human and civil rights.516  The momentous demonstration of
511. The production of English-language periodicals in Israel, such as the Israel Law Review,
the Tel Aviv University Studies in Law, and the Israel Yearbook for Human Rights, provides
evidence that Israeli legal academics, at least, view themselves as participants in a broader
Western discourse about law and democracy.
512. See supra note 501 and accompanying text (predicting problems withinjewish State and
in relations with neighbors if Palestinian land was to be expropriated).
513. SeeYOHANAN PERES & EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YAAR, TRENDS IN ISRAELI DEMOCRAC: THE
PUBUC'S VIEw 41-43 (1991) (presenting results of three-year survey on Israeli public's views on
democracy).
514. Professor David Kretzmer writes:
In spite of their particularistic perspective, the political elite were committed to turning
Israel into a modern democracy. Conscious as they were of the fate of Diaspora Jews
as persecuted minorities in many countries of the dispersion, they realized that the
state of the Jews could do no less than promise full equality to all its citizens, Jew and
non-Jew alike.
KRETzMER, supra note 28, at 3-4.
515. SeeNegbi, supra note 359, at 37 (describing role of Supreme CourtJustice Meir Shamgar
in extending Court's jurisdiction to Occupied Territories). Political considerations, however,
also suggested such a course. Id.
516. The Israeli Civil Rights Association (ICRA) might be likened to the American Civil
Liberties Union, concerned with such issues as freedom of speech and privacy rights. SeeJudy
Siegel-Itzkovich, Top U.S. Expert: Beware Israeli Epidemic of AIDS and Hepatitis B Spread by Medics
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400,000 Israelis-nearly a tenth of the Israeli population at the
time-in Tel Aviv in the fall of 1982 evidenced the popular roots of
this commitment. 17  The citizens were protesting the Israeli
Cabinet's initial decision not to establish a commission of inquiry into
the Israeli role in the massacres of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians
in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon.518
Government sensitivity to public perception influenced the form by
which Israel established control over appropriated lands. These forms
were, it seems, consciously designed to obfuscate their true purpose:
"The Development Authority Law was based on a kind of legal fiction.
It was not desired to transfer the abandoned land to Government
ownership, as this would be interpreted as confiscation of the
abandoned property. . . . It was necessary to find a means of
disposing of the property legally."'519
The Israelis disguised dispossession of the Palestinians from public
view through a variety of other techniques as well. For example, in
a fashion reminiscent of the French in Algeria, Israel has exploited
conditions of legal pluralism.. in its rule over the Occupied Territo-
ries. 1 The Israelis gleaned all legal methods of land appropriation
from all possible sources of substantive law 22 and facilitated their
enforcement by displacing local court jurisdiction with military
Killer-disease Time-bomb, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis LibraryJPost
File (citing ICRA's support for abortion rights). The more recently founded B'Tselem is devoted
exclusively to the defense of human rights in the Occupied Territories. See David Forman, We
Can't Afford to Take a Moral Vacation, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, JPost File (describing B Tselem as "human rights watch group").
517. See Herb Keinon, Settlers Vow to Continue Protests Over Rabin's Security Policies, JERUSALEM
POST, Oct. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPost file (citing 1982 protest as example
of demonstration changing government policy).
518. Id.; see also ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 265 (describing attacks on Sabra
and Shatila, and subsequent resignation of Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon).
519. ABRAHAM GRANOTr, THE LAND SYSTEM IN PALESrINE 102 (1952); see supra notes 233-53
and accompanying text (discussing decision concerning definition of "absentee" in Israel's
Absentee Property Law).
520. In this context, "legal pluralism" describes the co-existence of a plurality of systems of
substantive law and occasionally of legal institutions.
521. In colonial societies, some of the laws and legal institutions are of indigenous origin and
others are colonial accretions. SeeHOOKER, supranote 115, at 209 (describing relation of French
civil law and Islamic law in colonial Algeria). The manipulation of resulting alternatives has at
times formed an important part of the strategy of colonial rule. Id.; see also Ruedy, supra note
5, at 103 (stating that, in Algeria, it appeared "that when Muslim law could be used to further
the aims of the state, it was upheld, but that when the contrary effect was implied, it was ignored
or suppressed").
522. From 1948 to 1967, an Egyptian military administration ruled the Gaza strip according
to Palestinian mandatory law and Egyptian military regulations. See Carol Farhi, On the Legal
Status of the Gaza Strip, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, supra note 346, at 74-83
(stating that Israel has applied multiplicity of substantive laws in Occupied Territories, including
Ottoman, British mandatory, Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian law).
[Vol. 43:467
LAND, LAW, AND LEGrrIMAcY IN ISRAEL
administrative tribunals. 23
The military government's pattern of choices between potential
sources of substantive law suggests a preference for reliance on those
pre-dating Israeli rule. Prior to 1979, the principal vehicles for Israeli
land acquisition in the West Bank had been the Jordanian law of
eminent domain and military requisitioning under articles of the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations. 24 The military government has
claimed that these laws remained in effect from their initiation during
the Mandate through the period of Jordanian administration.
25
After the Beit E1-Toubas5 26 and Elon Moreh5 27 cases, the military
government resorted to Ottoman land categories and the "realization
of state lands" to continue land acquisition.5 2' The decision to do
so came after the military government considered and rejected other
alternatives, such as legislation explicitly authorizing Israeli civilian
settlement in all of the "Land of Israel" (including the Occupied
Territories), or legislation withdrawing the jurisdiction of the Israeli
High Court over land-seizure complaints arising from the Occupied
Territories.5"
The Israeli authorities may have gained several advantages in their
efforts to gain land in a politically and legally legitimate fashion by
their use of preexisting sources of law. First, it obviated the need for
new legislation, and thus avoided the appearance of an affirmative
movement on the part of the authorities to achieve its goals. Second,
conducting itself "in native terms" permitted the authorities to
represent their actions as no different from, and no less just than, the
practices of prior rulers, to which the Palestinian population was
presumably accustomed and so reconciled.5"
523. See supra note 473 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for disputes over land
registration).
524. See supra note 387 and accompanying text (discussing Jordanian law of eminent
domain); supra notes 394-97 and accompanying text (discussing military government's use of
Defense (Emergency) Regulations).
525. See supra notes 394-96 (discussing military governments treatment of Defense
(Emergency) Regulations).
526. Ayyub v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 606/78, 610/78 (1979) (holding West Bank
inhabitants to be "protected persons" under Hague Convention); see also supra note 408 and
accompanying text (discussing Ayyub case in detail).
527. Dweikatv. Government of Israel, HCJ 390/79 (1979) (holding government did not have
valid security reasons for seizing 31 acres of Palestinian land and passing it to Jewish settlers);
see also supra note 423 and accompanying text (discussing Dweikat case in detail).
528. LusricK, supra note 371, at 569-73 (describing new government process for securing
land for settlers in wake of Elon Moreh decision).
529. LusTIcK, supra note 371, at 564 (listing various legal formulas considered bygovernment
in effort to secure land for settlers after Elon Moreh decision).
530. Cf. Saltman, supra note 223, at 393-94 (explaining that Israel used Defense (Emergency)
Regulations in effort to use practices of prior rulers); see supra note 115 (discussing parallels to
French Algeria). It is interesting to consider Israel's treatment of miri lands as state domain in
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Finally, it is important to note that the goal of extinguishing
"absentee" Palestinians' ownership of lands in Israel was accomplished
incrementally. First, Israel established government "custodianship"
over these lands;53' it then gradually transformed "custodianship"
into full ownership.3 2 The transformation occurred through the
awkward mechanisms of paper transactions between state and
quasi-governmental national institutions, such as the Jewish National
Fund, over a five-year period from 1948 to 1953.53
This process clearly reflects the evolution of Israeli policy from
initial uncertainty about the future disposition of the Palestinian
refugees' properties to hardening conviction not to permit the
refugees to return.5 34 To have done otherwise would have resulted
in the loss of an historic opportunity to substantially advance the goal
of gaining land forJewish settlement. But the gradual Israeli termina-
tion of Palestinian ownership rights and the simple time lapse
between seizure and perfection of state title also functioned to lull
public attention from the implications of the laws in question. The
offer of compensation for expropriated lands gave further legal color
to government actions5" That the compensation may have been
inadequate, or unwanted, was probably little known to most Israelis,
and, in any case, may not have evoked their sympathy.
5 3 1
Most of the laws and policy measures reviewed in this Article had
the Occupied Territories in light of a statement by the putative owner of that land during the
late Ottoman period, namely the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II himself:
I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me but to my people. They
have won this empire and have fertilized it with their blood .... The Turkish people
own the Turkish Empire not I. I dispose of no part of it. The Jews may spare their
millions. When my Empire is divided, perhaps they will get Palestine for nothing. But
only our corpse can be divided. I will not consent to vivisection.
THE DIARIES OF THEODOR HERZL 152 (Marvin Lowenthal ed. & trans., 1956). The statement was
made to Theodor Herzl's aide in 1896 to discourage further Zionist colonization efforts. Id.
531. See supra notes 233-53 and accompanying text (describing use of Absentee Property Law
to give government custody over Palestinian lands).
532. See supra notes 280-303 and accompanying text (describing use ofvarious laws to transfer
to Israelis ownership of Palestinian lands in government custody).
533. See supra note 282-86 and accompanying text (discussing establishment of authority to
receive and transfer land and noting that Jewish National Fund enjoyed right of first offer of
land up for sale).
534. See PERErz, supra note 180, at 141-42 (describing evolution of Israel's absentee property
policy).
535. See supra notes 300-03 and accompanying text (describing compensation system and its
weaknesses).
536. Israel's willingness to compensate expropriated owners and strong resistance to
returning the land to Palestinian owners is reminiscent of the policy of the U.S. Government
toward Native American land claims. See Wilcomb Washburn, Land Claims in the Mainstr.am of
Indian/White Land History, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA, supra note 5, at 22. The Israeli position
is not surprising considering the relative ease of monetary compensation and the potential
political explosiveness of returning land to indigenous owners, a step that would require the
dislodging of settlers and their descendants.
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genuine administrative rationales other than the simple seizure of
Palestinian lands. 37 To satisfy themselves and the public at large,
administrators could refer to these other rationales and reframe the
dispossession of Palestinians as an incidental effect, rather than an
intended aim, of official actions.
D. Limitations of Legal Justifications
It is important not to overestimate the role that laws played in
legitimating the seizure of Palestinian lands. As in other colonial
contexts, an objective interest verging on necessity was the underpin-
ning of the laws effecting transfers of lands to Israeli control. 8
What originated as a general objective interest of the Zionist
movement and a condition of its viability was transformed into the
concrete interests of the particular individual settlers who occupied
formerly Palestinian-owned lands. One Israeli, who as a young soldier
expelled members of a Negev Bedouin encampment in 1948,
described the widespread seizures of land and movable property by
stating: "Whether public or private, the looting constituted an
additional, covert motive for the [expulsion] process ... since it
forged groups which had a material interest, either beforehand or
post factum, in the expulsion of the Arab population." '539
General ideological and political ideas also played a major role in
rationalizing land acquisition. As previously discussed, the war of
1948, and probably the war of 1967, provided justification for the
seizure of much Palestinian land.14' Although the results may
suggest otherwise, Israeli society indisputably viewed these wars as
537. See COHEN, supra note 334, at 155 (describing function of decree obliging government
licensure for land transactions in Occupied Territories as permitting military government to
ascertain that all such transactions are undertaken at free will of parties involved). The
Absentee Property Law addressed the genuine administrative problem of how to standardize
practice in regard to actual abandoned properties. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
Even in strict legal terms, its sweep was somewhat broader, however, permitting the assertion of
state control over the lands of many who were in fact present within the areas under Israeli rule.
See supra note 242 and accompanying text. The broad sweep of the law was most evident in the
clauses permitting appropriation of lands belonging to citizens of the Arab states that declared
war on Israel in 1948, irrespective of the person's presence or absence from Israeli-held areas,
and without regard to the shares of lands and businesses that were held by joint owners, some
of whom were not "absentees." See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
538. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing European colonialists' use of law
to take land from indigenous populations and to meet settlement necessities of their own
peoples).
539. Ephraim Kleiman, Khirbet Khis'ah and Other Unpleasant Memoies, 40JERUsAL.EM Q. 102,
110 (1986).
540. See supra notes 194, 331-34 and accompanying text (describing Israeli land acquisition
in aftermath of 1948 and 1967 wars).
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defensive struggles for its very survival.54' The sense of
embattlement has abated only very slowly, as Israel's regional military
superiority has grown, but will no doubt persist at some level as long
as Israel's relations with the neighboring Arab states remain fraught
with hostility and mutual suspicion.54 The sense of embattlement
has resulted in an unusual degree of social authority for the mili-
tary-as well as an inviolability of so-called "security" interests-in a
society that in other important respects is democratically oriented.
Hence the land-transfer laws implemented in Israel and in the
Occupied Territories complement the ideas and images of a more
general ideological and political character that Israel employs to
rationalize its actions in this realm. It is doubtful that a legalistic style
by itself could have legitimated ends that were not broadly felt to be
just and crucial to the success of the Zionist enterprise.
A second, though related qualification is that Israel's commitments
to democracy and the rule of law are not its only ideological values.
There are other, at times conflicting, commitments and tendencies
within Israeli political culture that are of equal, if not superior,
strength. The fundamental commitment of Zionism to the creation
and maintenance of a Jewish state is the most important of these
other commitments:
On the one hand, the new state was politically and legally commit-
ted to the standard legal and moral norms of secular western
democracy, and accountable in these terms to enlightened world
public opinion as institutionalized in the Charter of the United
Nations Organization. On the other hand, the original driving
force underlying the effort of political Zionism since its establish-
ment was to attempt to establish in Palestine a state that would be
as "Jewish" as England is "English.""
It is clear that the commitment of Zionism to the creation of a Jewish
state and its universalist, democratic, and legal commitments have
conflicted, and that in the confrontation, the former commitment has
often prevailed.5"
541. SeeYitzhak Rabin, Foreword toYONA COHEN,JERUSALEM UNDER SIEGE 9 (1982) (recalling
war of 1948 as part of Israel's continual fight for its existence); Stephen J. Roth, Introduction to
THE IMPACr OF THE SIX-DAY WAR xvi-xvii (Stephen J. Roth ed., 1988) (noting Israelis' fear of
extinction, particularly during 1967 war).
542. Other processes are at work, as well. For example, a recent phenomenon has been the
receding image of the Holocaust. See Amy D. Marcus, Turning A Page: As Holocaust Memoy
Fades, Israel Faces Difficult Transition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1993, at Al (describing lesser role of
Holocaust in younger Israel's national identity).
543. DAvis, supra note 27, at 21.
544. See Shamir, supra note 223, at 59 ("The differential treatment of Arabs andJews (on the
freedom of speech issue in Israel] corresponds to Israel's dominant political ideology that asserts
that Israel is, first and foremost, ajewish state. The ideological commitment to Jewish rule is
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Some observers of Israeli society and political culture detect,
coexistent with commitments to legality, a strong behavioral tendency
toward illegal behavior among Israeli political leaders that "far
exceeds the normal and expected sphere of disrespect for the legal
norms in a democracy."545 This tendency reflects a prevalent
attitude in Israeli political culture that is characterized by "an
instrumental orientation toward the legal order and a conviction that
democracy can work without strict adherence to the law."546  The
attitude has roots in the Jewish ghetto experience in Europe, where
survival included an elaborate system of using and eluding the law,
and grew in the bakshish (bribery) culture of the Ottoman Em-
pire. 47 It further developed during the British Mandate, when it
was, for the Zionists, "prestigious to cheat on the British and to
engage in 'illegal' settlement, 'illegal' defense, and 'illegal' immigra-
superior to other social commitments, including democratic standards."). Zionism's paramount
commitment to the creation of a Jewish state is most apparent in the religious and political
right, where law and Zionist interests can be conflated. The strength of this commitment is
illustrated in responses by Shlomo Geren ("G"), former chief rabbi of the Israeli army, to
questions from a representative of the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz ("H"):
H: But isn't torture of prisoners against the law?
G: How so? [A] ny law that serves the interests of the people of Israel is a good law.
A law that's contrary to the interests of the people doesn't exist as far as I'm
concerned.
BTselem, The Wrong Arm of the Law: Torture Disclosed and Deflected in Israeli Politics, TIKKUN,
Sept./Oct. 1991, at 13, 14, 86. Similar comments came from Limor Linyat ("L"), a member of
the Likud Central Committee:
H: Do you agree that the Right has an image problem if it appears that it doesn't put
human rights at the top of its concerns?
L: The Right concentrates on the rights of the Jews. We established this state in
order to safeguard our rights. The right to live in security, for instance. I don't suggest
that we should trample on others' rights, but one must call a spade a spade: Zionism
and rights don't always go hand-in-hand. The very establishment of this state is an
affront to the Arabs' rights. Arabs lived inJaffa. They didn't leave; they were expelled.
We went into the villages and said "Get out." And they got out. Yes, it's important for
me and others that this state be a democratic one, but you still have to consider the
difference between ourselves and the other countries and remember that democracy
is not a value in itself but an instrument. Zionism takes precedence over everything.
If a group like BTselem had been around when Israel was established, a Jewish state
would not have come into being.
Id. These priorities were similar to those of colonial America.
[T]he Puritan authorities sincerely thought they were doing their best to achieve
various and often contradictory objectives simultaneously. the welfare of the Indians,
the interest of the white settlers, and the well-being and integrity of the colony. When
the objectives came actually to conflict and contradict, however, the priority was clear
the security of the colony first, the welfare of the settlers second, and the benefit of the
Indians last.
KAWASHIMA, supra note 21, at 237.
545. Sprinzak, supra note 476, at 79.
546. Sprinzak, supra note 476, at 79.
547. Sprinzak, supra note 476, at 81.
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tion." "
Again, the legalistic approach could not have succeeded in
justifying measures that were not in confluence with surrounding
sentiments, commitments, and interests. Law, however, may only
effectively legitimate political authority for those who enjoy its fruits.
CONCLUSION
Within its own borders and in the Occupied Territories, Israel faced
a contradiction between its democratic image and the need for
undemocratic actions imposed by a structural dilemma. This
"dilemma" was the need, more or less pressing according to circum-
stances, to obtain land for Jewish settlement in a country that was
overwhelmingly owned by others as late as 1948, the year of Israel's
creation.549 Ultimately, Israel "finessed" this dilemma by interposing
a complex legal regime.
Israel's dilemma was "structural" in that it was a challenge intrinsic
to the project of settling an inhabited land, and as such has been
confronted by most colonial powers.55° Of course, the practical
problem of gaining land for settlement was a "dilemma" only insofar
as the colonizing power's ideology placed constraints on its freedom
in dealing with the native population:
Israel, as ajewish state, could not have become viable economically
and politically, without the expropriation of Arab lands. Any
totalitarian state would have had no problems in this respect and
would have ruthlessly legislated on this issue. But by means of
emergency powers, Israel could maintain a self-image of democracy
both for its Jewish citizens and for the outside world, while at the
same time it could selectively infringe upon the elementary civil
rights of its Arab citizens.55'
548. Sprinzak, supra note 476, at 94 (describing formation of Israeli leaders' political
psychology in 1940s Palestine). Moshe Negbi, legal correspondent for the Tel Aviv-based
Hebrew daily newspaper Hadasho4 opines that a majority of Israeli leaders harbor formalistic and
simplistic concepts of democracy and the rule of law. Negbi, supra note 361, at 19. According
to Negbi, current Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, who was defense minister during much of the
Intifada, has a standard reply to questions regarding human rights in the occupied territories:
"It is all legal, everything is done according to law." Id. Negbi asks why Rabin does not address
the "obligatory additional questions: What kind of law is it? Is it a law which is fit or permissible
for a democratic country to enact and enforce?" Id.
549. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (describing relatively small concentrations
ofJews in pre-1948 Palestine and Zionist leaders' realization that acquisition of land base would
be essential to creation of state of Israel).
550. See supra note 5 (describing history of European nations acquiring and settling on land
belonging to indigenous populations).
551. Saltman, supra note 223, at 393.
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While Israel's response to this dilemma has unique aspects, 552 the
numerous parallels with other colonial societies reinforce the
conclusion that the dilemma is recurrent, and the modes of its
resolution somewhat regular.
553
In the case of Israel and the Occupied Territories, the Israeli
Government has averted potential collisions between the objective
interest in gaining land and the limits on state actions imposed by
democratic ideology because it has always found a legal mode to
continue land acquisition. The complexities of substantive and
procedural laws and the layers of legal institutions that accomplished
the transfer of Palestinian lands had the effect of screening this
process from the Israeli public's scrutiny. Although, strictly speaking,
this screen was not impenetrable, it was sufficient to obstruct the
vision of all but the most diligent observer. With their general
ideological and political ideas supporting land acquisition and their
objective personal interests to defend, the Jewish Israeli public was
disinclined to recognize the dispossession of Palestinian landowners
for what it was. And having moved the Palestinians to the social and
political margin, Israel prevented the Palestinians from forcing the
issue of the alienation of their lands upon the consciousness of the
politically relevant segments of the Israeli public.
This Article began with a description of some widely held assump-
tions about the role of law in engendering the legitimacy of states and
standing social orders.554 One of these assumptions holds that law
and legal institutions in Western, class-based societies serve to protect
the interests of dominant elites by legitimating the dominant elites'
role in society by causing that dominance to appear natural, and even
just, to disenfranchised classes and groups. This assumption is
premised on another, sometimes unstated assumption: that the
dominant group would be hard pressed to rule without the consent
of the dominated.
In the description of Israel's actions to gain control over Palestinian
lands, this Article has shown one circumstance in which a fundamen-
tal imbalance of internal power vastly favoring the dominant group
has almost mooted the need for consent among those upon whom
the laws have their primary negative impact. The legalistic orientation
552. Several factors make Israel's response unique: the special ideological characteristics of
Zionism, the particular history of the country, the possibilities for maneuver afforded by local
law, and the forms of indigenous land tenure.
553. See supra note 5 (describing similar use of law in previous colonial societies).
554. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (noting extensive scholarship on role of law
and legal institutions in conferring legitimacy on system in which they operate).
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of a dominant group in this situation is explicable primarily by
reference to its needs for internal cohesion and morale.
On reflection, it appears that most studies attempting to link law to
legitimacy simply infer from the "quiescence" of dominated classes
and groups that law "must be working" to legitimate the social and
political order.555 This Article has attempted to show at an admit-
tedly rudimentary level another way in which law may work to effect
quiescence: by defusing resistance, channeling it into a manageable
path, and vesting "counter elites" with interests in following those
paths rather than others. This version does not posit the existence
either of a conniving dominant group or of a dominated group so
duped and mystified as to be incapable of recognizing its own
oppression.
What little is currently known about the quality of the observed
quiescence in Western societies seems entirely consistent with the case
of the Palestinians living under Israeli domination. 56 Among some
marginal groups at least, it seems appropriate to ask whether
underlying this quiescence is an enthusiastic, willing compliance with
a state and social order seen as "legitimate," or a begrudging and
resentful submission to forces that are effectively impossible to
resist. 57  Further empirical study of this question may well reveal
that law in its legitimating function may be effective only among those
proximate to the centers of social and political power.558  The
555. See Hyde, supra note 2, at 383 (citing THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
(1935); CHARLES BLACK,JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 34
(1960) as examples of authors making unsubstantiated functionalist assumptions about law and
legitimacy); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Robert Dahl, Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
556. See Sarat, supra note 9, at 377. Sarat writes:
My research indicates that the welfare poor frequently contest what are often thought
of as the key legitimating symbols of law, in particular the association of law with
neutrality, disinterestedness, rule determinacy and rights. They are not "taken in" by
those symbols, and, like others with continuous, regular contact with law, they have a
realistic, if not cynical view. They have complex and sophisticated views of the
bureaucratic and social relations that obtain between welfare workers and legal services
lawyers.
Id.
557. Cf JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE
28-37 (1985) (arguing that peasant compliance with standing social order is reflection of sense
of its inevitability rather than its legitimacy and that subtle forms of peasant resistance signify
incompleteness of ruling groups ideological hegemony).
558. Professor Sidley Harring makes a similar point with respect to the exportation of British
criminal procedures to British colonies: "Still, the motions, and warrants, and preliminary
hearings must have given comfort to the British and created a belief in the legitimacy of their
process. It cannot have mattered at all to the native people." Sidley L. Harring, 'Pease Send Six
Copies of the Penal Code": British Colonial Law in Selangor, 1874-1880, 19 INT'LJ. SOC. L. 193, 193-
94, 204 (1991); see also NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE ET AL., THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY THESIS 7-29
(1980) (making similar argument respecting role of ideology generally in British society).
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effectiveness may diminish, however, as the law radiates "outward" in
the direction of socially and culturally marginal groups in the society,
or "downward" in the direction of less powerful social classes. 59 If
this re-ordering of perspective deprives legal academics and others of
the cloak of the "Great De-mystifiers, the bringers of true conscious-
ness to the befuddled masses," this, after all, would be salutary.
Perhaps it is only us who have been so blind, and have needed
awakening, to the nakedness of imperial power.
559. This trend may be particularly true of postmodern societies transformed by mass
movements of peoples due to wars, natural disasters, development projects, labor migration, and
other factors, and thus characterized by unprecedented culttral diversity. See Akhil Gupta &
James Ferguson, Beyond "Culture: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference, CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 6, 9-13 (1992) (theorizing that changing concepts of space require reevaluation
of meaning of culture). While some of the studies on law and legitimacy select particular venues
and historical periods (typically the United States or England in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries) within which to situate their discussions, see, e.g., Jay M. Feinman & Peter Gabel,
Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 375-85 (David Kairys
ed., 1982) (focusing on contract law in eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries and
concluding that contract law legitimated oppressive social conditions); Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education as Trainingfor Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 38-58 (concentrating on law
school environment as indoctrination into current social hierarchy), others speak more broadly
about the topic in the context of an abstract "modem society." See generally UNGER, supra note
2, at 47-103 (creating model of relationship between law and society by surveying western
societies rather than focusing on specific country); Sol Piciotto, The Theoiy of the State, Class
Struggle and the Rule of Law, in MARISM AND LAW, supra note 2, at 169-79 (analyzing legal
relations as part of social relations with legal development intertwined with social change); Colin
Sumner, TheIdeological Nature of Law, in MARXISM AND LAW, supra note 2, at 255-61 (defining law
as product of collective consensus of population). Few studies explicitly consider any form of
social division beyond class. In particular, they almost never discuss ethnic or national diversity
within a single polity. Genovese, in his discussion of the pre-Emancipation American South, sees
a partial exception to the rule. See GENOVESE, supra note 2, at 25-49 (concentrating on law and
hegemony as it applied to black slave class).

